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Frank Hindriks [27]Frank A. Hindriks [4]
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Profile: Frank Hindriks (University of Groningen)
  1. Nikos Psarros & Frank Hindriks, The Status Account of Corporate Agents.
    In the literature on social ontology, two perspectives on collective agency have been developed. The first is the internal perspective, the second the external one. The internal perspective takes the point of view of the members as its point of departure and appeals, inter alia, to the joint intentions they form. The idea is that collective agents perform joint actions such as dancing the tango, organizing prayer meetings, or performing symphonies. Such actions are generated by joint intentions, a topic which (...)
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  2. Frank Hindriks, Incentives Scheme.
    An important but neglected problem in the philosophy of action concerns the normative nature of intentional action. The hypothesis at issue is that knowingly ignoring a bad effect of one’s actions implies that one brings it about intentionally. For example, a CEO who runs her business without any consideration for the foreseen and harmful effects on the environment harms it intentionally. Recent empirical research confirms that this is how we think about intentional action: experimental philosophers have made the striking discovery (...)
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  3. Frank Hindriks (forthcoming). Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism. Journal of Value Inquiry:1-22.
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  4. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality.
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  5. Frank Hindriks (2014). Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives. Mind and Language 29 (1):51-72.
    Intuitions about intentional action have turned out to be sensitive to normative factors: most people say that an indifferent agent brings about an effect of her action intentionally when it is harmful, but unintentionally when it is beneficial. Joshua Knobe explains this asymmetry, which is known as ‘the Knobe effect’, in terms of the moral valence of the effect, arguing that this explanation generalizes to other asymmetries concerning notions as diverse as deciding and being free. I present an alternative explanation (...)
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  6. Frank Hindriks, Sara Rachel Chant & Gerhard Preyer (2014). Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five. In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. 1-9.
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  7. Frank Hindriks (2013). Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):465-480.
    According to John Searle’s well-known Is-Ought Argument, it is possible to derive an ought-statement from is-statements only. This argument concerns obligations involved in institutions such as promising, and it relies on the idea that institutions can be conceptualized in terms of constitutive rules. In this paper, I argue that the structure of this argument has never been fully appreciated. Starting from my status account of constitutive rules, I reconstruct the argument and establish that it is valid. This reconstruction reveals that (...)
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  8. Frank Hindriks (2013). Explanation, Understanding, and Unrealistic Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):523-531.
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  9. Frank Hindriks (2013). The Location Problem in Social Ontology. Synthese 190 (3):413-437.
    Mental, mathematical, and moral facts are difficult to accommodate within an overall worldview due to the peculiar kinds of properties inherent to them. In this paper I argue that a significant class of social entities also presents us with an ontological puzzle that has thus far not been addressed satisfactorily. This puzzle relates to the location of certain social entities. Where, for instance, are organizations located? Where their members are, or where their designated offices are? Organizations depend on their members (...)
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  10. Frank Hindriks (2012). But Where Is the University? Dialectica 66 (1):93-113.
    Famously Ryle imagined a visitor who has seen the colleges, departments, and libraries of a university but still wonders where the university is. The visitor fails to realize that the university consists of these organizational units. In this paper I ask what exactly the relation is between institutional entities such as universities and the entities they are composed of. I argue that the relation is constitution, and that it can be illuminated in terms of constitutive rules. The understanding of the (...)
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  11. Luigino Bruni, John Davis, Robin Harding & Frank Hindriks (2011). N. Emrah Aydinonat is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Ankara University (Ankara, Turkey) and Part-Time Faculty at Bogazici University & Galatasaray University (Istanbul, Turkey). His Research Focuses on the History and Philosophy of Economics, in Particular Models and Explanation in Economics. He is the Author of The Invisible Hand. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27:369-370.
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  12. Frank Hindriks (2011). Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
    Skill or control is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for intentional action. This received wisdom is challenged by experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and Thomas Nadelhoffer, which suggest that moral considerations sometimes trump considerations of skill and control. I argue that this effect (as well as the Knobe effect) can be explained in terms of the role normative reasons play in the concept of intentional action. This explanation has significant advantages over its rivals. It involves at most a conservative (...)
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  13. Frank Hindriks (2011). Language and Society. In Ian Jarvie Jesus Zamora Bonilla (ed.), The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. 137.
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  14. Frank Hindriks (2011). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization, John R. Searle, Oxford University Press, 2010, 224 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (03):338-346.
  15. Frank Hindriks (2010). Person as Lawyer: How Having a Guilty Mind Explains Attributions of Intentional Agency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):339-340.
    In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.
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  16. Frank Hindriks (2009). Corporate Responsibility and Judgment Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):161-177.
    Paradoxical results concerning judgment aggregation have recently been invoked to defend the thesis that a corporate agent can be morally responsible for a decision without any of its individual members bearing such responsibility. I contend that the arguments offered for this irreducibility thesis are inconclusive. They do not pay enough attention to how we evaluate individual moral responsibility, in particular not to the role that a flawed assessment of the normative reasons that bear on the issue to be decided on (...)
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  17. Frank Hindriks (2009). Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology. Erkenntnis 71 (2):253-275.
    It is a commonplace within philosophy that the ontology of institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules. What exactly such rules are, however, is not well understood. They are usually contrasted to regulative rules: constitutive rules (such as the rules of chess) make institutional actions possible, whereas regulative rules (such as the rules of etiquette) pertain to actions that can be performed independently of such rules. Some, however, maintain that the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely (...)
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  18. Frank Hindriks (2009). Opzet en morele veranbvoordelijkheid in de experimentele filosofie. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte 101 (1).
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  19. Frank Hindriks (2008). False Models as Explanatory Engines. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):334-360.
    Many models in economics are very unrealistic. At the same time, economists put a lot of effort into making their models more realistic. I argue that in many cases, including the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem investigated in this paper, the purpose of this process of concretization is explanatory. When evaluated in combination with their assumptions, a highly unrealistic model may well be true. The purpose of relaxing an unrealistic assumption, then, need not be to move from a false model to a (...)
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  20. Frank Hindriks (2008). Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.
    Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First, people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of intentional action has (...)
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  21. Frank Hindriks (2008). The Freedom of Collective Agents. Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
    Corporate freedom is the freedom of a collective agent to perform a joint action. According to a reductive account, a collective or corporate agent is free exactly if the individuals who constitute the corporate agent are free. It is argued that individual freedoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for corporate freedom. The alternative account proposed here focuses on the performance of the joint action by the corporate agent itself. Subsequently, the analysis is applied to Cohen’s (1983) analysis of proletarian freedom. (...)
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  22. Frank Hindriks, Concretization, Explanation, and Mechanisms.
    Traditional accounts of explanation fail to illuminate the explanatory relevance of “models that are descriptively false” in the sense that the regularities they entail fail to obtain. In this paper, I propose an account of explanation, which I call ‘explanation by concretization’, that serves to explicate the explanatory relevance of such models. Starting from a highly abstract and idealized model, causal explanations of the absence of regularities are sought by adding complexity to the model or by concretizing it. Whether this (...)
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  23. Frank Hindriks (2007). Review of Nikos Psarros, Katainka Schulte-Ostermann (Eds.), Facets of Sociality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7).
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  24. Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
    According to the increasingly popular knowledge account, assertion is governed by the rule that speech acts of that kind require knowledge of their content. Timothy Williamson has argued that this knowledge rule is the constitutive rule of assertion. It is argued here that it is not the constitutive rule of assertion in any sense of the term, as it governs only some assertions rather than all of them. A (qualified) knowledge rule can in fact be derived from the traditional analysis (...)
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  25. Frank A. Hindriks (2006). Acceptance-Dependence: A Social Kind of Response-Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
    Neither Johnston's nor Wright's account of response-dependence offers a complete picture of response-dependence, as they do not apply to all concepts that are intrinsically related to our mental responses. In order to (begin to) remedy this situation, a new conception of response-dependence is introduced that I call "acceptance-dependence". This account applies to concepts such as goal, constitutional, and money, the first two of which have mistakenly been taken to be response-dependent in another sense. Whereas on Johnston's and Wright's accounts response-dependent (...)
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  26. Frank A. Hindriks (2006). Tractability Assumptions and the Musgrave–Mäki Typology. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (4):401-423.
    Musgrave (1981) proposed a typology of assumptions, developed further by Mäki (2000), to defend the idea that the truth of assumptions is often important when evaluating economic theories against those economists who consider only predictive success to be relevant for this purpose. In this paper I propose a new framework for this typology that sheds further light on the issue. The framework consists of a distinction between first?order assumptions that state the absence or lack of effect of some factor F, (...)
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  27. Igor Douven & Frank Hindriks (2005). Deflating the Correspondence Intuition. Dialectica 59 (3):315–329.
  28. Frank A. Hindriks (2005). Unobservability, Tractability and the Battle of Assumptions. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (3):383-406.
    Economic models often include unrealistic assumptions. This does not mean, however, that economists lack a concern for the truth of their assumptions. Unrealistic assumptions are frequently imposed because the effects are taken to be negligible or because the problem at hand is intractable without them. Using the Musgrave?Mäki typology as the point of departure, these claims are defended with respect to theories proposed by Solow, Hall and Roeger concerning productivity growth and the mark?up. Since they are unobservable, their values need (...)
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  29. Frank A. Hindriks (2004). A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.
    A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification problem. Finally, (...)
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  30. Frank Hindriks & Anthonie Meijers (2003). Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):161 – 164.
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  31. Peter Baumann, Rudiger Bittner, Luc Bovens, Margaret Gilbert, Boris Hennig & Frank Hindriks (2002). Ulrich BALTZER Assistant Professor at Philosophy Department, Technical University of Dresden. Http://Www. Tu-Dresden. De/Phfiph/Dozenten/Baltzer. Htm Ubaltzer@ Rcs. Urz. Tu-Dresden. De. [REVIEW] In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag. 475.
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