The readiness of Buddhists to dialogue with and embrace modern science has caused some to worry that this encounter will deform Buddhist traditions for the sake of acceptance by the West. But their strong tradition of epistemological skepticism and intellectual pluralism makes it unlikely that Buddhists will embrace scientific positivism. Given the tensions between religion and science in contemporary western society, it is perhaps this feature of Buddhism that can make the most fruitful contribution in its dialogue with science.

This essay seeks to step beyond the argument between ethical formalism and ethical naturalism concerning the nature of moral reason and to step outside the universalism versus relativism debate in cross-cultural studies. Its thesis is that both formalism and naturalism advance versions of moral reason that are functionaries of intellectual discussions that make sense of behavior and that such discussion should not be confused with the ostensible object of ethical inquiry-that is, with moral actions and the motivations that drive them. (...) Daoist thought provides a comparative base from which the nature and limitation of such ethical theories can be examined. The essay concludes by suggesting that the objectification and scrutiny of our own forms of knowledge can be a specific purpose of comparative ethics, which has the virtue of making explicit the value commitments behind our intellectual theories. (shrink)