Search results for 'Flavio M. Menezes' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Flavio M. Menezes & Paulo K. Monteiro (1997). Sequential Asymmetric Auctions with Endogenous Participation. Theory and Decision 43 (2):187-202.score: 290.0
    In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players (...)
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  2. Ritesh G. Menezes, Sadip Pant, Bhuchitra Singh Bankura, Jagadish Rao Padubidri & M. Arun (2013). Uninformed Consent: An Offshoot of Illiteracy and Ignorance. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (3):673-675.score: 120.0
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  3. L. Lins, S. Herbas, L. Lisboa, H. Damasceno & M. Menezes (2014). Perception of Illegal Practice of Medicine by Brazilian Medical Students. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (6):432-434.score: 120.0
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  4. Filipe M. Menezes (2011). A Ideia geral do "Aconselhamento filosófico".: Uma introduçao ao tema. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 20 (39):101-140.score: 120.0
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  5. Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin (2007). Games Without Rules. Theory and Decision 63 (4):315-347.score: 120.0
    We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.
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