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Profile: Frances Egan (Rutgers University)
  1. Frances Egan (forthcoming). Function-Theoretic Explanation and Neural Mechanisms. In David M. Kaplan (ed.), Integrating Mind and Brain Science: Mechanistic Perspectives and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
    A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called function-theoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function contributes to the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals the causal structure of (...)
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  2. Frances Egan (2013). Explaining Representation: A Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies:1-6.
  3. Frances Egan (2013). How to Think About Mental Content. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
  4. Frances Egan (2012). Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the Dog. Journal of Cognitive Science 13:39-49.
  5. Frances Egan (2012). Representationalism. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science. OUP.
    Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of (...)
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  6. Frances Egan (2010). Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.
  7. Frances Egan (2009). 20.1 Arguments for Wide Content. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 351.
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  8. Frances Egan (2009). Is There a Role for Representational Content in Scientific Psychology? In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. 14.
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  9. Frances Egan (2009). Wide Content. In A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP.
  10. Frances Egan (2008). The Content of Color Experience. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):407–414.
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  11. Frances Egan & Robert J. Matthews (2006). Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way. Synthese 153 (3):377-391.
    The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and (...)
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  12. Frances Egan (2003). Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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  13. Frances Egan (2003). Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In? In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 89--104.
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  14. Frances Egan (1999). In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.
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  15. Frances Egan (1999). Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination. In. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. 217--228.
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  16. Frances Egan (1998). Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 107 (1):118-120.
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  17. Frances Egan (1998). The Moon Illusion. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):604-23.
    Ever since Berkeley discussed the problem at length in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, theorists of vision have attempted to explain why the moon appears larger on the horizon than it does at the zenith. Prevailing opinion has it that the contemporary perceptual psychologists Kaufman and Rock have finally explained the illusion. This paper argues that Kaufman and Rock have not refuted a Berkeleyan account of the illusion, and have over-interpreted their own experimental results. The moon illusion (...)
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  18. Frances Egan (1996). Intentionality and the Theory of Vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
     
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  19. Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
  20. Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
    It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.
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  21. Frances Egan (1994). Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  22. Frances Egan (1994). Individualism and Vision Theory. Analysis 54 (4):258-264.
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  23. Frances Egan (1992). Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.
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  24. Frances Egan (1991). Must Psychology Be Individualistic? Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.
  25. Frances Egan (1991). Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):379 - 388.
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  26. Frances Egan (1990). Review: Vindicating Intentional Realism. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59 - 61.
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