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  1. Francis Y. Lin (1999). Chomsky on the 'Ordinary Language' View of Language. Synthese 120 (2):151-191.
    There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins, and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ ordinary language ’ view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, and his rejection of it is a (...)
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    Francis Y. Lin (2000). Events and Time in a Finite and Closed World. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):3-24.
    There are numerous occasions on which we need to reason about a finite number of events. And we often need to consider only those events which are given or which we perceive. These give rise to the Criteria of Finiteness and Closedness. Allen's logic provides a way of reasoning about events. In this paper I examine Allen and Hayes' axiomatisation of this logic, and develop two other axiomatisations based on the work by Russell and Thomason. I shall show that these (...)
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  3. Francis Y. Lin (2002). Grammar, Meaning and Understanding an Inquiry Into Grammatical and Semantic Competence.
     
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  4. Francis Y. Lin (2016). Wittgenstein's Private Language Investigation. Philosophical Investigations 39 (3).
    In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: ‘remembering the connection right’ means ‘reidentifying sensation-types’; the reason for ‘no criterion of correctness’ is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one type or different types; (...)
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