Search results for 'First-person authority' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Descartes and First Person Authority. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (2):181-189.score: 720.0
    Although Descartes apparently needs first person authority for his anti-skeptical project, his scattered remarks on it appear to be inconsistent. Why did he neglect this issue? According to E M Aurley, Descartes was answering Pyrrhonian skeptics, who could not consistently challenge him on it. This paper argues instead that Descartes assumed that his first person premises were certain qua clear and distinct perceptions, leaving first person authority a side issue.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Martin F. Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.score: 720.0
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Martin Francisco Fricke (2009). Evans and First Person Authority. Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.score: 720.0
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Richard N. Manning (2013). Sellarsian Behaviorism, Davidsonian Interpretivism, and First Person Authority. [REVIEW] Philosophia 42 (2):1-24.score: 717.0
    Roughly, behaviorist accounts of self-knowledge hold that first persons acquire knowledge of their own minds in just the same way other persons do: by means of behavioral evidence. One obvious problem for such accounts is that the fail to explain the great asymmetry between the authority of first person as opposed to other person attributions of thoughts and other mental states and events. Another is that the means of acquisition seems so different: other persons must infer my mental contents (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.score: 714.0
    Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Steven Gross (2012). Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.score: 630.0
    Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Andreas Kemmerling (2012). First Person Authority Without Glamorous Self-Knowledge. In Löffler Jäger (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement – Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium.score: 630.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jane Heal (2001). On First-Person Authority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.score: 624.0
  9. P. M. S. Hacker (1997). Davidson on First-Person Authority. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):285-304.score: 558.0
    Davidson’s explanation of first‐person authority in utterance of sentences of the form ‘I V that p’ derives first‐person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth‐bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker’s knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.score: 558.0
    In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Externalism and First-Person Authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.score: 558.0
    Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of one's own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based character of such knowledge could (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Eugen Fischer (2001). Discrimination: A Challenge to First-Person Authority? Philosophical Investigations 24 (4):330-346.score: 558.0
    It is no surprise that empirical psychology refutes, again and again, assumptions of uneducated common sense. But some puzzlement tends to arise when scientific results appear to call into question the very conceptual framework of the mental to which we have become accustomed. This paper shall examine a case in point: Experiments on colour-discrimination have recently been taken to refute an assumption of first-person authority that appears to be constitutive of our ordinary notion of perceptual experience. The paper (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Social Externalism and First-Person Authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.score: 540.0
    Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with (...) authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”. (shrink)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Josep E. Corbí (2010). First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.score: 540.0
    Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Rockney Jacobsen (2009). Davidson and First-Person Authority: Parataxis and Self-Expression. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266.score: 540.0
    Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Martin F. Fricke (2013). First Person Authority and Knowledge of One's Own Actions. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (134):3-16.score: 540.0
    What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Neil C. Manson (2012). First-Person Authority: An Epistemic-Pragmatic Account. Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.score: 540.0
    Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon's ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon's ascent routine theory, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Martin F. Fricke (2012). Rules of Language and First Person Authority. Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.score: 540.0
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Severin Schroeder (2006). Moore's Paradox and First-Person Authority. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):161-174.score: 537.0
    This paper explores Wittgenstein's attempts to explain the peculiarities of the first-person use of 'believe' that manifest themselves in Moore's paradox, discussed in Philosophical Investigations, Part II, section x. An utterance of the form 'p and I do not believe that p' is a kind of contradiction, for the second conjunct is not, as it might appear, just a description of my mental state, but an expression of my belief that not-p, contradicting the preceding expression of my belief that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Colin McGinn (2004). Inverted First-Person Authority. The Monist 87 (2):237-254.score: 534.0
  21. Hans Bernhard Schmid (forthcoming). Expressing Group Attitudes: On First Person Plural Authority. Erkenntnis:1-17.score: 525.0
    Under normal circumstances, saying that you have a thought, a belief, a desire, or an intention differs from saying that somebody (who happens to be you) has that attitude. The former statement comes with some form of first person authority and constitutes commitments that are not involved in the latter case. Speaking with first person authority, and thereby publicly committing oneself, is a practice that plays an important role in our communication and in our understanding of what it (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Mark McCullagh (2002). Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.score: 522.0
  23. Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). First-Person Knowledge and Authority. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Language Mind and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 495.0
    Let us call a thought or belief whose content would be expressed by a sentence of subject-predicate form (by the thinker or someone attributing the thought to the thinker) an ‘ascription’. Thus, the thought that Madonna is middle-aged is an ascription of the property of being middle-aged to Madonna. To call a thought of this form an ascription is to emphasize the predicate in the sentence that gives its content. Let us call an ‘x-ascription’ an ascription whose subject is x, (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jane Heal (2002). The Presidential Address: On First-Person Authority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102:1 - 19.score: 486.0
    How are we to explain the authority we have in pronouncing on our own thoughts? A 'constitutive' theory, on which a second-level belief may help to constitute the first-level state it is about, has considerable advantages, for example in relieving pressures towards dualism. The paper aims to exploit an analogy between authority in performative utterances and authority on the psychological to get a clearer view of how such a constitutive account might work and its metaphysical presuppositions.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Sven Bernecker (1996). Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-39.score: 468.0
    Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind?body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ?in the head? and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jonathan Berg (1998). First-Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh-Knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.score: 468.0
  27. H. J. Glock & John M. Preston (1995). Externalism and First-Person Authority. The Monist 78 (4):515-33.score: 468.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Donald Davidson (1993). Reply to Eva Picardi's First-Person Authority and Radical Interpretation. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 468.0
  29. Eva Picardi (1993). First-Person Authority and Radical Interpretation. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 468.0
  30. Bernhard Thole (1993). The Explanation of First Person Authority. In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson: Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers (Foundations of Communication). Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 468.0
  31. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Basis of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.score: 459.0
    This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Dorit Bar-On (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):53 - 71.score: 459.0
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Talia Mae Bettcher (2009). Trans Identities and First-Person Authority. In Laurie Shrage (ed.), You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 453.0
  34. Donald Davidson (1984). First Person Authority. Dialectica 38 (2‐3):101-112.score: 450.0
  35. Victoria McGeer (2008). The Moral Development of First-Person Authority. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):81–108.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. William Child (2007). Davidson on First Person Authority and Knowledge of Meaning. Noûs 41 (2):157–177.score: 450.0
  37. Victoria I. Burke (2010). Hegel, Antigone, and First-Person Authority. Philosophy and Literature 34 (2):373-380.score: 450.0
    Hegel thought Sophocles' Antigone was the finest tragedy, and he put drama atop his hierarchy of the arts, precisely at the point where his system transitions from aesthetics to the philosophy of religion. Hegel concluded his Aesthetics by writing, "Of all the masterpieces of the classical and modern world, the Antigone seems to me to be the most magnificent and satisfying work of art."1The Antigone owes its place in Hegel's hierarchy to its focus on Antigone's uncanny self-certainty. Positioned at the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. André Gallois (1996). The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority. Cambridge University Press.score: 450.0
    In this original and challenging study, Andre; Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Peter Ludlow (1999). First-Person Authority and Memory. In Mario De Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Kluwer.score: 450.0
  40. Diana Raffman (1998). First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 450.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. A. Minh Nguyen (2004). Davidson on First-Person Authority. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4):457-472.score: 450.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Monima Chadha, The Epistemic Illusion of First-Person Authority.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Stephen Voss (2008). Agent's Knowledge and First-Person Authority. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:199-205.score: 450.0
    I propose the hypothesis that our knowledge of our own mental states derives from our knowledge of our intentions, and that our knowledge of our intentions is part of having those intentions. I enumerate various aspects of the question to be answered and various aspects of my answer. The hypothesis begins to explain various aspects of self-knowledge, such as its fallibility and its variability from one kind of mental state to another. Self-knowledge is also grounded in our common antecedent knowledge (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Truls Wyller (1994). First Person Authority and Singular Thoughts. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (4):585 - 594.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. A. Minh Nguyen (2000). Why There is No Such Thing as First Person Authority. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):165-189.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Irene Switankowsky (2001). The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority André Gallois Cambridge Studies in Philosophy New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, Xii + 213 Pp., $54.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 40 (04):852-.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. W. J. Holly (1986). On Donald Davidson's First Person Authority. Dialectica 40:153-156.score: 450.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Robert Welshon (1991). Ideology, First-Person Authority and Self-Deception. Social Epistemology 5 (3):163 – 175.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. William Whisner (1994). To 'Ideology, First-Person Authority, and Self-Deception' (1991). Social Epistemology 8 (2):199 – 213.score: 450.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Paul M. Pietroski (1993). First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67.score: 450.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000