Search results for 'For free will compatibilism' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  91
    Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2010). The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  55
    Carrie Figdor & Mark Phelan (2015). Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627.
    Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. A. A. Howsepian (2007). Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense. Sophia 46 (3):217-236.
    It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  42
    Kenneth J. Perszyk (1999). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defence: A Reply to Bishop. Australasian Journal of Philosopy 77 (1):92-105.
    This paper 1) argues that libertarians are virtually as badly off as compatibilists in the face of the objection to the Free Will Defence that omnipotent God could have ensured that all free beings always but freely did right, and 2) explores the prospects for an "upgraded" Free Will Defense which takes freedom merely as a necessary condition for a further higher good which logically could not be achieved if God employed any of the available (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
    Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities to do otherwise are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6. Maria Brincker (2015). Evolution Beyond Determinism - on Dennett's Compatibilism and the Too Timeless Free Will Debate. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):39-74.
    Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Manuel Vargas (2006). Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work For Philosophical Debates on Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1):239-254.
    I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  8.  79
    John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Philip Pettit (1996). Strategies for Free Will Compatibilists. Analysis 56 (4):191-201.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  65
    James Lenman (2002). On the Alleged Shallowness of Compatibilism: A Critical Study of Saul Smilansky: Free Will and Illusion. Iyyun 51 (January):63-79.
    The millionaire’s idle, talentless and self-centered daughter inherits a large sum of money that she does not really deserve. The victim of kidnapping rots in a cell in 1980s Beirut in a captivity that springs not from any wrong he has done but from his ill-fortune in being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The hard-working, brilliant and self-denying Nobel Prize-winning scientist receives a large cheque for his extraordinarily productive labours. The murderer spends decades in jail for the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  61
    Saul Smilansky (2005). Free Will and Respect for Persons. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):248-261.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11. Ariel Yadin (2004). Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism. Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  46
    Brian Garvey (2008). Free Will, Compatibilism and the Human Nature Wars. Philosophical Explorations.
    There has been much controversy over whether the claims of evolutionary psychologists, if true, imply that we humans are significantly less free than has traditionally been thought. This in turn gives rise to the concern that excuses are being given to philanderers and other ne’er-do-wells for their behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists themselves often respond to this concern by claiming that it presupposes that they believe in genetic determinism, which they do not. Philosophers, such as Janet Radcliffe Richards in Human Nature (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  96
    Stephen G. Morris (2014). Commentary on “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism”. Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):802-807.
    In “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” Deery, Davis, and Carey recommend that experimental philosophers employ a new methodology for determining the extent to which the folk are natural compatibilists about free will and moral responsibility. While I agree that the general methodology that the authors developed holds great promise for improving our understanding of folk attitudes about free will and moral responsibility, I am much less enthusiastic about some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Simon Shengjian Xie (2009). What is Kant: A Compatibilist or an Incompatibilist? A New Interpretation of Kant's Solution to the Free Will Problem. Kant-Studien 100 (1):53-76.
    There are generally two controversial issues over Kant's solution to the free will problem. One is over whether he is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist and the other is over whether his solution is a success. In this paper, I will argue, regarding the first controversy, that “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” are not the right terms to describe Kant for his unique views on freedom and determinism; but that of the two, incompatibilist is the more accurate description. Regarding (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  31
    Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias (2016). “Local Determination”, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Robyn Repko Waller, A Response to Some Conceptual and Scientific Threats to Compatibilist Free Will.
    The aim of this dissertation is to respond to a collection of conceptual and scientific threats to compatibilist accounts of free will, particularly reasons-responsive views. Compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with the truth of determinism. Some compatibilists also claim that some actual agent at least sometimes acts freely, where it is true that she acts freely in virtue of her satisfying a specific set of control and epistemic conditions. These conditions often include the possession (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Benjamin Vilhauer (2008). Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will. In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Laura W. Ekstrom (2003). Free Will, Chance, and Mystery. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80.
    This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  19. Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (2015). The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism. Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801.
    Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the “natural” compatibilism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20. Verena Wagner (forthcoming). On the Analogy of Free Will and Free Belief. Synthese:1-26.
    Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  61
    Manuel Vargas (2009). Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement and Defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.
    This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  22. Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  23. Michael McKenna (2009). Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3-13.
    In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist's perspective a critical discussion of "Four Views on Free Will" by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer's semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors' objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  35
    Christopher Bartel (2015). Free Will and Moral Responsibility in Video Games. Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):285-293.
    Can a player be held morally responsible for the choices that she makes within a videogame? Do the moral choices that the player makes reflect in any way on the player’s actual moral sensibilities? Many videogames offer players the options to make numerous choices within the game, including moral choices. But the scope of these choices is quite limited. I attempt to analyze these issues by drawing on philosophical debates about the nature of free will. Many philosophers worry (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Manuel Vargas (2009). Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement & Defense. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45 - 62.
    This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26.  76
    Saul Smilansky (2012). Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):211-239.
    In Part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multi-level situation. In Part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    "This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   121 citations  
  28.  58
    Paul Russell (2008). Free Will, Art and Morality. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):307 - 325.
    The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that (...) will is required only in the sphere of morality—and that to this extent the art/morality analogy breaks down. I argue that both these incompatibilist approaches encounter significant problems and difficulties—and that incompatibilist have paid insufficient attention to these issues. However, although the analogy between art and morality may be welcomed by compatibilists, it does not pave the way for an easy or facile optimism on this subject. On the contrary, while the art/morality analogy may lend support to compatibilism it also serves to show that some worries of incompatibilism relating to the role of luck in human life cannot be easily set aside, which denies compatibilism any basis for complacent optimism on this subject. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29.  97
    Jason Brennan (2007). Free Will in the Block Universe. Philosophia 35 (2):207-217.
    Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions. I suggest that what (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  41
    Patrick Francken (1993). Incompatibilism, Nondeterministic Causation, and the Real Problem of Free Will. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:37-63.
    I argue that there cannot be a sense attached to “could have done otherwise” that is both compatible with the truth of determinism and relevant to the question of free will. Then I develop an incompatibilist response to the common objection that the incompatibilist requires of free actions that they have no causes and therefore cannot be anything for which an agent can be responsible. In the process, I bring out a similarity between compatibilism and incompatibilism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  10
    Robert Kane (2007). Free Will: New Directions for an Ancient Problem: A Reply to Allen and Rogers. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:291-302.
    Over the past three decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will motivated by a desire to reconcile a non-determinist view of free will with modern science as well as with recent developments in philosophy. A view of free will of the kind I defend did not exist in a developed form before the 1980s, but is now discussed in the philosophical literature as one of three chief options an incompatibilist or (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Manuel Vargas (2013). How to Solve the Problem of Free Will. In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. OUP Usa 400.
    This paper outlines one way of thinking about the problem of free will, some general reasons for dissatisfactions with traditional approaches to solving it, and some considerations in favor of pursuing a broadly revisionist solution to it. If you are looking for a student-friendly introduction to revisionist theorizing about free will, this is probably the thing to look at.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  34.  58
    Eddy Nahmias (2016). Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment. In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. OUP
    I offer analyses of free will in terms of a complex set of psychological capacities agents possess to varying degrees and have varying degrees of opportunities to exercise effectively, focusing on the under-appreciated but essential capacities for imagination. For an agent to have free will is for her to possess the psychological capacities to make decisions—to imagine alternatives for action, to select among them, and to control her actions accordingly—such that she is the author of her (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Laura W. Ekstrom (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview.
    In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  36. R. E. Hobart (1934). Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It. Mind 43 (169):1-27.
    The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   57 citations  
  37. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism. In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society.
  38. Manuel Vargas (2011). Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges. In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford UP
    The present chapter is concerned with revisionism about free will. It begins by offering a new characterization of revisionist accounts and the way such accounts fit (or do not) in the familiar framework of compatibilism and incompatibilism. It then traces some of the recent history of the development of revisionist accounts, and concludes by remarking on some challenges for them.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Eddy Nahmias, The State of the Free Will Debate: From Frankfurt Cases to the Consequence Argument.
    In this paper I tie together the reasoning used in the Consequence Argument with the intuitions that drive Frankfurt cases in a way that illuminates some of the underlying differences between compatibilists and incompatibilists. I begin by explaining the ‘basic mechanism’ at work in Frankfurt cases: the existence of sufficient conditions for an outcome that do not actually bring about that outcome. I suggest that other potential threats to free will, such as God’s foreknowledge, can be understood in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  22
    Randolph Clarke & Thomas Reed (2015). Free Will and Agential Powers. Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility 3:6-33.
    Free will is often said—by compatibilists and incompatibilists alike—to be a power (or complex of powers) of agents. This paper offers proposals for, and examines the prospects of, a powers-conception of free will that takes the powers in question to be causal dispositions. A difficulty for such an account stems from the idea that when one exercises free will, it is up to oneself whether one wills to do this or that. The paper also (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  63
    Chris Weigel (2012). Experimental Evidence for Free Will Revisionism. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43.
    Philosophers who theorize about whether free will is compatible with causal determinism often rely on ordinary intuitions to bolster their theory. A revisionist theory of free will takes a different approach, saying that the best philosophical theory of what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we ordinarily do think about free will. I contend that revisionism has not been taken as seriously as should be because philosophers have not (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2008). The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Richard Double (1997). Misdirection on the Free Will Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.
    The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  67
    Kevin Timpe (forthcoming). Free WIll. In Neil Manson & Bob Barnard (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum
    It is sometimes said that Augustine discovered the faculty of the will, and as a result inaugurated philosophy’s fascination with issues related to free will. While philosophers prior to Augustine clearly discussed related issues of, for example, voluntariness and agency, one finds in Augustine a focus on a faculty distinct from reason which is necessary for praise and blame that one would be hard-pressed to find in earlier thinkers. Augustine addressed the importance of free will (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.) (2013). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.
    I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2004). The Phenomenology of Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.
    Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are supported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflict as well. We suggest that this should motivate an effort to study the phenomenology of free will in a more systematic way that goes beyond merely the introspective reports of the philosophers themselves. After presenting three disputes about the phenomenology of free will, we (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  48.  65
    Stefaan E. Cuypers (2004). The Trouble with Harry: Compatibilist Free Will Internalism and Manipulation. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):235-254.
  49. John D. Bishop (1993). Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):104-20.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Gregory Harding (1997). Free Will and Determinism: Why Compatibilism is False. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000