Search results for 'Folk Psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Charles L. Folk & Bradley S. Gibson (eds.) (2001). Attraction, Distraction and Action: Multiple Perspectives on Attentional Capture. Advances in Psychology. Elsevier.
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  2. Joshua Knobe (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
    It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction (...)
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  3. A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk (...), the common understanding of mental states. This subfield of scientific psychology is what I mean by the phrase 'the psychology of folk psychology'. (shrink)
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  4.  50
    Adam Morton (2007). Folk Psychology Does Not Exist. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press 211--221.
    I discuss the possibility that there is no intrinsic unity to the capacities which are bundled under the label "folk psychology". Cooperative skills, attributional skills, and predictive skills may be scattered as parts of other non--psychological capacities. I discuss how some forms of social life bring these different skills together. I end with some remarks on how abilities that are not unified in their essential mechanisms may still form a rough practical unity. (Remark: the paper is conjectural. It (...)
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  5. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the (...)
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  6.  38
    Adam Morton (2003). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology As Ethics. New York: Routledge.
    The Importance of Being Understood argues for an alternative to traditional accounts in contemporary philosophy of the power of folk psychology to explain our...
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  7. Eric Hochstein (forthcoming). When Does "Folk Psychology" Count as Folk Psychological? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv028.
    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk (...)
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  8. Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
    This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folkpsychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an (...)
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  9.  87
    Malcolm Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology: A Reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437 – 452.
    Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are (...)
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  10.  58
    John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.
    In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon (...)
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  11. Adam Morton (1996). Folk Psychology is Not a Predictive Device. Mind 105 (417):119-37.
    I argue that folk psychology does not serve the purpose of facilitating prediction of others' behaviour but if facilitating cooperative action. (See my subsequent book *The Importance of Being Understood*.
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  12.  56
    G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
    This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are (...)
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  13.  73
    Bill Wringe (2002). Is Folk Psychology a Lakatosian Research Program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.
    It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian (...)
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  14.  36
    William S. Robinson (1996). Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.
    Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism (...)
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  15.  13
    P. Weatherall (1996). What Do Propositions Measure in Folk Psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.
    In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation (...)
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  16. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). The Domain of Folk Psychology. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 25–48.
    My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...)
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  17. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005). Folk Psychology as a Model. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (6):1-16.
    I argue that everyday folk-psychological skill might best be explained in terms of the deployment of something like a model, in a specific sense drawn from recent philosophy of science. Theoretical models in this sense do not make definite commitments about the systems they are used to understand; they are employed with a particular kind of flexibility. This analysis is used to dissolve the eliminativism debate of the 1980s, and to transform a number of other questions about the status (...)
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  18.  41
    Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) (2007). Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  19. Kristin Andrews (2008). It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical (...)
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  20.  81
    Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Folk Psychology as Narrative Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6 - 8.
    There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’ abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity and diversity of everyday psychological capacities has become more nuanced and variegated, new possibilities have been articulated: (i) that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of actions in terms of reason (our folk psychology) may itself be best characterized as a kind of (...)
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  21.  37
    Daniel D. Hutto (2007). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):43-68.
    This paper promotes the view that our childhood engagement with narratives of a certain kind is the basis of sophisticated folk psychological abilities —i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our primary understanding and skill in folk (...)
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  22. Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Review of Kristin Andrews' Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 4.
    Kristin Andrews proposes a new framework for thinking about folk psychology, which she calls Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Her approach emphasizes kinds of psychological prediction and explanation that don't rest on propositional attitude attribution. Here I review some elements of her theory and find that, although the approach is very promising, there's still work to be done before we can conclude that the manners of prediction and explanation she identifies don't involve implicit propositional attitude attribution.
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  23. Daniel D. Hutto (2004). The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
    It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of (...)
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  24.  83
    Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  25.  51
    Kristin Andrews (2008). It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical (...)
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  26.  18
    Adam Morton (2009). Folk Psychology. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    I survey the previous 20 years work on the nature of folk psychology, with particular emphasis on the original debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists, and the positions that have emerged from this debate.
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  27.  37
    Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003). Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272.
    My commentary on Hurley is concerned with foundational issues. Hurley's investigation of animal cognition is cast within a particular framework—basically, a philosophically refined version of folk psychology. Her discussion has a complicated relationship to unresolved debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, especially debates about the extent to which folk psychological categories are aimed at picking out features of the causal organization of the mind.
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  28.  82
    Martin J. Pickering & Nick Chater (1995). Why Cognitive Science is Not Formalized Folk Psychology. Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.
    It is often assumed that cognitive science is built upon folk psychology, and that challenges to folk psychology are therefore challenges to cognitive science itself. We argue that, in practice, cognitive science and folk psychology treat entirely non-overlapping domains: cognitive science considers aspects of mental life which do not depend on general knowledge, whereas folk psychology considers aspects of mental life which do depend on general knowledge. We back (...)
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  29. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (1998). Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 53-82.
    This paper is about the contemporary debate concerning folk psychology – the debate between the proponents of the theory theory of folk psychology and the friends of the simulation alternative.1 At the outset, we need to ask: What should we mean by this term ‘folk psychology’?
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  30.  38
    David Hodgson (1994). Neuroscience and Folk Psychology: An Overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):205-216.
    This article looks at two approaches to the human brain and to the causation of behaviour: the objective approach of neuroscience, which treats the brain as a physical system operating in accordance with physical laws of general application; and the subjective approach of folk psychology, which treats people, and thus their brains and minds, as making choices or decisions on the basis of beliefs, desires, etc. It suggests three ways in which these two approaches might be related, two (...)
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  31.  67
    Joel Pust (1999). External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.
    Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their (...)
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  32.  13
    Anika Fiebich (2016). Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):135-149.
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false (...)
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  33.  34
    Martin Capstick (2013). On-Line False Belief Understanding ≪em Class="a-Plus-Plus"≫Qua≪/Em≫ Folk Psychology? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):27-40.
    In this paper, I address Mitchell Herschbach’s arguments against the phenomenological critics of folk psychology. Central to Herschbach’s arguments is the introduction of Michael Wheeler’s distinction between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ intelligence to the debate on social understanding. Herschbach uses this distinction to describe two arguments made by the phenomenological critics. The first is that folk psychology is exclusively off-line and mentalistic. The second is that social understanding is on-line and non-mentalistic. To counter the phenomenological critics, Herschbach (...)
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  34.  41
    J. D. Trout (1991). Belief Attribution in Science: Folk Psychology Under Theoretical Stress. Synthese 87 (June):379-400.
    Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of inconsistency, (...)
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  35.  24
    Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin (2012). Making Folk Psychology Explicit. Philosophia 40 (1):139-163.
    One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive (...)
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  36.  26
    John Michael, Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology. EPSA07.
    Simulation as an epistemic tool between theory and practice: A Comparison of the Relationship between Theory and Simulation in Science and in Folk Psychology In this paper I explore the concept of simulation that is employed by proponents of the so-called simulation theory within the debate about the nature and scientific status of folk psychology. According to simulation theory, folk psychology is not a sort of theory that postulates theoretical entities (mental states and (...)
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  37.  21
    William E. Morris & Robert C. Richardson (1995). How Not to Demarcate Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology: A Response to Pickering and Chater. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (3):339-355.
    Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an independent enterprise, with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C''s case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. (...)
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  38.  1
    Adam Morton (2005). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. Routledge.
    I investigate the role that facilitating cooperative action plays in shaping folk psychology. Publisher's blurb: _The Importance of Being Understood _is an innovative and thought-provoking exploration of the links between the way we think about each other's mental states and the fundamentally cooperative nature of everyday life. Adam Morton begins with a consideration of '<span class='Hi'>folk</span> <span class='Hi'>psychology</span>', the tendency to attribute emotions, desires, beliefs and thoughts to human minds. He takes the view that it is (...)
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  39.  1
    Adam Morton (2002). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. Routledge.
    I describe attribution of states of mind in everyday life to the needs of small-scale cooperation between individuals. This requires us to be able to anticipate one another's actions, within the context of shared projects. I argue that this shapes concepts of belief and desire and motivation, but also leads to routines of simulation which have presuppositions of cooperative intent. Publisher's blurb:_The Importance of Being Understood _is an innovative and thought-provoking exploration of the links between the way we think about (...)
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  40. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.) (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Blackwell.
    Many philosophers and psychologists argue that normal adult human beings possess a primitive or 'folk' psychological theory. Recently, however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human bings are able to predict and explain each others' actions by using the resources of their own minds to simuate the psychological etiology of the actions of others. The thirteen essays in this volume present the foundations of theory of mind debate, and are accompanied (...)
     
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  41. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (2002). Folk Psychology. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell 35-71.
    For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk (...)
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  42. Matthew Ratcliffe (2007). Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations.
     
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  43. Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
  44. Shaun Nichols (2004). The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts. Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
    According to agent-causal accounts of free will, agents have the capacity to cause actions, and for a given action, an agent could have done otherwise. This paper uses existing results and presents experimental evidence to argue that young children deploy a notion of agent-causation. If young children do have such a notion, however, it remains quite unclear how they acquire it. Several possible acquisition stories are canvassed, including the possibility that the notion of agent-causation develops from a prior notion of (...)
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  45.  15
    Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating (...)
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  46.  26
    Martin Roth (2013). Folk Psychology as Science. Synthese 190 (17):3971-3982.
    There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of science over folk psychological explanations of human action: do the (perhaps implicit) generalizations that underwrite such explanations purport to state contingent, empirically established connections between beliefs, desires, and actions, or do such generalizations serve rather to define, at least in part, what it is to have a belief or desire, or perform an action? This question has proven important because of certain traditional assumptions made about (...)
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  47.  85
    Jonathan Knowles (2002). Is Folk Psychology Different? Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.
    In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the (...)
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  48.  21
    Nicholas P. Power (1996). Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
    Jerry Fodor has long championed the view, recently dubbed “scientific intentional realism” (Loewer and Ray, 1991, p. xiv), that “a scientifically adequate psychology will contain laws that quantify over intentional phenomena in intentional terms.” On such a view our belief/desire psychology will be “vindicated” through empirical investigation; that is, it will be shown to denote the explanatory (or causally salient) states or events in the production of thought and behavior. That intentional properties, states, or events have causal efficacy---are (...)
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  49. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon (1991). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum 499-533.
  50. Richard Breheny (2006). Communication and Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 21 (1):74-107.
    Prominent accounts of language use (those of Grice, Lewis, Stalnaker, Sperber and Wilson among others) have viewed basic communicative acts as essentially involving the attitudes of the participating agents. Developmental data poses a dilemma for these accounts, since it suggests children below age four are competent communicators but would lack the ability to conceptualise communication if philosophers and linguists are right about what communication is. This paper argues that this dilemma is quite serious and that these prominent accounts would be (...)
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