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Profile: Frances Egan (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1.  157 DLs
    Frances Egan (2012). Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the Dog. Journal of Cognitive Science 13:39-49.
  2.  96 DLs
    Frances Egan (forthcoming). Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms. In David M. Kaplan (ed.), Integrating Mind and Brain Science: Mechanistic Perspectives and Beyond. Oxford University Press
    A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called function-theoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function contributes to the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals the causal structure of (...)
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  3.  91 DLs
    Frances Egan (2012). Representationalism. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science. OUP
    Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of (...)
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  4.  84 DLs
    Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
  5.  82 DLs
    Frances Egan (1992). Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.
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  6.  81 DLs
    Frances Egan (2003). Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In? In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 89--104.
  7.  71 DLs
    Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  8.  65 DLs
    Frances Egan (2013). How to Think About Mental Content. Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
    Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...)
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  9.  63 DLs
    Frances Egan (2008). The Content of Color Experience. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):407–414.
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  10.  62 DLs
    Frances Egan (2010). Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.
    The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Keywords: Computation; Representational content; Cognitive capacities; Explanation.
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  11.  58 DLs
    Frances Egan & Robert J. Matthews (2006). Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way. Synthese 153 (3):377-391.
    The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and (...)
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  12.  48 DLs
    Frances Egan (1999). In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.
    Externalism about the mind holds that the explanation of our representational capacities requires appeal to mental states that are individuated by reference to features of the environment. Externalists claim that ‘narrow’ taxonomies cannot account for important features of psychological explanation. I argue that this claim is false, and offer a general argument for preferring narrow taxonomies in psychology.
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  13.  46 DLs
    Frances Egan (1991). Must Psychology Be Individualistic? Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.
  14.  34 DLs
    Frances Egan (2009). Wide Content. In A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP
  15.  32 DLs
    Frances Egan (forthcoming). Function-Theoretic Explanation and Neural Mechanisms. In David M. Kaplan (ed.), Integrating Mind and Brain Science: Mechanistic Perspectives and Beyond.
    A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called function-theoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...)
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  16.  30 DLs
    Frances Egan (1998). The Moon Illusion. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):604-23.
    Ever since Berkeley discussed the problem at length in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, theorists of vision have attempted to explain why the moon appears larger on the horizon than it does at the zenith. Prevailing opinion has it that the contemporary perceptual psychologists Kaufman and Rock have finally explained the illusion. This paper argues that Kaufman and Rock have not refuted a Berkeleyan account of the illusion, and have over-interpreted their own experimental results. The moon illusion (...)
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  17.  22 DLs
    Frances Egan (2013). Explaining Representation: A Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies (1):1-6.
    Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy project in the paper is to (...)
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  18.  21 DLs
    Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  19.  18 DLs
    Frances Egan (1998). Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 107 (1):118-120.
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  20.  11 DLs
    Frances Egan (1991). Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):379 - 388.
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  21.  8 DLs
    Frances Egan (1994). Individualism and Vision Theory. Analysis 54 (4):258-264.
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  22.  7 DLs
    Frances Egan (1990). Review: Vindicating Intentional Realism. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59 - 61.
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  23.  5 DLs
    Frances Egan (2013). Milkowski, Marcin., Explaining the Computational Mind. Review of Metaphysics 67 (2):436-438.
  24.  2 DLs
    Frances Egan (2009). Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology? In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell 14.
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  25.  1 DLs
    Frances Egan (1999). Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer 217--228.
  26.  0 DLs
    Frances Egan (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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  27.  0 DLs
    Frances Egan (2009). 20.1 Arguments for Wide Content. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press 351.
     
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  28.  0 DLs
    Frances Egan (1996). Intentionality and the Theory of Vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press
     
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