Online research in philosophy

Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another by virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.

The „Paradox of the Concept Horse" arises on the assumption of the Reference Principle: that co-referential expressions should be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. Accordingly no singular term can co-refer with an unsaturated expression. The paper outlines a number of desiderata for a satisfactory response to the problem and argues that recent treatments by Dummett and Wiggins fall short by their lights. It is then pointed out that a more consistent perception of the requirements (...) of the Reference Principle leads not to the Paradox but to the result that Frege had no business extending the notion of Bedeutung to unsaturated expressions in the first place. Rather the relation between, e.g., predicates and the entities that comprise the range of higher-order logical variables must be logically unlike that between singular terms and their referents; the way is therefore opened for singular terms to refer to entities of the former kind after all. The Concept Horse is a concept (and a Fregean object too.). (shrink)

Born of the mysteries of dawn, they ponder on how, between the tenth and the twelfth stroke of the clock, the day could present a face so pure, so radiant, so joyfully transfigured—they seek the philosophy of the morning.On January 3, 1889, Nietzsche writes to Meta von Salis that "[t]he world is transfigured, for God is on the earth" (KSB 8). The next day, he writes to Peter Gast: "Sing me a new song, the world is transfigured and all (...) the skies rejoice" (KSB 8: letter to Köselitz, 4 January 1889). He signs both letters as "The Crucified." Of the thirteen letters he writes on January 4, six are signed similarly; all the others are signed "Dionysus" (see KSB 8: letters, 4 January 1889).The letter to Gast draws from .. (shrink)

We present tableau systems and sequent calculi for the intuitionistic analoguesIK, ID, IT, IKB, IKDB, IB, IK4, IKD4, IS4, IKB4, IK5, IKD5, IK45, IKD45 andIS5 of the normal classical modal logics. We provide soundness and completeness theorems with respect to the models of intuitionistic logic enriched by a modal accessibility relation, as proposed by G. Fischer Servi. We then show the disjunction property forIK, ID, IT, IKB, IKDB, IB, IK4, IKD4, IS4, IKB4, IK5, IK45 andIS5. We also investigate the relationship (...) of these logics with some other intuitionistic modal logics proposed in the literature. (shrink)

In this paper we address the problem of combining a logic with nonmonotonic modal logic. In particular we study the intuitionistic case. We start from a formal analysis of the notion of intuitionistic consistency via the sequent calculus. The epistemic operator M is interpreted as the consistency operator of intuitionistic logic by introducing intuitionistic stable sets. On the basis of a bimodal structure we also provide a semantics for intuitionistic stable sets.

Since the earliest formalisation of default logic by Reiter many contributions to this appealing approach to nonmonotonic reasoning have been given. The different formalisations are here presented in a general framework that gathers the basic notions, concepts and constructions underlying default logic. Our view is to interpret defaults as special rules that impose a restriction on the juxtaposition of monotonic Hubert-style proofs of a given logicL. We propose to describe default logic as a logic where the juxtaposition of default proofs (...) is subordinate to a restriction condition . Hence a default logic is a pair (L, ) where properties of the logic , like compactness, can be interpreted through the restriction condition . Different default systems are then given a common characterization through a specific condition on the logicL. We also prove cumulativity for any default logic (L, ) by slightly modifying the notion of default proof. We extend, in fact, the language ofL in a way close to that followed by Brewka in the formulation of his cumulative default system. Finally we show the existence of infinitely many intermediary default logics, depending on and called linear logics, which lie between Reiter's and ukaszewicz' versions of default logic. (shrink)

The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...) not un- controversial that emotional experiences are always intentional. John Searle, for exam- ple, remarks, AMany conscious states are not Intentional, e.g., a sudden sense of elation . . .@ (1983, p. 2). Moreover, many animals experience emotions and it is natural to sup- pose that such emotions lack the sophistication of beliefs or thoughts. When a dog ex- periences delight in seeing its master after an absence of several days, the suggestion that at least part of the dog=s experience of delight is a belief (or thought) that its master has returned home seems to import into the experience something that at best is associ- ated with it and perhaps is not really a state to which the dog is subject at all. And even in the case of human beings, emotional experience often does not seem to involve thought. Consider the experience of disgust, to take one obvious example.1 Nor is a sali- ent belief required. One may have a strong fear of spiders and yet not believe that spi- ders typically pose any risk to humans. But if emotional experiences need not involve beliefs or thoughts, then just how are they intentional?2.. (shrink)

We have been witnessing more than two hundred years of successful formation and spread of the nation-state. As a historical reminder, let me quote great French historian of the nineteenth century, Jules Michelet; in spite of its somewhat sentimental tone, his view on the unification of France is typical of what any nationalist would like to say about the successful creation of an ethno-national state: "This unification of France, this destruction of parochial spirit is often considered as the simple result (...) of the conquest of provinces. But a conquest can glue together, chain together the hostile parts, never unite them: the conquest and the war have only opened provinces to each other, and has given to isolated populations an opportunity to meet each other; the quick and lively sympathy of Gallic genius, its social instinct, has done the rest of the work. What a strange event! These provinces, of differing climate, customs and language have understood each other, fallen in love with each other, felt solidarity towards each other….”(Michelet, Histoire de la france, t. III; 1844, Histoire de la France, Anthologized in Saly et. al.1996, p. 115) Saly, P., Gerard, A., Gervais, C. and Rey, M.P., “Nations et nationalismes en Europe 1848-1914., my translation)" Contemporary sociologists express similar thoughts in a different rhetorical garb. They stress the advantages of nation-forming along ethnonational lines. By offering to people a culture in languag(es) they actually spoke, by encouragement of the formation of more local elites, directly in contact with their electorate, and by promoting capitalist mode of production it has enabled the massive democratization. As many sociologists , prominently Anderson and Gellner, have pointed out, democracy and nationalism go together.. (shrink)