Search results for 'Frances Howard-snyder Neil Feit' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daniel & Frances Howard-Snyder Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304–327.score: 3870.0
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  2. Scott A. Davison (2011). On the Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer: Response to Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):227 - 237.score: 345.6
    I respond to Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder’s criticisms of my arguments in another place for the conclusion that human supplicants would have little responsibility (if any) for the result of answered petitionary prayer, and criticize their defense of the claim that God would have good reasons for creating an institution of petitionary prayer.
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  3. Secondary Qualities (1999). Frances Howard-Snyder. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3).score: 259.2
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  4. Suck-Jung Park & Hypothetico-Deductivism is Still (2004). Michael Kremer/How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism 1–26 Neil Campbell/Generalizing Qualia Inversion 27–34 M. Janvid/Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity 35–49 Daniel Howard-Snyder/Lehrer's Case Against. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 60 (1):423-424.score: 253.8
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  5. Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.score: 240.0
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  6. Neil Feit (2002). The Time of Death's Misfortune. Noûs 36 (3):359–383.score: 240.0
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  7. Neil Feit (2008). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  8. Neil Feit (1998). More on Brute Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):625 – 630.score: 240.0
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  9. Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.score: 240.0
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  10. Neil Feit (2013). Plural Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 240.0
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  11. Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.score: 240.0
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  12. Neil Feit (2003). Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.score: 240.0
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  13. Neil Feit (2006). The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.score: 240.0
  14. Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.score: 240.0
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  15. Neil Feit (2000). Self-Ascription and Belief de Re. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.score: 240.0
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  16. Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.score: 240.0
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  17. Neil Feit (1996). On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:381 - 386.score: 240.0
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  18. Neil Feit (2001). The Structure of Higher Goods. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):47-57.score: 240.0
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  19. Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Explaining the Geometry of Desert. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.score: 240.0
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  20. Stephen Kershnar & Neil Feit (2001). The Most Valuable Player. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (2):193-206.score: 240.0
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  21. Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Public Aefairs Quarterly. Public Affairs Quarterly 18:273.score: 240.0
     
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  22. Neil Feit (2012). Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--213.score: 240.0
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  23. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2001). What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder. Utilitas 13 (03):342-.score: 205.2
    If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that (...)
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  24. M. W. Howard (1980). Reviews : Mickael W. Howard -- From Commodity Fetishism to Market Socialism: Critical Notes on Stanley Moore. Philosophy and Social Criticism 7 (2):184-214.score: 120.0
  25. M. W. Howard (1984). Michael W. Howard -- Utopianism and Nuclear Deterrence. Philosophy and Social Criticism 10 (3-4):53-65.score: 120.0
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  26. D. Howard (1976). Moral Development and Ego Identity: A Clarification by Dick Howard. Telos 1976 (27):176-182.score: 120.0
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  27. Scott Forschler (2009). Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism. Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.score: 86.4
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the (...)
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  28. Erik Carlson (1999). The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 11 (01):91-96.score: 86.4
    Frances Howard-Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard-Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘producing the best consequences’ in which we cannot do so, objective (...)
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  29. Klaas J. Kraay (2005). William L. Rowe's A Priori Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 22 (2):211-234.score: 86.4
    William Rowe’s a posteriori arguments for the non-existence of God are well-known. Rather less attention has been given, however, to Rowe’s intriguing a priori argument for atheism. In this paper, I examine the three published responses to Rowe’s a priori argument (due to Bruce Langtry, William Morris, and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, respectively). I conclude that none is decisive, but I show that Rowe’s argument nevertheless requires more defence than he provides.
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  30. Jesse R. Steinberg (2005). Why an Unsurpassable Being Cannot Create a Surpassable World. Religious Studies 41 (3):323-333.score: 86.4
    Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder suggest that it is possible for an omnipotent being, Jove, to create randomly a world from a continuum of ever more perfect possible worlds. They then go on to argue that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable despite creating a surpassable world. I raise a number of problems for the view that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable when he creates (randomly or not) a surpassable world.
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  31. Graham Oppy, Review of Reason for the Hope Within (2005). [REVIEW]score: 86.4
    Chapter 1: "Reason for Hope (in the Post-modern World)" by Michael J. Murray Chapter 2: "Theistic Arguments" by William C. Davis Chapter 3: "A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God: The Fine- Tuning Design Argument" by Robin Collins Chapter 4: "God, Evil and Suffering" by Daniel Howard Snyder Chapter 5: "Arguments for Atheism" by John O'Leary Hawthorne Chapter 6: "Faith and Reason" by Caleb Miller Chapter 7: "Religious Pluralism" by Timothy O'Connor Chapter 8: "Eastern Religions" by Robin Collins (...)
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  32. Mozaffar Qizilbash (1999). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism: A Comment. Utilitas 11 (01):97-105.score: 86.4
    Frances Howard-Snyder argues that objective consequentialism should be rejected because it violates the principle of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ in asking us to do what we cannot. In this comment I suggest that Howard-Snyder does not take sufficiently seriously the chief defence of objective consequentialism, which reformulates it so that it applies only to actions we can perform. Nonetheless, I argue that there are arguments relating to ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ which discredit objective consequentialism even if it is thus (...)
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  33. Brad Hooker (1994). Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck? Analysis 54 (2):92 - 97.score: 86.4
    Some things aren't what their names suggest. This is true of rubber ducks, stool pigeons, clay pigeons, hot dogs, and clothes horses. Frances Howard-Snyder's "Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck" ("APQ", 30 (1993) 271-78) argues that the answer is Yes. Howard-Snyder thinks rule-consequentialism is a form of deontology, not a form of consequentialism. This thought is understandable: many recent definitions of consequentialism are such as to invite it. Thinking rule-consequentialism inferior to act-consequentialism, many philosophers, when discussing consequentialism, (...)
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  34. Klaas J. Kraay (2006). God and the Hypothesis of No Prime Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (1):49-68.score: 86.4
    Many theists hold that for any world x that God has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y, that God had the power to actualize instead of x. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this scenario is incompatible with traditional theism: roughly, it is claimed that no being can be essentially unsurpassable on this view, since no matter what God does in actualizing a world, it is possible for God (or some other being) to do better, (...)
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  35. Jeremy Gwiazda (2008). Remarks on Jove and Thor. Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):79-86.score: 86.4
    In “How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder employ a fascinating thought experiment in anattempt to show that a morally unsurpassable being can create a surpassable world. Imagine that for each positive integer there is a world that a good,omnipotent, omniscient being can create. Jove randomly selects a number and creates the corresponding world; Thor simply creates world 888. The Howard-Snyders argue that it is logically possible that Jove is morally unsurpassable. William (...)
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  36. JesserSteinberg, Why an Unsurpassable Being Cannot Create a Surpassable World.score: 86.4
    Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder suggest that it is possible for an omnipotent being, Jove, to create randomly a world from a continuum of ever more perfect possible worlds. They then go on to argue that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable despite creating a surpassable world. I raise a number of problems for the view that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable when he creates (randomly or not) a surpassable world.
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  37. Frances Howard-Snyder & Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). God, Knowledge & Mystery. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):397-399.score: 86.4
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  38. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder & Ryan Wasserman (2013). The Power of Logic, 5th Edition. McGraw-Hill.score: 84.6
    This is a basic logic text for first-time logic students. Custom-made texts from the chapters is an option as well. And there is a website to go with text too: http://www.poweroflogic.com/cgi/menu.cgi .
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  39. Frances Howard-Snyder (1997). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 9 (02):241-248.score: 84.6
    Objective consequentialism is often criticized because it is impossible to know which of our actions will have the best consequences. Why exactly does this undermine objective consequentialism? I offer a new link between the claim that our knowledge of the future is limited and the rejection of objective consequentialism: that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and we cannot produce the best consequences available to us. I support this apparently paradoxical contention by way of an analogy. I cannot beat Karpov at chess in (...)
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  40. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1993). The Christian Theodicist's Appeal to Love. Religious Studies 29 (2):185 - 192.score: 84.6
    Many Christian theodicists believe that God's creating us with the capacity to love Him and each other justifies, in large part, God's permitting evil. For example, after reminding us that, according to Christian doctrine, the supreme good for human beings is to enter into a reciprocal love relationship with God, Vincent Brummer recently wrote: In creating human persons in order to love them, God necessarily assumes vulnerability in relation to them. In fact, in this relation, he becomes even more vulnerable (...)
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  41. Frances Howard-Snyder (1996). A New Argument for Consequentialism? A Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong. Analysis 56 (2):111–115.score: 84.6
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  42. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1999). Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil? American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):115 - 130.score: 84.6
    We argue that Michael Peterson's and William Hasker's attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible constitute miserable failures. We then sketch Peter van Inwagen's attempt to do the same and conclude that, to date, no one has shown his attempt a failure.
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  43. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (2010). The Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2):43 - 68.score: 84.6
    The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any difference (...)
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  44. Frances Howard-snyder (2005). It's the Thought That Counts. Utilitas 17 (3):265-281.score: 84.6
    Agnes's brakes fail. Should she continue straight into the busy intersection or should she swerve into the field? Add to the story, what Agnes does not and cannot know, that continuing into the intersection will cause no harm, whereas swerving into the apparently empty field will cause a death. I evaluate arguments for the claim that she should enter the intersection, i.e. for objectivism about right and wrong; and arguments for the claim that she should swerve, i.e. for subjectivism about (...)
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  45. Frances Howard-Snyder (1994). The Heart of Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):107 - 129.score: 84.6
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  46. Frances Howard-Snyder (2006). “Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):233 - 246.score: 84.6
    I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought to do some alternative (...)
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  47. Frances Howard-Snyder (2008). Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don't! Philosophia 36 (1):1-15.score: 84.6
    This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any (...)
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  48. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1994). How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World. Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):260-268.score: 84.6
    Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more powerful or knowledgable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create. Since he is all-powerful, there is nothing but the bounds of possibility to prevent him from getting what he wants. Unfortunately, as he holds before his mind the host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. Although he can create any (...)
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  49. Frances Howard-Snyder (1999). Response to Carlson and Qizilbash. Utilitas 11 (01):106-111.score: 84.6
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