Search results for 'First Person' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..score: 240.0
    In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.score: 240.0
    Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). First-Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (9):1-16.score: 240.0
    First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be allowed to use private evidence. I argue that both views rest on a false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Neil Campbell Manson (2002). What Does Language Tell Us About Consciousness? First-Person Mental Discourse and Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.score: 240.0
    The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2008). First-Person Thought and the Use of 'I'. Synthese 163 (2):145 - 156.score: 240.0
    The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Friederike Moltmann (2012). Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content. Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177.score: 240.0
    In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought and I propose an account that will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Carl Ginsburg (2005). First-Person Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.score: 240.0
    The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Josep Corbí (2011). Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View. Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.score: 240.0
    In Values and the Reflective Point of View (2006), Robert Dunn defends a certain expressivist view about evaluative beliefs from which some implications about self-knowledge are explicitly derived. He thus distinguishes between an observational and a deliberative attitude towards oneself, so that the latter involves a purely first-person point of view that gives rise to an especially authoritative, but wholly non-observational, kind of self-knowledge. Even though I sympathize with many aspects of Dunn's approach to evaluative beliefs and also (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Uljana Feest (forthcoming). Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data. Philosophy of Science.score: 240.0
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Richard N. Manning (2013). Sellarsian Behaviorism, Davidsonian Interpretivism, and First Person Authority. [REVIEW] Philosophia 42 (2):1-24.score: 240.0
    Roughly, behaviorist accounts of self-knowledge hold that first persons acquire knowledge of their own minds in just the same way other persons do: by means of behavioral evidence. One obvious problem for such accounts is that the fail to explain the great asymmetry between the authority of first person as opposed to other person attributions of thoughts and other mental states and events. Another is that the means of acquisition seems so different: other persons must infer (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. J. P. M. A. Maes & A. R. Van Gool (2008). Misattribution of Agency in Schizophrenia: An Exploration of Historical First-Person Accounts. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):191-202.score: 240.0
    This paper provides a concise description and discussion of bottom–up and top–down approaches to misattribution of agency in schizophrenia. It explores if first-person accounts of passivity phenomena can provide support for one of these approaches. The focus is on excerpts in which the writers specifically examine their experiences of external influence. None of the accounts provides arguments that fit easily with only one of the possible approaches, which is in line with current attempts to theoretical integration.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Friederike Moltmann (2006). Generic 'One', Arbitrary PRO, and the First Person. Natural Language Semantics 14 (3):257–281.score: 240.0
    The generic pronoun 'one' (or its empty counterpart, arbitrary PRO) exhibits a range of properties that show a special connection to the first person, or rather the relevant intentional agent (speaker, addressee, or described agent). The paper argues that generic 'one' involves generic quantification in which the predicate is applied to a given entity ‘as if’ to the relevant agent himself. This is best understood in terms of simulation, a central notion in some recent developments in the philosophy (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Descartes and First Person Authority. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (2):181-189.score: 240.0
    Although Descartes apparently needs first person authority for his anti-skeptical project, his scattered remarks on it appear to be inconsistent. Why did he neglect this issue? According to E M Aurley, Descartes was answering Pyrrhonian skeptics, who could not consistently challenge him on it. This paper argues instead that Descartes assumed that his first person premises were certain qua clear and distinct perceptions, leaving first person authority a side issue.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Martin F. Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.score: 240.0
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. [deleted]Kalina Christoff Kieran C. R. Fox, Savannah Nijeboer, Elizaveta Solomonova, G. William Domhoff (2013). Dreaming as Mind Wandering: Evidence From Functional Neuroimaging and First-Person Content Reports. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 240.0
    Isolated reports have long suggested a similarity in content and thought processes across mind wandering (MW) during waking, and dream mentation during sleep. This overlap has encouraged speculation that both ‘daydreaming’ and dreaming may engage similar brain mechanisms. To explore this possibility, we systematically examined published first-person experiential reports of MW and dreaming and found many similarities: in both states, content is largely audiovisual and emotional, follows loose narratives tinged with fantasy, is strongly related to current concerns, draws (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Bjorn Merker (2013). The Efference Cascade, Consciousness, and its Self: Naturalizing the First Person Pivot of Action Control. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 240.0
    The 20 billion neurons of the neocortex have a mere hundred thousand motor neurons by which to express cortical contents in overt behavior. Implemented through a staggered cortical "efference cascade" originating in the descending axons of layer 5 pyramidal cells throughout the neocortical expanse, this steep convergence accomplishes final integration for action of cortical information through a system of interconnected subcortical way stations. Coherent and effective action control requires the inclusion of a continually updated joint "global best estimate" of current (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. [deleted]Kieran C. Fox, Savannah Nijeboer, Elizaveta Solomonova, G. William Domhoff & Kalina Christoff (2013). Dreaming as Mind Wandering: Evidence From Functional Neuroimaging and First-Person Content Reports. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 240.0
    Isolated reports have long suggested a similarity in content and thought processes across mind wandering (MW) during waking, and dream mentation during sleep. This overlap has encouraged speculation that both ‘daydreaming’ and dreaming may engage similar brain mechanisms. To explore this possibility, we systematically examined published first-person experiential reports of MW and dreaming and found many similarities: in both states, content is largely audiovisual and emotional, follows loose narratives tinged with fantasy, is strongly related to current concerns, draws (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Martin Francisco Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.score: 240.0
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Expressing First-Person Authority. Philosophical Studies:1-23.score: 234.0
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-based (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. N. Georgalis (2006). Representation and the First-Person Perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.score: 216.0
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Geoffrey C. Madell (2003). Materialism and the First Person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 123-139.score: 212.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Saul A. Kripke (2011). The First Person. In , Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.score: 210.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Colin McGinn (2004). Inverted First-Person Authority. The Monist 87 (2):237-254.score: 210.0
  24. Steven Gross (2012). Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.score: 210.0
    Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jane Heal (2001). On First-Person Authority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.score: 210.0
  26. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.score: 210.0
  27. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The First Person: Error Through Misidentification, the Split Between Speaker's and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.score: 210.0
  28. Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.score: 210.0
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. J. Petranker (2003). Inhabiting Conscious Experience: Engaged Objectivity in the First-Person Study of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):3-23.score: 210.0
  30. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 323.score: 210.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Josep E. Corbí (2011). Observation, Character, and A Purely First-Person Point of View. Acta Analytica 26 (4):311-328.score: 210.0
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Andreas Kemmerling (2012). First Person Authority Without Glamorous Self-Knowledge. In Löffler Jäger (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement – Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium.score: 210.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Attempted Inroads From the First Person Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):219-248.score: 210.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Pär Sundström (1999). Psychological Phenomena and First-Person Perspectives: Critical Discussions of Some Arguments in Philosophy of Mind. Acta University Umensis.score: 210.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Patrick Stokes (2014). Crossing the Bridge: The First-Person and Time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):295-312.score: 184.0
    Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David J. Chalmers, The First Person and Third Person Views (Part I).score: 180.0
    Intro to what "first person" and "third person" mean. (outline the probs of the first person) (convenience of third person vs absoluteness of first person) (explain terminology) Dominance of third person, reasons. (embarassment with first person) (division of reactions) (natural selection - those who can make the most noise) (analogy with behaviourism) Reductionism, hard line and soft line Appropriation of first person terms by reductionists.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David J. Chalmers (1999). First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Consciousness Bulletin.score: 180.0
    As I see it, the science of consciousness is all about relating _third-person data_ - about brain processes, behavior, environmental interaction, and the like - to _first-person data_ about conscious experience. I take it for granted that there are first-person data. It's a manifest fact about our minds that there is something it is like to be us - that we have subjective experiences - and that these subjective experiences are quite different at different times. Our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.score: 180.0
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks:285--306.score: 180.0
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be (...)
    Direct download (16 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In , Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 285--306.score: 180.0
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Social Externalism and First-Person Authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.score: 180.0
    Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with (...)-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”. (shrink)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 180.0
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Dilip Ninan (2009). Persistence and the First-Person Perspective. Philosophical Review 118 (4):425--464.score: 180.0
    When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are "further facts," over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the (...)-person point of view is a guide to centered possibility , a type of possibility analyzed in terms of centered worlds. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this? (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). “Tätigsein Und Die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the First-Person Perspective). In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag.score: 180.0
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. William J. Rapaport (2000). How to Pass a Turing Test: Syntactic Semantics, Natural-Language Understanding, and First-Person Cognition. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9 (4):467-490.score: 180.0
    I advocate a theory of syntactic semantics as a way of understanding how computers can think (and how the Chinese-Room-Argument objection to the Turing Test can be overcome): (1) Semantics, considered as the study of relations between symbols and meanings, can be turned into syntax – a study of relations among symbols (including meanings) – and hence syntax (i.e., symbol manipulation) can suffice for the semantical enterprise (contra Searle). (2) Semantics, considered as the process of understanding one domain (by modeling (...)
    Direct download (17 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.score: 180.0
    To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Anna Alexandrova (2008). First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.score: 180.0
    First-person reports are central to the study of subjective well-being in contemporary psychology, but there is much disagreement about exactly what sort of first-person reports should be used. This paper examines an influential proposal to replace all first-person reports of life satisfaction with introspective reports of affect. I argue against the reasoning behind this proposal, and propose instead a new strategy for deciding what measure is appropriate.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Peter W. Hanks (2013). First-Person Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):155-182.score: 180.0
    A first-person proposition is a proposition that only a single subject can assert or believe. When I assert ‘I am on fire’ I assert a first-person proposition that only I have access to, in the sense that no one else can assert or believe this proposition. This is in contrast to third-person propositions, which can be asserted or believed by anyone.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Josep E. Corbí (2010). First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.score: 180.0
    Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. P. M. S. Hacker (1997). Davidson on First-Person Authority. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):285-304.score: 180.0
    Davidson’s explanation of firstperson authority in utterance of sentences of the form ‘I V that p’ derives firstperson authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth‐bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker’s knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000