Search results for 'Frédérique Vignemont' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  91
    Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique Vignemont (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
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  2.  15
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2009). Review: Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In "Simulating minds", Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman's theory. (...)
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  3. Fréderique Vignemont (2008). Empathie miroir et empathie reconstrucctive. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 3:337-346.
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  4.  89
    Frederique De Vignemont & Tania Singer (2006). The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (10):435-441.
  5. Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob (2012). What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain? Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the (...)
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  6. Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Is Social Cognition Embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):154-159.
    Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...)
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  7.  66
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2010). Embodiment, Ownership and Disownership. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):1-12.
    There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and (...)
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  8. Frederique de Vignemont (2007). Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body. Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  9.  22
    Adrian Alsmith & Frédérique De Vignemont (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
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  10. Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Self for the Body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
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  11. Frederique de Vignemont (2005). Body Mereology. In G. Knoblich, I. M. Thornton, M. Grosjean & M. Shiffrar (eds.), Human Body Perception From the Inside Out. Oxford University Press
  12.  25
    Frederique de Vignemont (2014). Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):542-560.
    Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014] and Klein [forthcoming]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain (...)
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  13.  38
    Uta Frith & Frederique de Vignemont (2005). Egocentrism, Allocentrism, and Asperger Syndrome. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):719-738.
    In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person (...)
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  14.  53
    José Luis Bermúdez (2015). Bodily Ownership, Bodily Awareness and Knowledge Without Observation. Analysis 75 (1):37-45.
    In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber (...)
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  15.  38
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2014). A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness. Mind 123 (492):00-00.
    One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, and balance). It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to (...)
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  16.  13
    Pierre Jacob & Frédérique de Vignemont (2010). Spatial Coordinates and Phenomenology in the Two-Visual Systems Model. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
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  17.  69
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences. Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):188-204.
    The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences (Noë, 2004), but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.
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  18.  69
    Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Touch. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
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  19.  45
    Alessia Folegatti, Alessandro Farnè, R. Salemme & Frédérique De Vignemont (2012). The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two's a Company, but Three's a Crowd. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):799-812.
    On the one hand, it is often assumed that the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is constrained by a structural body model so that one cannot implement supernumerary limbs. On the other hand, several recent studies reported illusory duplication of the right hand in subjects exposed to two adjacent rubber hands. The present study tested whether spatial constraints may affect the possibility of inducing the sense of ownership to two rubber hands located side by side to the left of the subject's (...)
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  20.  67
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2009). Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds , Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s (...)
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  21.  20
    Frederique de Vignemont (2012). Habeas Corpus: poczucie własności swojego ciała. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  22. Philippe Fossati Allilaire, Frédérique de Vignemont, Tiziana Zalla, Andrés Posada, Anne Louvegnez, Olivier Koenig, Nicolas Georgieff, Nicolas Franck, Arnaud DÕArgembeau & Martial Van der Linden (2006). Cédric Lemogne, Pascale Piolino, Stéphanie Friszer, Astrid Claret, Nathalie Girault, Roland Jouvent, Jean-François. Consciousness and Cognition 15:232-233.
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  23.  17
    Przemysław Nowakowski (2012). Czy moje ciało ucieleśnia poznanie? Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    [Does my body embody cognition?] The works published in this section address the question of embodied cognition in an inspiring manner. In her article written ten years ago, Natika Newton deals with the notion of the relation between mental representation and embodiment. Frederique de Vignemont in his text written five years prior begins a strictly philosophical debate regarding the sense of ownership of one’s own body. Claire Petitmengin’s article is a kind of counterpoint to the previous texts. She attempts (...)
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  24.  37
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2007). How Many Representations of the Body? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):204-205.
    Based on functional differences, Dijkerman and de Haan emphasize the duality of somatosensory processing and therefore of body representations. But how many body representations do we really have? And what kind of criterion can we use to distinguish them? I review here the empirical and conceptual difficulties in drawing such distinctions and the way to progress.
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  25.  13
    Frédérique De Vignemont & Hugo Mercier, Under Influence.
    In many circumstances we tend to assume that other people believe or desire what we ourselves believe or desire. This has been labeled 'egocentric bias.' This is not to say that we systematically fail to understand other people and forget that they can have a different perspective. If it were the case, then it would be highly difficult, if not impossible, to communicate, cooperate or compete with them. In those situations, we need to take the other person's perspective and to (...)
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  26.  7
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2006). A Review of Shaun Gallagher: How the Body Shapes the Mind. [REVIEW] Psyche 12 (1):1-7.
    With 'How the body shapes the mind', Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the importance of the body in cognition, based on significant experimental results. His main goals here are (1) to describe body awareness in detail and (2) to investigate the influence of the body on self-consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. Here, I focus on two points: the distinction between the body schema and the body image and the structuring role of the body.
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  27.  4
    Frédérique de Vignemont (2008). Empathie miroir et empathie reconstructive. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 3 (3):337-345.
    Étant donné la confusion conceptuelle quant à la définition même de l’empathie, il me paraît utile d’en distinguer deux formes spécifiques, l’empathie miroir et l’empathie reconstructive. Dans les deux cas, je partage l’émotion de l’autre, mais de manières différentes. Brièvement, l’empathie miroir est provoquée par la perception d’indices émotionnels, tandis que l’empathie reconstructive est induite par la simulation de la situation émotionnelle de l’autre. J’analyse ici plus en détail leur spécificité respective, ainsi que leurs limites.Given the general confusion surrounding the (...)
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  28.  1
    Frédérique De Vignemont (2006). L'hystérie : ne plus vouloir pouvoir, ne plus pouvoir vouloir. Philosophiques 33 (1):197-215.
    L’hystérie se définit comme un déficit fonctionnel sans cause organique. Par exemple, certains patients sont incapables de se mouvoir volontairement, comme s’ils étaient véritablement paralysés, sans que l’on puisse fournir une explication physiologique. À l’inverse, les patients souffrant d’anosognosie sont véritablement paralysés, mais affirment pouvoir bouger. Ces pathologies résultent toutes deux d’un trouble de la conscience de la capacité à agir : les uns croient qu’ils ne peuvent pas agir alors qu’ils le pourraient et les autres croient pouvoir agir alors (...)
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  29. Frédérique de Vignemont (2006). Brainreading of Perceptual Experiences: A Challenge for First-Person Authority? Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):151-162.
    According to a traditional Cartesian view of the mind, you have a privileged access to your own conscious experiences that nobody else can have. Therefore, you have more authority than anybody else on your own experiences. Perceptual experiences are selfintimating: you are aware of what you are consciously perceiving. If you report seeing a pink elephant, nobody is entitled to deny it. There may be no pink elephant, but you do have the conscious experience of such elephant. However, the progress (...)
     
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  30. Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Bodily Spatial Content. Psyche 15 (1).
    The classic notion of an egocentric frame of reference cannot be easily applied to bodily space, given the difficulties in providing a centre of such frame as well as axes on which one could compute distances and directions . Yet, Smith tries to rehabilitate the egocentric account of bodily frame by switching from an anatomical definition of egocentricity to a more functional definition . Here I will review some empirical evidence that shows that one cannot ground bodily experiences in action. (...)
     
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  31. Frédérique de Vignemont (2014). Ukąszenie komara przeciwko enaktywistycznemu ujęciu doświadczeń cielesnych. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1.
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  32. Christine van Geen & Frederique de Vignemont (eds.) (2006). European Review of Philosophy, 6: The Structure of Nonconceptual Content. Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    Can concepts represent subtleties in emotions, bodily sensations, and perceptions? What is the nature of mental representations in nonlinguistic and prelinguistic creatures? _The European Review of Philosophy, Volume 6_ tackles issues such as these by asking how far the analogy between conceptual and nonconceptual content can be carried. By bringing together contributions from both conceptualists and nonconceptualists, this volume sheds new light on an issue sure to interest cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind.
     
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  33.  8
    John Michael & Francesca Fardo (2014). What (If Anything) Is Shared in Pain Empathy? A Critical Discussion of De Vignemont and Jacob's Theory of the Neural Substrate of Pain Empathy. Philosophy of Science 81 (1):154-160.
    In a recent article in Philosophy of Science, De Vignemont and Jacob defend the view that empathy involves interpersonal similarity between an empathizer and a target person with respect to internal affective states. Focusing on empathy for pain, they propose a theory of the neural substrate of pain empathy. We point out several flaws in their interpretation of the data and argue that currently available data do not differentiate between De Vignemont and Jacob’s model and alternative models. Finally, (...)
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  34.  4
    Robert Tindall (2016). Subversive Spiritualities: How Rituals Enact the World. Frédérique, Apffel‐Marglin. Oxford University Press, 2012. 264 Pp. ISBN 978‐0199793860, $38.95. [REVIEW] Anthropology of Consciousness 27 (1):102-104.
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  35.  37
    Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Replies to Perner and Brandl, Saxe, Vignemont, and Carruthers. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):477 - 491.
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  36.  7
    Cavendish Hooke, Jonathan Barnes, David William Bates & David Bloor (forthcoming). Abromeit, John. Max Horkheimer and the Foundations of the Frankfurt School. New York: Cambridge UP, 2011. Xiii, 441p., Bibl., Ill., Index, $95. Intellectual Biography of the Early and Middle Horkheimer, 1895–1941. Aıt-Touati, Frédérique. Fictions of the Cosmos: Science and Literature in the Seventeenth Century. Trans. Susan Emanuel. Chicago: U of Chicago P. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Ideas.
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  37.  11
    Yvon Lafrance (2000). Protagoras Platon Traduction inédite, introduction et notes par Frédérique Ildefonse Collection «GF-Texte intégral» Paris, Flammarion, 1997, 267 p. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (02):391-.
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  38.  3
    Jesse D. Hurlbut (2006). Bernard Bousmanne, Céline Van Hoorebeeck, Et Al., Eds., La Librairie des Ducs de Bourgogne: Manuscrits Conservés À la Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, 1: Textes Liturgiques, Ascétiques, Théologiques, Philosophiques Et Moraux. Turnhout: Brepols, 2000. Pp. 369; Black-and-White Figures and 1 Table. €62.Bernard Bousmanne, Frédérique Johan, and Céline Van Hoorebeeck, Eds., La Librairie des Ducs de Bourgogne: Manuscrits Conservés À la Bibliothéque Royale de Belgique, 2: Textes Didactiques. Turnhout: Brepols, 2004. CD-ROM with Accompanying Booklet. €1,300. [REVIEW] Speculum 81 (3):813-815.
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  39.  1
    Anthony J. DeSantis (2012). Frédérique Aït-Touati.Fictions of the Cosmos: Science and Literature in the Seventeenth Century. Trans. Susan Emanuel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. Pp. X+261. $45.00. [REVIEW] Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):387-390.
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  40.  5
    J. H. W. Penney (1993). Greek and Latin Letters Frédérique Biville: Graphie Et Prononciation des Mots Grecs En Latin. (Bibliothèque de L'Information Grammaticale, 7.) Pp. 31. Paris and Louvain: S.I.G./Peeters, 1987. Paper, B.Fr. 350. Frédérique Biville: Les Emprunts du Latin au Grec. Approche Phonétique. Tome I. Introduction Et Consonantisme. (Bibliothèque de l'Information Grammaticale, 19.) Pp. 399. Paris and Louvain: Peeters, 1990. Paper, B.Fr. 2,100. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 43 (2):320-321.
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  41.  2
    Chantal Kircher (2008). Frédérique Fleck — Interrogation, coordination et subordination, le latin quin. Corpus 7.
    Cet ouvrage a été réalisé à partir de la thèse soutenue par l’auteur le premier décembre 2006 à Paris IV. Le titre met bien en évidence les multiples systèmes de la langue dans lequel intervient le terme étudié, que l’on a pu caractériser de « Protée syntaxique ». Dès l’introduction, le problème est bien posé et la démarche bien explicitée avec l’annonce d’un plan justifié par la place donnée à la perspective historique – ce qui ne surprend pas chez un (...)
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  42. Marshall Clagett (1985). Les Pretres-Ouab de Sekhmet Et les Conjurateurs de Serket by Frederique von Kanel. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 76:628-629.
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  43. Object Oriented Databases (1996). Frederique BULLAT Lionel MALLORDY Michel SCHNEIDER Laboratoire d'lnformatique Universite Blaise Pascal Clermont-Ferrand II. Esda 1996: Expert Systems and Ai; Neural Networks 7:131.
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  44. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Replies to Perner and Brandl, Saxe, Vignemont, and Carruthers. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):477-491.
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  45. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (2004). Moderata FONTE [Modesta Pozzo], Le Mérite des Femmes, Traduction, Annotation Et Postface de Frédérique Verrier, Paris, Éditions Rue d'Ulm , 2002, 267 P. [REVIEW] Clio 18:286-288.
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  46.  87
    Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de (...)
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  47.  25
    Fraser MacBride & Frederique Janssen-Lauret (2015). Meta-Ontology, Epistemology & Essence: On the Empirical Deduction of the Categories. The Monist 98 (3):290-302.
    A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information about the world outside of us. So the justification for a theory of the categories must derive from the empirical support of the scientific theories whose descriptions it unifies and clarifies. We don’t have reliable information about the de re modal profiles of external things either because the overwhelming proportion of our knowledge of the external world is theoretical—knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. This undermines (...)
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  48. Monika Dullstein (2013). Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein's Account of Empathy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...)
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  49.  43
    F. de Vignemont & P. Fourneret (2004). The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the "Who" System. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of (...)
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  50. F. de Vignemont (2013). The Mark of Bodily Ownership. Analysis 73 (4):643-651.
    I am aware that this hand is my own. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than judgements? On the deflationary view recently defended by Martin and Bermúdez in their works, the sense of bodily ownership has no counterpart at the experiential level. Here I present a series of cases that the deflationary account cannot easily accommodate, including belief-independent illusions of ownership and experiences of disownership despite the presence of bodily (...)
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