This is a sequel to Forman's well-received collection, The Problems of Pure Consciousness (OUP 1990). The essays in this previous volume argued that some mystical experiences do not seem to be formed or shaped by the language system--a thesis that stands in sharp contrast to the constructivist school, which holds that all mysticism is the product of a cultural and linguistic process. In The Innate Capacity, the same scholars put forward a hypothesis about the formative causes of these "pure consciousness" (...) experiences. All the contributors agree that mysticism is the result of an innate human capacity, rather than a learned, socially conditioned constructive process. They look at mystical experience as it is manifested in a variety of religious and cultural settings, including Hindu Yoga, Buddhism, Sufism, and medieval Christianity. Taken together, the essays constitute an important contribution to the ongoing debate about the nature of mystical experience and its relation to the social and cultural context in which it appears. (shrink)
Upshot: George Forman has had a long interest in Piaget and constructivism. He was a Professor in the Education Department at the University of Massachusetts and so he and Ernst were colleagues from the time Ernst moved there when he left Athens, Georgia.
Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free since moral goodness is (as Kant says) “created by us, hence is in our power.” But when our end is the fulfillment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, this means that happiness requires that we get other (...) people to work for our ends; and this requires, in turn, that we gain control over the things other people value so as to have influence over them. If this plan for happiness is not subordinated to morality, then what is most valuable to us will be precisely what others value. This is the root of the “passions” that make us evil and make us slaves whose satisfaction depends on others. But, significantly, this dependence is a moral slavery and hence does not signal a loss, or even diminishment of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. (shrink)
Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of the agent: (...) an agent can act on a maxim either because it promises agreeable results or because he deems it to be an intrinsically correct principle of action. Kant describes a maxim of the latter sort as “firm” and as indicative of “character” in the honorific sense. If the agent’s commitment to his maxim is instead conditional on its agreeable results, we can say he does not act “on principle” and in that sense does not act on maxims at all: rather than aiming at a set of results because the action that produces them conforms to his maxim, he acts according to his maxim because doing so promises (and only as long as it promises) the results he desires. Such an agent thus lacks the principled maxims of a person of character since his maxims are always for sale to the highest bidder. Kant allows that an evil person can approximate the ideal of a principled indifference to results, but claims that only morally good action can be wholly principled. This is also why maxims of action in conformity with duty can be acquired gradually through habituation whereas an authentically moral maxim must instead arise from a “revolution” in thought. (shrink)
For Sellars, the possibility of empirical knowledge presupposes the existence of "sense impressions" in the perceiver, i.e., non-conceptual states of perceptual consciousness. But this role for sense impressions does not implicate Sellars' account in the Myth of the Given: sense impressions do not stand in a justificatory relation to instances of perceptual knowledge; their existence is rather a condition for the possibility of the acquisition of empirical concepts. Sellars suggests that learning empirical concepts presupposes that we can remember certain past (...) facts that we could not conceptualize at the time they obtained. And such memory presupposes, in turn, the existence of certain (past) non-conceptual sensory states that can be conceptualized. (shrink)
Hegel's discussion of the concept of “habit” appears at a crucial point in his Encyclopedia system, namely, in the transition from the topic of “nature” to the topic of “spirit” (Geist): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a “second nature,” Hegel highlights the fact that incipient spirit retains (...) a “moment” of the natural that marks a limitation compared to “pure thought” but that also makes perceptual consciousness possible. This makes Hegel's account analogous in important respects to John McDowell's “naturalism of second nature.” But Hegel's account of habit can be seen as a version of a Kantian synthesis of the productive imagination—and hence presupposes a given material that can become one's own by means of habit. This does not mean that Hegel falls into the Myth of the Given, but it does suggest that an appropriate account of second nature might be committed to something McDowell wants to deny: that nonconceptual states of consciousness play a role (even if not a justificatory role) in perception. (shrink)
The concept of second nature plays a central role in McDowell's project of reconciling thought's external constraint with its spontaneity or autonomy: our conceptual capacities are natural in the sense that they are fully integrated into the natural world, but they are a second nature to us since they are not reducible to elements that are intelligible apart from those conceptual capacities. Rather than offering a theory of second nature and an account of how we acquire one, McDowell suggests that (...) Aristotle's account of ethical character formation as the acquisition of a second nature serves as a model that can reassure us that thought's autonomy does not threaten its naturalness. However, far from providing such reassurance, the Aristotelian model of second nature actually generates an anxiety about how the acquisition of such autonomous conceptual abilities could be possible. (shrink)
Are mystical experiences primarily formed by the mystic's cultural background and concepts, as modern day "constructivists" maintain, or do mystics in some way transcend language, belief, and culturally conditioned expectations? Do mystical experiences differ in the different religious traditions, as "pluralists" contend, or are they identical across cultures? Twelve contributors here attempt to answer these questions through close examination of a particular form of mystical experience, "Pure Consciousness"--the experience of being awake but devoid of intentional content for consciousness. The contributors (...) analyze pure consciousness and other mystical experiences from historical Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Jewish sources, as well as from modern mystics. They demonstrate that pure consciousness poses serious conceptual problems for a contructivist understanding of mysticism. Revealing the inconsistencies and inadequacies of current models, they make significant strides towards developing new models for the phenomenon of mysticism, breaking new ground for our understanding of mysticism and of human experience in general. (shrink)
The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, (...) the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. Keywords: DSM-IV, Nosology, psychiatric classification CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Capitalizing on the constructivist approach developed by philosophers and psychologists, Steven Katz argues that mystical experience is in part constructed, shaped and colored by the concepts and beliefs which the mystic brings to it. Merits and problems of this constructivist account of mysticism are discussed. The approach is seen to be ill-suited to explain the novelties and surprises for which mysticism is renowned. A new model is suggested: that mysticism is produced by a process similar to forgetting. Two forms of (...) forgetting are described: a massive and complete forgetting of concepts in the “pure consciousness event” and de automatization in the more permanent unitive experiences. (shrink)
Adults who give proxy consent for medical treatment for adolescents must decide how much weight to give to adolescents' own preferences. There is evidence that some adolescents choose treatments different from what adults see as most reasonable. It is argued that adolescents choose according to age-specific values, i.e. values they hold, as adolescents, and which fulfil important developmental needs. Because not fulfilling these needs may do serious psychological damage, it is urged that proxies give weight to these values, up to (...) the limit where it would endanger or profoundly limit future life. (shrink)
Abstract In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, AdamSmith observed that we live in a fundamentally conflictual world. Although he held that we are creatures who sympathize, he also observed that our sympathy seems to be constrained by geographical limits. Accordingly, traditional theories of cosmopolitanism were implausible; yet, as a moral philosopher, Smith attempted to reconcile his bleak description of the world with his eagerness for international peace. Smith believed that commercial intercourse among self?interested nations would (...) emulate sympathy on a global scale, balancing national wealth and international peace without a coercive apparatus to enforce compliance with international law. (shrink)
El presente trabajo nació como una reflexión posterior a la traducción del libro de Stanley Cavell Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. La reflexión era necesaria habida cuenta de las dudas suscitadas por la traducción del título del libro. Para ser más exacto, la reflexión giraba en torno a las lágrimas que forman parte de la primera parte del título, las lágrimas vertidas por las mujeres desconocidas que protagonizan los melodramas analizados en el libro. En mi opinión, (...) llegar a entender la razón y la naturaleza de esas lágrimas es clave para comprender lo que Cavell nos viene contando desde hace cinco décadas. Por ello, lo que sigue intenta reunir mis propios comentarios sobre la obra de Cavell en general, con la justificación de la traducción final del título: Más allá de las lágrimas. (shrink)
Some experiences of the natural world bring a sense of unity, knowledge, self-transcendence, eternity, light, and love. This is the first detailed study of these intriguing phenomena. Paul Marshall explores the circumstances, characteristics, and after-effects of this important but relatively neglected type of mystical experience, and critiques explanations that range from the spiritual and metaphysical to the psychoanalytic, contextual, and neuropsychological. The theorists discussed include R. M. Bucke, Edward Carpenter, W. R. Inge, Evelyn Underhill, Rudolf Otto, Sigmund Freud, Aldous Huxley, (...) R. C. Zaehner, W. T. Stace, Steven Katz, and Robert Forman, as well as contemporary neuroscientists. The book makes a significant contribution to current debates about the nature of mystical experience. (shrink)
En este artículo el autor analiza la encíclica Caritas in veritate de Benedicto XVI teniendo como clave de lectura el mercado, el Estado y la sociedad civil, los cuales forman una unión osmótica en la que la persona, libre y responsable, puede expresarse en términos de desarrollo integral. El mercado pasa por el contrato, el Estado por las leyes justas y la sociedad civil por el don y la gratuidad. En este contexto, la sociedad civil es esencial para no encerrar (...) al hombre entre el mercado y el Estado. In this article I discuss the encyclical Caritas in veritate, Benedict XVI having as key to reading the market, the state and civil society, which form a union in which the osmotic person, free and responsible, can be expressed in terms of development. The market goes through the contract, the State by just laws and civil society for the gift and gratuity. In this context, civil society is essential to not close man between the market and the state. (shrink)
Si es cierto que Tocqueville apreció grandes virtudes en el sistema democrático, tampoco dejó de señalar sus peligros. Con arreglo al diagnóstico de Tocqueville, sobre sus contemporáneos –y por ende sobre todos nosotros– actuarían incesantemente dos pasiones opuestas: la necesidad de ser conducidos y el deseo de ser libres. No sabiendo acabar con ninguna de tales inclinaciones contradictorias, nos esforzaríamos por satisfacer ambas a la vez., concibiendo un poder único, tutelar, todopoderoso, pero elegido por los ciudadanos. La dialéctica entre igualdad (...) y libertad representa el núcleo de sus inquietudes. Los trabajos reunidos aquí fueron debatidos en el Ateneo madrileño al cumplirse 150 años del fallecimiento de Tocqueville. Todos ellos nos invitan a revisitar las múltiples facetas de un autor imprescindible, si queremos revisar los avatares de la democracia y proceder a repensar cómo deberíamos actualizar sus reglas de juego. (Este volumen se inscribe dentro del Programa sobre “Cultura de la Legalidad” TRUST-CM liderado por José María Sauca). Diálogos con clásicos europeos La Colección Clásicos europeos (que dirige Roberto R. Aramayo) pretende rescatar del olvido algunos textos fundamentales para comprender mejor nuestro presente, al poner en valor la impronta que han legado a Europa y al mundo determinados pensadores europeos. Como complemento a esa colección de textos, este volumen sobre Tocqueville prosigue la serie de Diálogos con clásicos europeos, que quisiera cumplir en castellano un papel similar al jugado por los Companions filosóficos de Cambridge. Conviene seguir dialogando con ciertos autores que forman parte del entramado de nuestro acervo cultural, pues no en vano el diálogo es condición sine qua non del filosofar. (shrink)
Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hypotheses are formed for generalizations such as “pineapples taste sweet” or “rainbows appear when the sun breaks through the rain”. This phenomenon has received little attention in formal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and everyday reasoning. Second, the adaptive logic LA∀ is presented to explicate this process formally.La (...) abducción de generalizaciones es el proceso en el que se forman hipótesis explicativas para generalizaciones tales como "las piñas saben dulce" o "el arcoiris aparece cuando el sol sale a través de la lluvia". Este fenómeno ha recibido poca atención tanto en lógica formal como en filosofía de la ciencia. Este artículo viene a llenar este hueco. En primer lugar, ofrecemos una panorámica de algunas características generales de este proceso, analizando su ubicuidad en el razonamiento científico y cotidiano. En segundo lugar, se presenta la lógica adaptativa LA∀ para dar una explicación formal de este proceso. (shrink)
There has been much discussion about the nature and even existence of so-called “pure conscious events” (PCEs). PCEs are often described as mental events which are non-conceptual and lacking all experiential content (Forman 1990). For a variety of reasons, a number of authors have questioned both the accuracy of such a characterization and even the very existence of PCEs (Katz 1978, Bagger 1999). In this chapter, I take a somewhat different, but also critical, approach to the nature and possibility of (...) PCEs. I focus on several overlapping views found in recent analytic philosophy of mind and examine PCEs in light of them. After introducing terminology and some preliminary matters, I examine whether or not the “higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness” rules out the possibility of PCEs, and conversely, whether or not PCEs show that the HOT theory cannot apply to all conscious states. The HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a higher-order thought to the effect that “I am in mental state M now.” A related theme will be to assess PCEs in light of the recent debate between so-called “conceptualists” and those who believe that there are “non-conceptual contents of experience.” Conceptualism, to which I am very sympathetic, is basically the view that all conscious experience is structured by concepts possessed by the subject. I argue that PCEs are indeed conceptual and so no threat to conceptualism. For example, standard criticisms of conceptualism do not apply to PCEs. Finally, I examine the possibility that PCEs are not conscious at all. In the end, my overall conclusion is that we should hold that PCEs are indeed compatible with both HOT theory and conceptualism or seriously question the idea that PCEs are conscious at all. (shrink)
El objetivo de esta presentación es establecer una relación entre el ciclo de la labor, conceptualizado por Arendt en La condición humana, y el campo de concentración. Se parte de la clara alusión de Arendt, en donde argumenta que lo que se busca en el campo de concentración, es la construcción de un animal que sólo tenga la “libertad” de “reproducir su especie”. Dichas características están insertas en el animal laborans que también pareciera ser la cifra del homo sacer de (...) Giorgio Agamben. Esa institución del derecho romano arcaico, según los desarrollos de Agamben, permite entender al interno del campo de concentración. El animal laborans se puede encontrar en las prácticas que se desarrollan en el campo. La labor y el consumo forman parte fundamental de una estrategia de supervivencia y modulan, en forma definitiva, la diferencia entre el futuro sobreviviente y el musulmán. Vida y muerte son moduladas por lalabor y por el consumo. El ciclo de la labor crea sujetos, crea posibilidades. Esas estrategias, a través de la labor y del consumo, permiten visualizar que la supervivencia puede ser leída con la grilla de inteligibilidad del homo oeconomicus, es decir, un sujeto de interés empresario de sí mismo, que se gobierna a sí mismo como una posesión, y que, por ende, puede ser entendido como un sujeto gobernable. El sobreviviente hace un trabajo sobre sí mismo para poder sobrevivir, educarse para subsisitir y no caer en la selección. El homo oeconomicus del neoliberalismo puede permitirnos entender la vida dentro del campo y, por ende, puede ser la cifra del homo sacer a través de su condición del animal laborans. (shrink)
“Without good brain function, living to age 100 is not an attractive proposition,” said Nir Barzilai, director of the college’s Institute for Ageing Research. “We’ve shown that the same gene variant that helps people live to exceptional ages has the added benefit of helping them think clearly.
El objeto de este libro es mostrar quién fue, qué pensó y cual es el sentido, para nosotros, del pensamiento de Abu al-Ualíd Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Ahmad Ibn Ruxd, en adelante Averroes, nombre que deriva de la latinización del apelativo Ibn Ruxd, nacido en Córdoba en 1126 y muerto en Marrakex en 1181. Su impronta en la cultura de su tiempo le hizo figurar nada menos que entre el auténtico canon onomástico de la teología y (...) la filosofía medievales que supuso La Divina Comedia de Dante, o en el parnaso de la filosofía de Rafael en "La escuela de Atenas". Y eso no resulta incompatible con su peso central en el pensamiento racionalista que marcó el rumbo de la modernidad de donde surge nuestro mundo presente. Averroes supone una cima del pensamiento universal en cualquier tiempo y lugar. Entre los límites cronológicos que encierran una vida como la de Averroes no podemos lograr totalidades, más allá de un conjunto de fragmentos, indicios, referencias indirectas procedentes de datos que nos ofrecen autores contemporáneos o sucesores. El conjunto de todas esas informaciones, que forman la biografía del filósofo, resulta ser muy escaso y poco ilustrativo si lo comparamos con la trayectoria de su pensamiento, un proceso intelectual cuyo prodigioso esfuerzo racional deja en la sombra al Averroes persona en beneficio del Averroes pensador. Frente a los momentos destacados de una vida, cuyos límites espaciales o geográficos vienen determinados por continuos desplazamientos de ida y vuelta entre Córdoba, Sevilla y Marrakex, lugares donde desempeñó cargos oficiales, sobresale un constante y sostenido esfuerzo intelectual plasmado en sus 92 obras escritas en 72 años de vida del filósofo. (shrink)
Este libro propone un recorrido por la obra de Jürgen Habermas desde la atención prioritaria hacia la articulación histórica y efectiva de las identidades. Así, la versión de Habermas como representante señero de la segunda generación de la Escuela de Frankfurt es analizada atendiendo, además de a su ambición epistemológica como ciencia social, a su comprensión de los escenarios de la praxis, allí, en definitiva, donde se dilucida la posible realización de los ideales identitarios. El contraste entre la crítica de (...) Habermas a los nacionalismos obsesionados con el nexo entre pasado histórico e identidad colectiva y las comparecencias empíricas de unas voluntades políticas y sociales nacionalistas que persiguen su autodeterminación precisamente desde el reclamo de ese nexo, permite advertir los problemas de la teoría de Habermas para integrar como conocimiento las dimensiones de la realidad social que discuten su idea de un progreso dirigido hacia el universalismo. Desde ese interés principal que focaliza la presente lectura de los textos de Habermas, cobra protagonismo la reflexión acerca de la experiencia histórica y las repercusiones que la misma puede tener en la comprensión de los requerimientos de la identidad. De ahí que también tenga presencia la influencia del Holocausto en la sensibilidad teórica de un Habermas comprometido en el propósito de que sea normativamente imposible la repetición de un escenario similar. Una vez aclaradas las condiciones que influyen en la versión de Habermas acerca de los límites de la legitimidad en las apuestas identitarias, el análisis empírico del uso nacionalista del bombardeo a Gernika y de la obra de Picasso "Guernica", se presenta como un contrapunto plástico a los ideales de la teoría. Así, el recurso de la identidad colectiva vasca a ese recodo puntual de su historia se conjuga en una clave que choca con la concepción moderna sobre cómo se construye la autonomía. La evidencia de que las diversas interpretaciones inconciliables sobre el Guernica forman parte de la materialización social de una determinada convicción identitaria testifica, justamente, acerca de la necesidad de integrar en la teoría esas dimensiones de la vida social que, en efecto, chocan con la racionalidad y que, en principio, retan al sociólogo para comprender que no es lo mismo la racionalidad de su ciencia que la de su objeto de estudio. (shrink)
