I would like to show how with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, we have to do with three different ways of understanding the experience of the other. For Sartre it is a visual experience, the experience of being looked at by the other, so that the experience of the other is understood as a confrontation; for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the other necessarily implies coexistence and what he calls intercorporeality, so that for him the other is never to be found in (...) front, but instead beside me, in reciprocity with me; for Levinas, the experience of the other is the experience of a non-reciprocity, of an assymetrical relation, because the experience of the other is for him an ethical and not an ontological experience, and because this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other : the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas. (shrink)
Translated by David Farrell Krell. This essay continues the project, also found in "Qui est le Zarathoustra de Nietzsche?" published in first issue of this journal, of discerning the importance of Asian sources for emergent modern European thought. It explores Novalis's relation to the now mostly neglected Sanskrit myth (and play by Kālidāsa) of Shakuntala, clarifying its importance for Novalis's view of the interpenetration of the visible and the invisible and the need for a visual symbol, such as the ring, (...) as pointer and reminder of the invisible's fullness and pervasiveness, in this world, as Love. (shrink)
Françoise Dastur (2009). The Body of Speech. In Robert Vallier, Wayne Jeffrey Froman & Bernard Flynn (eds.), Merleau-Ponty and the Possibilities of Philosophy: Transforming the Tradition. State University of New York Press.
This paper is dedicated to the analysis of some important points of Patočka’s Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History in order to question his major thesis of the common origin of philosophy, politics and history shared by Hannah Arendt and based on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological conception of the Greek beginning. It tries to show the complexity of Patočka’s conception of Europe, which on one side can be understood as falling into Eurocentrism, but on the other side brings to (...) light the dark face of modern European nihilism and planetary domination and tries to find a remedy for it by appealing to a philosophical conversion leading to the recognition of the diversity of human culture. (shrink)
It has often been considered that the most important part of Derrida's work consisted in the five books published between 1967 and 1972. This paper intends, by way of a re-reading of Derrida's most powerful text from this period, Speech and Phenomena, to bring to light Derrida's specific manner of uniting the question of the disruption of presence to the question of writing. What is therefore questioned is Derrida's emphasis on death, considered as the very condition of possibility of language (...) and writing. As Derrida rightfully shows, Husserl, in spite of the importance he conferred upon writing in the process of idealization, was not aware of the fact that the relationship to death constitutes the concrete structure of the living present. But on the other hand, by still opposing in a too dualistic manner presence and absence, life and death, Derrida himself was not able to see that the condition of language is not so much the death of the subject as the being toward death and the finitude of Dasein. (shrink)
How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the "paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology," and for this reason, she concludes, "We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified with (...) openness to unpredictability." The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)
: Françoise Dastur describes her efforts to practice history of philosophy in a (paradoxically) non-historical fashion. She discusses her concept of the historical, and argues that the only true way to be of one's time is to be against one's time.
Le jeune Heidegger, dont la lecture principale demeura pendant de longues années les Recherches logiques de Husserl, a consacré ses premiers travaux aux problèmes logiques. Sa Dissertation de 1914 analyse les théories du jugement de cinq logiciens contemporains, Wundt, Maier, Brentano, Marty et Lipps qui ont en commun de demeurer à l'intérieur du psychologisme, c'est-à-dire de considérer le jugement comme un acte psychique au lieu de le situer, comme le fait Husserl, dans la sphère logique du sens. C'est sur (...) cette notion de sens que le jeune Heidegger fait porter ses questions et c'est l'analyse de sa structure relationnelle qui lui permet, en s'appuyant sur la théorie de la validité de Lotze et à la suite de Lask et de sa Théorie du jugement de 1912, d'éclairer décisivement la nature proprement logique du jugement. The young Heidegger, whose main reading remained during many years Husserl's Logical Investigations, dedicated his first works to logical problems. His Dissertation (1914) analyses the theories of judgement of five contemporary logicians, Wundt, Maier, Brentano, Marty, and Lipps, who share the same psychologist attitude, which means that they consider judgment as a psychological act instead of situating it in the logical sphere of sense, as does Husserl. The young Heidegger concentrates his questions on this notion of sense and through the analysis of its relational structure, with the help of Lotze's theory of validity and in following the indications given by Lask in his book of 1912 on The Theory of Judgment, he undertakes a decisive elucidation of the properly logical nature of judgment. (shrink)