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Profile: Francesco Orsi (University of Tartu)
  1. Francesco Orsi (2013). Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods. Mind 122 (487):687-698.
    In this paper I argue that Bykvist’s recent challenges to the fitting-attitude account of value (FA) can be successfully met. The challenge from solitary goods claims that FA cannot account for the value of states of affairs which necessarily rule out the presence of favouring subjects. I point out the modal reasons why FA can account for solitary goods by appealing to contemplative attitudes. Bykvist’s second challenge, the ‘distance problem’, questions the ability of FA to match facts about the intensity (...)
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  2. Francesco Orsi (2013). How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness. Philosophia 41 (4):1237-1251.
    This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...)
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  3. Francesco Orsi (2013). Russ Shafer-Landau, Ed. , Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5 . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (1):77-81.
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  4. Francesco Orsi (2013). Russ Shafer-Landau, Ed. , Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6 . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (1):77-81.
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  5. Francesco Orsi (2013). What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing? Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
    In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...)
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  6. Francesco Orsi (2012). David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts. Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2).
    The denial of the intrinsic value of acts apart from both motives and consequences lies at the heart of Ross’s deontology and his opposition to ideal utilitarianism. Moreover, the claim that acts can have intrinsic value is a staple element of early and contemporary attempts to “consequentialise” all of morality. I first show why Ross’s denial is relevant both for his philosophy and for current debates. Then I consider and reject as inconclusive some of Ross’s explicit and implicit motivations for (...)
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  7. Francesco Orsi (2012). Moral Judgment, Sensitivity To Reasons, and the Multi-System View. The Baltic International Yearbook Of Cognition, Logic And Communication 7 (1):1-19.
    In this paper I attempt a critical examination of the multi-system or dual-process view of moral judgment. This view aims to provide a psychological explanation of moral sensitivity, and in particular an explanation of conflicting moral sensitivities in dilemma cases such as the crying baby scenario. I argue that proponents of the multi-system view owe us a satisfactory account of the mechanisms underlying “consequentialist” responses to such scenarios. For one thing, the “cognitive” processes involved in consequentialist reasoning only seem to (...)
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  8. Francesco Orsi (2012). Sidgwick and the Morality of Purity. Revue d'Etudes Benthamiennes 10 (10).
    The aim of this work is to bring analytically to light Sidgwick’s complex views on sexual morality. Sidgwick saw nothing intrinsically, self-evidently, and even derivatively wrong in getting sexual pleasure for its own sake. However, the overall consequences of attempting to modify common sense in matters of sexual ethics seemed to him to be worse, at his time, than retaining the moral category of purity. Sidgwick’s view is then contrasted with John Stuart Mill’s, whom he directly mentions in this connection. (...)
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  9. Francesco Orsi (2008). L'io Morale. David Hume E l'Etica Contemporanea. Hume Studies 34 (1):159-162.
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  10. Francesco Orsi (2008). Obligations of Nearness. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):1-21.
    Frances Kamm argues that physical distance is per se relevant to our duty to give aid to strangers.
    Her methods, however, fail to bring into light the relevance per se of distance. To understand the claim that
    distance is per se morally relevant, it is helpful to use distinctions devised by Jonathan Dancy among
    different roles a feature may play in the explanation of moral reasons, yielding thus different senses of
    relevance. A feature can directly count in favor of an action, enable another feature (...)
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  11. Francesco Orsi (2008). The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses. Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.
    Sidgwick’s dualism of the practical reason is the idea that since egoism and utilitarianism aim both to have rational supremacy in our practical decisions, whenever they conflict there is no stronger reason to follow the dictates of either view. The dualism leaves us with a practical problem: in conflict cases, we cannot be guided by practical reason to decide what all things considered we ought to do. There is an epistemic problem as well: the conflict of egoism and utilitarianism shows (...)
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  12. Francesco Orsi (2006). Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value. Philosophical Writings 32:58-77.
    It has been thought that the prospects for non-naturalism about normativity may be significantly advanced if non-naturalists take the relation of being a reason as the basic normative entity, and so if, inter alia, they endorse a buck-passing account of value. This is thought to yield theoretical benefits regarding (i) the open question argument, (ii) the defence against the charge of queerness, and (iii) demands of parsimony. In the paper I contest these claims. Non- naturalists need not focus on reasons, (...)
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