Search results for 'For free will compatibilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2010). The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.score: 1080.0
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. (...)
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  2. A. A. Howsepian (2007). Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense. Sophia 46 (3):217-236.score: 996.0
    It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one (...)
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  3. Kenneth J. Perszyk (1999). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defence: A Reply to Bishop. Australasian Journal of Philosopy 77 (1):92-105.score: 996.0
    This paper 1) argues that libertarians are virtually as badly off as compatibilists in the face of the objection to the Free Will Defence that omnipotent God could have ensured that all free beings always but freely did right, and 2) explores the prospects for an "upgraded" Free Will Defense which takes freedom merely as a necessary condition for a further higher good which logically could not be achieved if God employed any of the available (...)
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  4. John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Philip Pettit (1996). Strategies for Free Will Compatibilists. Analysis 56 (4):191-201.score: 958.0
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  5. Manuel Vargas (2006). Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work For Philosophical Debates on Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1):239-254.score: 876.0
    I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts (...)
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  6. James Lenman (2002). On the Alleged Shallowness of Compatibilism: A Critical Study of Saul Smilansky: Free Will and Illusion. Iyyun 51 (January):63-79.score: 810.0
    The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the (...)
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  7. Saul Smilansky (2005). Free Will and Respect for Persons. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):248-261.score: 798.0
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  8. Ariel Yadin (2004). Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism. Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.score: 798.0
     
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  9. Brian Garvey (2008). Free Will, Compatibilism and the Human Nature Wars. .score: 783.0
    There has been much controversy over whether the claims of evolutionary psychologists, if true, imply that we humans are significantly less free than has traditionally been thought. This in turn gives rise to the concern that excuses are being given to philanderers and other ne’er-do-wells for their behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists themselves often respond to this concern by claiming that it presupposes that they believe in genetic determinism, which they do not. Philosophers, such as Janet Radcliffe Richards in Human Nature (...)
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  10. Simon Shengjian Xie (2009). What is Kant: A Compatibilist or an Incompatibilist? A New Interpretation of Kant's Solution to the Free Will Problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1):53-76.score: 768.0
    There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding (...)
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  11. Jason Turner (2013). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):125-137.score: 768.0
    The free will defense is a theistic strategy for resisting the atheistic argument known as “the logical problem of evil.” It insists that God may have to allow some evil in order to get the greater good of creatures freely choosing to act rightly. Many philosophers have thought that the free will defense requires the truth of incompatibilism, according to which acts cannot be free if they are causally determined. For it seems that if (...) is true, God should be able to get the goods of free creatures acting rightly without any evil by simply creating a world where creatures are causally determined to always act rightly. I argue that this is not so. First I describe and motivate a compatibilist account of free will according to which, although God can create creatures which are both free and causally determined, the freedom of determined creatures depends on God’s not taking into account what they will be determined to do. I then show how, given such a form of compatibilism, God may be able to create free and determined creatures without being able to create creatures determined to always freely act rightly. (shrink)
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  12. Benjamin Vilhauer (2008). Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will. In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.score: 753.0
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua (...)
     
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  13. Laura W. Ekstrom (2003). Free Will, Chance, and Mystery. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80.score: 699.0
    This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises (...)
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  14. Manuel Vargas (2009). Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement & Defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45 - 62.score: 696.0
    This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection (...)
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  15. Jason Brennan (2007). Free Will in the Block Universe. Philosophia 35 (2):207-217.score: 696.0
    Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions. I suggest that what (...)
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  16. Saul Smilansky (2012). Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):211-239.score: 696.0
    In Part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multi-level situation. In Part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend (...)
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  17. Manuel Vargas (2009). Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement and Defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.score: 696.0
    This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection (...)
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  18. Paul Russell (2008). Free Will, Art and Morality. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):307 - 325.score: 696.0
    The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that (...) will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject. (shrink)
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  19. Patrick Francken (1993). Incompatibilism, Nondeterministic Causation, and the Real Problem of Free Will. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:37-63.score: 696.0
    I argue that there cannot be a sense attached to “could have done otherwise” that is both compatible with the truth of determinism and relevant to the question of free will. Then I develop an incompatibilist response to the common objection that the incompatibilist requires of free actions that they have no causes and therefore cannot be anything for which an agent can be responsible. In the process, I bring out a similarity between compatibilism and incompatibilism (...)
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  20. Oisin Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism. Philosophical Psychology:1-26.score: 684.0
    Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism (...)
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  21. Michael McKenna (2009). Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3 - 13.score: 684.0
    In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist's perspective a critical discussion of "Four Views on Free Will" by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer's semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors' objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed (...)
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  22. Eddy Nahmias, The State of the Free Will Debate: From Frankfurt Cases to the Consequence Argument.score: 646.0
    In this paper I tie together the reasoning used in the Consequence Argument with the intuitions that drive Frankfurt cases in a way that illuminates some of the underlying differences between compatibilists and incompatibilists. I begin by explaining the ‘basic mechanism’ at work in Frankfurt cases: the existence of sufficient conditions for an outcome that do not actually bring about that outcome. I suggest that other potential threats to free will, such as God’s foreknowledge, can be understood in (...)
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  23. Richard Double (1997). Misdirection on the Free Will Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.score: 640.0
    The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, (...)
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  24. Manuel Vargas (2011). Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges. In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford UP.score: 630.0
    The present chapter is concerned with revisionism about free will. It begins by offering a new characterization of revisionist accounts and the way such accounts fit (or do not) in the familiar framework of compatibilism and incompatibilism. It then traces some of the recent history of the development of revisionist accounts, and concludes by remarking on some challenges for them.
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  25. Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.score: 612.0
    "This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
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  26. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 612.0
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined (...)
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  27. Laura W. Ekstrom (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview.score: 612.0
    In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to (...)
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  28. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2008). The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.score: 612.0
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that (...)
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  29. Kevin Timpe (forthcoming). Free WIll. In Neil Manson & Bob Barnard (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum.score: 612.0
    It is sometimes said that Augustine discovered the faculty of the will, and as a result inaugurated philosophy’s fascination with issues related to free will. While philosophers prior to Augustine clearly discussed related issues of, for example, voluntariness and agency, one finds in Augustine a focus on a faculty distinct from reason which is necessary for praise and blame that one would be hard-pressed to find in earlier thinkers. Augustine addressed the importance of free will (...)
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  30. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.) (2013). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.score: 612.0
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  31. Chris Weigel (2012). Experimental Evidence for Free Will Revisionism. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43.score: 605.3
    Philosophers who theorize about whether free will is compatible with causal determinism often rely on ordinary intuitions to bolster their theory. A revisionist theory of free will takes a different approach, saying that the best philosophical theory of what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we ordinarily do think about free will. I contend that revisionism has not been taken as seriously as should be because philosophers have not (...)
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  32. Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.score: 598.5
    I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
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  33. John D. Bishop (1993). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.score: 598.5
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  34. Gregory Harding (1997). Free Will and Determinism: Why Compatibilism is False. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.score: 598.5
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  35. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2004). The Trouble with Harry: Compatibilist Free Will Internalism and Manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.score: 598.5
  36. Filippo Santoni de Sio (2012). The Free Will Worth Wanting: Daniel Dennett and Contemporary Compatibilism. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (1):123-144.score: 598.5
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  37. Loren E. Lomasky (1975). Are Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense Compatible? Personalist 56:385-388.score: 598.5
     
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  38. Gregory B. Bonn (2013). Re-Conceptualizing Free Will for the 21st Century: Acting Independently with a Limited Role for Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 4:920.score: 594.0
    This paper examines the concept of free will, or independent action, in light of recent research in psychology and neuroscience. Reviewing findings in memory, prospection, and mental simulation, as well as the neurological mechanisms underlying behavioral control, planning, and integration, it is suggested in accord with previous arguments (e.g. Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2003) that a folk conception of free will as entirely conscious control over behavior should be rejected. However, it is argued that, when taken together, (...)
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  39. Alfred R. Mele (1999). Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.score: 576.0
    This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the "Intelligibility" and "Existence" questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls "The Significance Question" about (...) will: "Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom 'worth wanting'... and, if so, why?" A desire for "objective worth" has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire. (shrink)
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  40. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2004). The Phenomenology of Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.score: 576.0
    Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are supported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflict as well. We suggest that this should motivate an effort to study the phenomenology of free will in a more systematic way that goes beyond merely the introspective reports of the philosophers themselves. After presenting three disputes about the phenomenology of free will, we (...)
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  41. Richard M. Gale (1990). Freedom and the Free Will Defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423.score: 576.0
    It is my purpose to explore some of the problems concerning the relation between divine creation and creaturely freedom by criticizing various versions of the Free Will Defense (FWD hereafter).1 The FWD attempts to show how it is possible for God and moral evil to co-exist by describing a possible world in which God is morally justified or exonerated for creating persons who freely go wrong. Each version of the FWD has its own story to tell of how (...)
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  42. Nicholas Rescher (2008). Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal. Transaction Publishers.score: 576.0
    Introduction -- The nature of free will -- Requirements of freedom : preeminently deliberation -- Free will requires the absence of thought-external -- Determination over choices and decisions -- Choice and decision are crucial -- Doing and trying -- Free action and agent causality -- Modes of freedom -- Metaphysical and moral freedom -- Moral freedom is removed by manipulation and especially -- Compulsion -- Intention and moral standing -- Moral freedom of the will (...)
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  43. Joshua Shepherd (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: Experimental Studies. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):915-927.score: 576.0
    What are the folk-conceptual connections between free will and consciousness? In this paper I present results which indicate that consciousness plays central roles in folk conceptions of free will. When conscious states cause behavior, people tend to judge that the agent acted freely. And when unconscious states cause behavior, people tend to judge that the agent did not act freely. Further, these studies contribute to recent experimental work on folk philosophical affiliation, which analyzes folk responses to (...)
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  44. Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.score: 576.0
    The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they (...)
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  45. Donald Levy (2003). Neural Holism and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.score: 576.0
    Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: neural holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience (...)
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  46. Timothy O'Connor (ed.) (1995). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.score: 576.0
    Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated (...)
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  47. Derk Pereboom (2002). Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 477-488.score: 549.0
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  48. Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture. Neuroethics 4 (1):1-11.score: 549.0
    Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably (...)
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  49. John S. Callender (2010). Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.score: 549.0
    This book is aimed primarily at the practitioners of morals such as psychiatrists,lawyers and policy-makers. My professional background is clinical psychiatry It is divided into three parts. The first of these provides an overview of moral theory, morality in non-human species and recent developments in neuroscience that are of relevance to moral and legal responsibility. In the second part I offer a new paradigm of free action based on the overlaps between free will, moral value and art. (...)
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  50. Bruce N. Waller (2003). A Metacompatibilist Account of Free Will: Making Compatibilists and Incompatibilist More Compatible. Philosophical Studies 112 (3):209-224.score: 534.0
    The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree (...)
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