Search results for 'Frances Howard-snyder Neil Feit' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  20
    Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder & Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304–327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...)
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  2. Scott A. Davison (2011). On the Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer: Response to Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):227 - 237.
    I respond to Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder’s criticisms of my arguments in another place for the conclusion that human supplicants would have little responsibility (if any) for the result of answered petitionary prayer, and criticize their defense of the claim that God would have good reasons for creating an institution of petitionary prayer.
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  3.  3
    Secondary Qualities (1999). Frances Howard-Snyder. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3).
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  4.  3
    Suck-Jung Park & Hypothetico-Deductivism is Still (2004). Michael Kremer/How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism 1–26 Neil Campbell/Generalizing Qualia Inversion 27–34 M. Janvid/Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity 35–49 Daniel Howard-Snyder/Lehrer's Case Against. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 60 (1):423-424.
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  5.  7
    Martin Peterson (2016). The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Reply to Schmidt, Brown, Howard-Snyder, Crisp, Andric and Tanyi, and Gertken. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):71-82.
    In this article I respond to comments and objections raised in the special issue on my book The Dimensions of Consequentialism. I defend my multi-dimensional consequentialist theory against a range of challenges articulated by Thomas Schmidt, Campbell Brown, Frances Howard-Snyder, Roger Crisp, Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi, and Jan Gertken. My aim is to show that multi-dimensional consequentialism is, at least, a coherent and intuitively plausible alternative to one-dimensional theories such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and mainstream accounts of egalitarianism. (...)
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  6.  37
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2001). What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder. Utilitas 13 (3):342.
    If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that (...)
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  7.  62
    Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (2013). The Problem of De Se Attitudes: An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays. In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications 1-25.
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  8. Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  9.  62
    Neil Feit (2013). Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content. In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications 105-31.
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  10.  43
    Neil Feit (2008). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  11.  21
    Neil Feit (2016). Comparative Harm, Creation and Death. Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
    Given that a person's death is bad for her, when is it bad? I defend subsequentism, the view that things that are bad in the relevant way are bad after they occur. Some have objected to this view on the grounds that it requires us to compare the amount of well-being the victim would have enjoyed, had she not died, with the amount she receives while dead; however, we cannot assign any level of well-being, not even zero, to a dead (...)
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  12.  51
    Neil Feit (2015). Plural Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
    In this paper, I construct and defend an account of harm, specifically, all-things-considered overall harm. I start with a simple comparative account, on which an event harms a person provided that she would have been better off had it not occurred. The most significant problems for this account are overdetermination and preemption cases. However, a counterfactual comparative approach of some sort is needed to make sense of harm, or so I argue. I offer a counterfactual comparative theory that accounts nicely (...)
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  13.  65
    Neil Feit (2002). The Time of Death's Misfortune. Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
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  14.  14
    Stephen Kershnar & Neil Feit (2001). The Most Valuable Player. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (2):193-206.
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  15.  39
    Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  16.  38
    Neil Feit (2000). Self-Ascription and Belief de Re. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  17.  41
    Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  18.  28
    Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  19.  35
    Neil Feit (2003). Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  20.  39
    Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  21.  23
    Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  22.  44
    Neil Feit (1998). More on Brute Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):625 – 630.
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  23. Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Public Aefairs Quarterly. Public Affairs Quarterly 18:273.
     
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  24.  18
    Neil Feit (2001). The Structure of Higher Goods. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):47-57.
  25.  26
    Neil Feit (2006). The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
  26.  11
    Neil Feit (1996). On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:381 - 386.
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  27.  3
    Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Explaining the Geometry of Desert. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.
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  28.  15
    Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.) (2013). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications.
    In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various (...)
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  29. Neil Feit (1996). Graduate Papers From the Joint Session 1995: On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):381-386.
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  30. Neil Feit (2012). Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--213.
     
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  31.  77
    M. W. Howard (1984). Michael W. Howard -- Utopianism and Nuclear Deterrence. Philosophy and Social Criticism 10 (3-4):53-65.
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  32. M. W. Howard (1980). Reviews : Mickael W. Howard -- From Commodity Fetishism to Market Socialism: Critical Notes on Stanley Moore. Philosophy and Social Criticism 7 (2):184-214.
  33. D. Howard (1976). Moral Development and Ego Identity: A Clarification by Dick Howard. Télos 1976 (27):176-182.
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  34. John Locke & Alfred Howard (1825). The Beauties of Locke, Selections, by A. Howard.
     
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  35. Jeremy Rifkin & Ted Howard (1980). Entropy a New World View /by Jeremy Rifkin with Ted Howard ; Afterword by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. --. --. Viking Press,1980.
     
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  36.  42
    Vuko Andrić (2015). Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’. Ratio 29 (2):n/a-n/a.
    This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally (...)
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  37.  26
    P. Hanks (2009). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content * by Neil Feit. Analysis 69 (3):570-572.
    In this short, clear and engaging book, Neil Feit defends the unorthodox view that the contents of beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are properties, and not, as is usually held, propositions. The core of his argument has to do with de se beliefs, beliefs about the self. Based on examples and arguments due to Perry , Lewis and Chisholm , along with considerations about internalism and physicalism, Feit offers a battery of arguments for the conclusion that the (...)
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  38.  32
    William Lane Craig (2006). Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder. Philosophia Christi 8 (1):101 - 113.
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  39.  12
    J. L. Schellenberg (1996). Response to Howard-Snyder. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):455 - 462.
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  40.  14
    James Bradley (2003). Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Paul K. Moser. Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Review of Metaphysics 56 (4):884-885.
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  41.  64
    William L. Rowe (1998). In Defense of 'the Free Will Defense' Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (2):115 - 120.
  42.  42
    Nick Trakakis (2003). Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Eds.), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (1):53-55.
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  43.  2
    John O'leary-Hawthorne (1996). Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant: J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and D. Howard-Snyder. Religious Studies 32 (2):233-258.
    The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs , and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and a more conservative Kantian view. We reject the theistic-belief-as-mere-practical-belief view: it is bad descriptive anthropology, (...)
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  44.  32
    Edward N. Martin (1997). Daniel Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 42 (2):119-121.
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  45.  12
    Cara Spencer (2009). Review of Neil Feit, Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  46. Klaas J. Kraay (2003). Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, Eds., Divine Hiddenness: New Essays Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (1):33-35.
     
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  47.  7
    Robert McKim (2002). Review of Daniel Howard-Snyder, Paul K. Moser (Eds.), Divine Hiddenness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (8).
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  48.  1
    Stephen T. Davis (2004). The Mad/Bad/God Trilemma: A Reply to Daniel Howard-Snyder. Faith and Philosophy 21 (4):480-492.
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  49.  2
    Nick Trakakis (2003). Book Review : Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Eds.), Divine Hiddenness : New Essays. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (1):53-55.
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  50. W. L. Rowe (2003). Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Paul K. Moser, Eds., Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):606.
     
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