Search results for 'Folk' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer, Folk Mereology Is Teleological.score: 24.0
    When do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that fits with folk intuitions, and yet there has been little agreement about what the folk intuit. We aim to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Our studies suggest that folk mereology is teleological: people tend to intuit that composition occurs when the result serves a purpose. We thus conclude that metaphysicians should dismiss folk intuitions, (...)
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  2. Joshua Knobe (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.score: 24.0
    It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood (...)
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  3. A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.score: 24.0
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the (...)
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  4. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.score: 24.0
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the (...)
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  5. Eddy A. Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.score: 24.0
    Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from action theory to ethics to epistemology. In this paper we present the results of our attempts to apply this approach to the free will debate, in which philosophers on opposing sides claim that their view best accounts for and accords with folk intuitions. After discussing the motivation for such research, we describe our (...)
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  6. Kristin Andrews (2008). It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.score: 24.0
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or (...)
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  7. Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 225-255.score: 24.0
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any (...)
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  8. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005). Folk Psychology as a Model. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (6):1-16.score: 24.0
    I argue that everyday folk-psychological skill might best be explained in terms of the deployment of something like a model, in a specific sense drawn from recent philosophy of science. Theoretical models in this sense do not make definite commitments about the systems they are used to understand; they are employed with a particular kind of flexibility. This analysis is used to dissolve the eliminativism debate of the 1980s, and to transform a number of other questions about the status (...)
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  9. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (1998). Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 53-82.score: 24.0
    This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.1 At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
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  10. Scott Atran (1998). Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science: Cognitive Universals and Cultural Particulars. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):547-569.score: 24.0
    This essay in the is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based, species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, nor (...)
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  11. Andrew Kenneth Jorgensen (2010). The Sky Over Canberra: Folk Discourse and Serious Metaphysics. Philosophia 38 (2):365-383.score: 24.0
    I take up the task of examining how someone who takes seriously the ambitious programme of conceptual analysis advocated by the Canberra School can minimise the eliminative consequences which I argue the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis recipe of conceptual analysis is likely to have for many folk discourses. The objective is to find a stable means to preserve the constative appearance of folk discourse and to find it generally successful in its attempts to describe an external world, albeit in non-scientific terms (...)
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  12. Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Review of Kristin Andrews' Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 4.score: 24.0
    Kristin Andrews proposes a new framework for thinking about folk psychology, which she calls Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Her approach emphasizes kinds of psychological prediction and explanation that don't rest on propositional attitude attribution. Here I review some elements of her theory and find that, although the approach is very promising, there's still work to be done before we can conclude that the manners of prediction and explanation she identifies don't involve implicit propositional attitude attribution.
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  13. Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.score: 24.0
    This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised (...)
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  14. Jonathan Knowles (2002). Is Folk Psychology Different? Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the (...)
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  15. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Folk Psychology as Narrative Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6 - 8.score: 24.0
    There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’ abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity and diversity of everyday psychological capacities has become more nuanced and variegated, new possibilities have been articulated: (i) that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of actions in terms of reason (our folk psychology) may itself be best characterized as a kind of narrative (...)
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  16. Bill Wringe (2002). Is Folk Psychology a Lakatosian Research Program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.score: 24.0
    It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research (...)
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  17. Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.score: 24.0
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  18. M. Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437-52.score: 24.0
    Abstract Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best (...)
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  19. L. Doughney (2013). Folk, Theory, and Feeling: What Attention Is. Dissertation, La Trobe Universityscore: 24.0
    In this thesis three independent answers to the question ‘what is attention?’ are provided. Each answer is a description of attention given through one of the perspectives that people have on the mental phenomenon. The first answer is the common-sense answer to the question, and is an account of the folk psychology of attention. The understanding of attention put forward here is of attention as a limited, divisible resource that is used in mental acts. The second answer is the (...)
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  20. John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.score: 24.0
    In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within (...)
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  21. Alessandro Lanteri (2012). Three-and-a-Half Folk Concepts of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):17-30.score: 24.0
    Fiery Cushman and Alfred Mele recently proposed a ‘two-and-a-half rules’ theory of folk intentionality. They suggested that laypersons attribute intentionality employing: one rule based on desire, one based on belief, and another principle based on moral judgment, which may either reflect a folk concept (and so count as a third rule) or a bias (and so not count as a rule proper) and which they provisionally count as ‘half a rule’. In this article, I discuss some cases in (...)
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  22. Martin J. Pickering & Nick Chater (1995). Why Cognitive Science is Not Formalized Folk Psychology. Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.score: 24.0
    It is often assumed that cognitive science is built upon folk psychology, and that challenges to folk psychology are therefore challenges to cognitive science itself. We argue that, in practice, cognitive science and folk psychology treat entirely non-overlapping domains: cognitive science considers aspects of mental life which do not depend on general knowledge, whereas folk psychology considers aspects of mental life which do depend on general knowledge. We back up our argument on theoretical grounds, and also (...)
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  23. Dominic Murphy (2012). The Folk Epistemology of Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.score: 24.0
    Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.
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  24. Joel Pust (1999). External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.score: 24.0
    Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their second version (...)
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  25. G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.score: 24.0
    This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically (...)
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  26. Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology (6):1-18.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  27. Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2007). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.score: 24.0
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  28. Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding Qua Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach argues for (...)
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  29. William S. Robinson (1996). Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.score: 24.0
    Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor (...)
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  30. J. D. Trout (1991). Belief Attribution in Science: Folk Psychology Under Theoretical Stress. Synthese 87 (June):379-400.score: 24.0
    Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of inconsistency, and (...)
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  31. Adam Morton (2003). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology As Ethics. New York: Routledge.score: 24.0
    The Importance of Being Understood argues for an alternative to traditional accounts in contemporary philosophy of the power of folk psychology to explain our...
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  32. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003). Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272.score: 24.0
    My commentary on Hurley is concerned with foundational issues. Hurley's investigation of animal cognition is cast within a particular framework—basically, a philosophically refined version of folk psychology. Her discussion has a complicated relationship to unresolved debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, especially debates about the extent to which folk psychological categories are aimed at picking out features of the causal organization of the mind.
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  33. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):43-68.score: 24.0
    This paper promotes the view that our childhood engagement with narratives of a certain kind is the basis of sophisticated folk psychological abilities —i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our primary understanding and skill in folk (...)
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  34. D. Resnik (2000). Pain as a Folk Psychological Concept: A Clinical Perspective. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (2):193-207.score: 24.0
    This paper develops an instrumentalistic argumentagainst an eliminativist approach to using the folkconcept of pain in clinical medicine and draws someimplications for biomedical theories of pain. Thepaper argues that the folk concept of pain plays afundamental role in several aspects of clinicalmedicine, including the diagnosis and treatment ofdiseases and symptoms, relieving human suffering, andthe doctor-patient relationship. Since clinicians mustbe able to apply biomedical theories of pain inmedical practice, these theories should not stray toofar from pain's clinical realities. Biomedicaltheories of (...)
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  35. Martin Roth (2013). Folk Psychology as Science. Synthese 190 (17):3971-3982.score: 24.0
    There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of science over folk psychological explanations of human action: do the (perhaps implicit) generalizations that underwrite such explanations purport to state contingent, empirically established connections between beliefs, desires, and actions, or do such generalizations serve rather to define, at least in part, what it is to have a belief or desire, or perform an action? This question has proven important because of certain traditional assumptions made about (...)
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  36. Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin (2012). Making Folk Psychology Explicit. Philosophia 40 (1):139-163.score: 24.0
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive (...)
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  37. Frank C. Keil (2010). The Feasibility of Folk Science. Cognitive Science 34 (5):826-862.score: 24.0
    If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Laypeople’s explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps, and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people overestimate their own understandings. Yet recent views suggest that formal scientists may not be so different. In spite of these limitations, science somehow works and its success offers hope for the feasibility of folk science as well. The success (...)
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  38. Harvey S. Smallman & Maia B. Cook (2011). Naïve Realism: Folk Fallacies in the Design and Use of Visual Displays. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (3):579-608.score: 24.0
    Often implicit in visual display design and development is a gold standard of photorealism. By approximating direct perception, photorealism appeals to users and designers by being both attractive and apparently effortless. The vexing result from numerous performance evaluations, though, is that increasing realism often impairs performance. Smallman and St. John (2005) labeled misplaced faith in realistic information display Naïve Realism and theorized it resulted from a triplet of folk fallacies about perception. Here, we illustrate issues associated with the wider (...)
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  39. John Michael, Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology. EPSA07.score: 24.0
    Simulation as an epistemic tool between theory and practice: A Comparison of the Relationship between Theory and Simulation in Science and in Folk Psychology In this paper I explore the concept of simulation that is employed by proponents of the so-called simulation theory within the debate about the nature and scientific status of folk psychology. According to simulation theory, folk psychology is not a sort of theory that postulates theoretical entities (mental states and processes) and general laws, (...)
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  40. William E. Morris & Robert C. Richardson (1995). How Not to Demarcate Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology: A Response to Pickering and Chater. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (3):339-355.score: 24.0
    Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an independent enterprise, with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C''s case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude (...)
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  41. Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.score: 24.0
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating (...)
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  42. P. Weatherall (1996). What Do Propositions Measure in Folk Psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.score: 24.0
    In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of (...)
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  43. C. R. Chapman, Y. Nakakura & C. N. Chapman (2000). Pain and Folk Theory. Brain and Mind 1 (2):209-222.score: 24.0
    Pain is not a primitive sensory event but rather a complexperception and a process by which a person interacts with theinternal and external environments, constructs meaning, andengages in action. Because folk beliefs are central to meaning,folk concepts of pain play multiple causal roles in a painpatient's interaction with health care providers and others.In every case, the notion of pain is linked to a goal-directedbehavior that is useful to the person. The wide variation inconcepts of pain across individuals suffering (...)
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  44. Mathieu Arminjon (2013). Is Psychoanalysis a Folk Psychology? Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 24.0
    Even as the neuro-psychoanalytic field has matured, the epistemological status of Freudian interpretations still remains problematic. As a result of the resurgence of hermeneutics, the claim has been made that psychoanalysis is an extension of folk psychology. For these “extensionists”, asking psychoanalysis to prove its interpretations would be as absurd as demanding the proofs of the scientific accuracy of folk psychology. I propose to show how Dennett’s theory of the intentional stance allows us to defend an extensionist position (...)
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  45. Jeffery W. Bentley (2006). Folk Experiments. Agriculture and Human Values 23 (4):451-462.score: 24.0
    Folk experiments in agriculture are often inspired by new ideas blended with old ones, motivated by economic and environmental change. They tend to save labor or capital. These notions are illustrated with nine short case studies from Nicaragua and El Salvador. The new ideas that catalyze folk experiments may be provided by development agencies, but paradoxically, the folk experiments are so common that the agencies that inspire them usually pay little attention to them. Some folk experiments (...)
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  46. Anika Fiebich (forthcoming). Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. (...)
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  47. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon (1991). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. 499-533.score: 21.0
  48. Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.score: 21.0
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that contains the (...)
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  49. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). The Domain of Folk Psychology. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 25–48.score: 21.0
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