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  1. Jerry A. Fodor (forthcoming). Review of Bermudez's Thinking Without Words. [REVIEW] The Guardian.
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  2. Jerry A. Fodor (2010). What Darwin Got Wrong. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    What kind of theory is the theory of natural selection? -- Internal constraints : what the new biology tells us -- Whole genomes, networks, modules and other complexities -- Many constraints, many environments -- The return of the laws of form -- Many are called but few are chosen : the problem of 'selection-for' -- No exit? : some responses to the problem of 'selection-for' -- Did the dodo lose its ecological niche? : or was it the other way around? (...)
     
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  3. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (2010). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 15 - 35.
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  4. Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  5. Andrew C. Connolly, Jerry A. Fodor, Lila R. Gleitman & Henry Gleitman (2007). Why Stereotypes Don't Even Make Good Defaults. Cognition 103 (1):1-22.
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  6. Jerry A. Fodor (2007). The Revenge of the Given. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 105--116.
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  7. Jerry A. Fodor (2006). Logical Behaviorism [Selection From Language of Thought]. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman and Littlefield. 27.
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  8. Jerry A. Fodor (2005). Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work?. Mind and Language 20 (1):25-32.
  9. Jerry A. Fodor (2004). Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  10. Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume's Program (and Ours). In Hume Variation. Clarendon Press.
  11. Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
    Hume? Yes, David Hume, that's who Jerry Fodor looks to for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. Fodor claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study (...)
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  12. Jerry A. Fodor (2002). 18 Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science As. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 126.
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  13. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (2002). The Compositionality Papers. Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Jerry Fodor have published a series of original and controversial essays on issues relating to compositionality in language and mind; they have...
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  14. Jerry A. Fodor (2001). Language, Thought and Compositionality. Mind and Language 16 (1):1-15.
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  15. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
  16. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). Replies to Critics. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):350-374.
  17. Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1999). All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on Meaning Similarity. Journal of Philosophy 96 (8):381-403.
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  19. Seyla Benhabib, Ray Billington, Alison Leigh Brown, Steven M. Cahn, Peter Markie, Noel Carroll, Daniel C. Dennett, Tom Digby, Jerry A. Fodor & Peter A. French (1998). Barcalow, Emmett. Moral Philoso. Teaching Philosophy 21 (3):311.
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  20. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  21. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Private Language, Public Language. In Andrea Nye (ed.), Philosophy of Language: The Big Questions. Blackwell Publishers.
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  22. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
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  23. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work. Cognition 62 (1):109-19.
  24. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):149-63.
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  25. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes. Cognition 58 (2):253-70.
    1 There is a Standard Objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): Because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren't compositional, so concepts can't be prototypes (see, e.g., Margolis, 1994).2 However, two recent papers (Osherson and Smith, 1988; Kamp and Partee, 1995) reconsider this consensus. They suggest that, although the Standard Objection is probably right in the long run, the cases where prototypes fail to exhibit compositionality are relatively exotic and involve phenomena (...)
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  26. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1996). What Cannot Be Evaluated Cannot Be Evaluated and It Cannot Be Supervalued Either. Journal of Philosophy 93 (10):516-535.
  27. Jerry A. Fodor (1995). Concepts: A Potboiler. Philosophical Issues 50 (1-3):133-51.
  28. Jerry A. Fodor (1995). 2 Special Sciences. In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. 51.
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  29. Jerry A. Fodor (1994). Posebne Nauke, Ili Nejedinstvo Nauke Kao Radna Hipoteza-Jerry A. Fodor: Special Science, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis', Synthese, 28 (1974), Pp. 97-115. [REVIEW] Theoria 37 (1):67-84.
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  30. Jerry A. Fodor (1994). The Elm and the Expert. MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  31. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1994). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? Philosophical Perspectives 8:101-119.
  32. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1994). What is the Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.
    The Connection Principle (hereafter, CP) says that there is some kind of internal relation between a state's1 having intentional content ("aspectual shape") and its being (at least potentially) conscious. Searle's argument for the principle is just that potential consciousness is the only thing he can think of that would distinguish original intentionality from ersatz (Searle, 1992, pp. 84, 155 and passim. All Searle references are to 1992). Cognitivists have generally found this argument underwhelming given the empirical successes recently enjoyed by (...)
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  33. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? In Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. 101-119.
  34. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  35. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). The Persistence of the Attitudes. In Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. L. Erlbaum. 221--246.
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  36. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LaPore (eds.) (1993). Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  37. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...)
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  38. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1993). Precis of Holism: A Shopper's Guide. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):637-682.
  39. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1993). Reply to Block and Boghossian. Mind and Language 8 (1):41-48.
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  40. Ernest LePore & Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Reply to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):673-682.
  41. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1992). Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Blackwell.
    The main question addressed in this book is whether individuation of the contents of thoughts and linguistic expressions is inherently holistic.
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  42. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). A Modal Argument for Narrow Content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
  43. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). The Dogma That Didn't Bark (a Fragment of a Naturalized Epistemology). Mind 100 (2):201-220.
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  44. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room. In D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press.
     
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  45. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.
  46. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1991). Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role. Mind and Language 6 (4):328-43.
    It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression (...)
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  47. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content II. In , A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
     
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  48. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content I. In , A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  49. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  50. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). Information and Representation. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
     
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