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Profile: Franz Huber (University of Toronto)
  1. Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder & Franz Huber (2013). Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):279-300.
  2.  79
    Franz Huber (2013). Structural Equations and Beyond. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.
    Recent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models. These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do. The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality. The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I do so by formulating two constraints under which extended (...)
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  3.  67
    Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief. Springer.
    Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...
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  4.  67
    Franz Huber (2008). Assessing Theories, Bayes Style. Synthese 161 (1):89 - 118.
    The problem addressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen, BC, 1983, Theory comparison and relevant Evidence. In J. Earman (Ed.), Testing scientific theories (pp. 27–42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Sections 1– 3 contain the general plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment. In a nutshell, the message is (1) that there are two values a theory should exhibit: (...)
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  5.  12
    Franz Huber (2015). How to Learn Concepts, Consequences, and Conditionals. Analytica 1 (1):20-36.
    In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.
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  6.  66
    Franz Huber (2014). New Foundations for Counterfactuals. Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.
    Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that the (...)
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  7. Thomas Kroedel & Franz Huber (2013). Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow. Noûs 47 (3):453-466.
    We argue that a semantics for counterfactual conditionals in terms of comparative overall similarity faces a formal limitation due to Arrow’s impossibility theorem from social choice theory. According to Lewis’s account, the truth-conditions for counterfactual conditionals are given in terms of the comparative overall similarity between possible worlds, which is in turn determined by various aspects of similarity between possible worlds. We argue that a function from aspects of similarity to overall similarity should satisfy certain plausible constraints while Arrow’s impossibility (...)
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  8.  7
    Peter Brössel & Franz Huber (2015). Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.
    Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide (...)
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  9.  57
    Peter Brössel & Franz Huber (2014). Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):axu004.
    Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide (...)
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  10.  69
    Franz Huber (2015). What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case? Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):81-110.
    The question I am addressing in this paper is the following: how is it possible to empirically test, or confirm, counterfactuals? After motivating this question in Section 1, I will look at two approaches to counterfactuals, and at how counterfactuals can be empirically tested, or confirmed, if at all, on these accounts in Section 2. I will then digress into the philosophy of probability in Section 3. The reason for this digression is that I want to use the way observable (...)
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  11.  77
    Franz Huber (2008). Milne's Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure. Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420.
    This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log‐likelihood ratio l rather than the log‐ratio measure r as “the one true measure of confirmation. ” *Received December 2006; revised December 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Formal Epistemology Research Group, Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: franz.huber@uni‐konstanz.de.
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  12.  96
    Franz Huber (2005). What Is the Point of Confirmation? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.
    Philosophically, one of the most important questions in the enterprise termed confirmation theory is this: Why should one stick to well confirmed theories rather than to any other theories? This paper discusses the answers to this question one gets from absolute and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. According to absolute confirmation, one should accept ''absolutely well confirmed'' theories, because absolute confirmation takes one to true theories. An examination of two popular measures of incremental confirmation suggests the view that one should stick (...)
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  13.  79
    Franz Huber (2006). Ranking Functions and Rankings on Languages. Artificial Intelligence 170:462-471.
    The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of subjective probability theory. Unlike probabilities, however, ranking functions are only indirectly—via a pointwise ranking function on the underlying set of possibilities W —defined on a field of propositions A over W. This research note shows under which conditions ranking functions on a field of propositions A over W and rankings on a language L are induced by pointwise ranking functions on W and the set of (...)
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  14.  67
    Franz Huber (2007). The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions. Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.
    The paper provides an argument for the thesis that an agent’s degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. This Consistency Argument is based on the Consistency Theorem. The latter says that an agent’s belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed iff her degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms and are updated according to the ranktheoretic update rules.
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  15.  89
    Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
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  16.  75
    Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas (...)
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  17.  81
    Franz Huber (2008). Hempel's Logic of Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181 - 189.
    This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another (...)
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  18.  65
    Franz Huber (2007). The Logic of Theory Assessment. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.
    This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper (...)
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  19. Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of belief for a particular (...)
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  20.  6
    Franz Huber (forthcoming). Why Follow the Royal Rule? Synthese:1-26.
    This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.
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  21. Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
    Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesian confirmation theory The example (...)
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  22.  44
    Franz Huber, Formal Representations of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Belief is thus central to epistemology. It comes in a qualitative form, as when Sophia believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria, and a quantitative form, as when Sophia's degree of belief that Vienna is the capital of Austria is at least twice her degree of belief that tomorrow it will be sunny in Vienna. Formal epistemology, as opposed to mainstream epistemology (Hendricks 2006), is epistemology done in a formal way, (...)
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  23.  78
    Franz Huber (2008). Inductive Logic. In J. Lachs R. Talisse (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge
    Logic is the study of the quality of arguments. An argument consists of a set of premises and a conclusion. The quality of an argument depends on at least two factors: the truth of the premises, and the strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion. The truth of the premises is a contingent factor that depends on the state of the world. The strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion is supposed to be independent of the state of (...)
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  24.  11
    Franz Huber (2014). What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution Of? -- A Question for Kroedel. Logos and Episteme 5 (3):333-342.
    Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief (...)
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  25.  10
    Franz Huber (2014). For True Conditionalizers Weisberg's Paradox is a False Alarm. Symposion 1 (1):111-119.
    Weisberg introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization, and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory and for Dempster-Shafer theory. In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.
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  26.  47
    Franz Huber (2008). The Plausibility-Informativeness Theory. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan
    The problem adressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen 1983, 27).
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  27.  3
    Franz Huber (2008). Assessing Theories, Bayes Style. Synthese 161 (1):89-118.
    The problem addressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen, BC, 1983, Theory comparison and relevant Evidence. In J. Earman (Ed.), Testing scientific theories (pp. 27–42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Sections 1– 3 contain the general plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment. In a nutshell, the message is (1) that there are two values a theory should exhibit: (...)
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  28.  62
    Franz Huber (2005). The Logic of Confirmation. In O. Neumaier, C. Sedmak & M. Zichy (eds.), Philosophische Perspektiven. Beiträge zum VII. Internationalen Kongress der ÖGP. Ontos
    The paper presents a new analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy, differing from the one in Carnap. Hempel, so it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true theories, and another aiming at informative theories. However, so the analysis continues, he also realized that these two concepts were conflicting, and so he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. It is then shown that one can have the cake and eat it: (...)
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  29.  4
    Franz Huber (2004). Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of Confirmation. Dissertation, University of Erfurt
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  30.  39
    Franz Huber (2012). Essay Review: The Laws of Belief. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 79 (4):584-588.
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  31. Franz Huber (2009). Ranking Functions. In A. Pazos Sierra, J. R. Rabunal Dopico & J. Dorado de la Calle (eds.), Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence. Hershey
    Ranking functions have been introduced under the name of ordinal conditional functions in Spohn (1988; 1990). They are representations of epistemic states and their dynamics. The most comprehensive and up to date presentation is Spohn (manuscript).
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  32.  28
    Franz Huber (2012). Wolfgang Spohn: The Laws of Belief. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 79 (4):584-588.
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  33.  40
    Franz Huber (2013). Belief First. The Reasoner 7 (7):82.
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  34.  17
    Franz Huber & Jonathan Weisberg (2014). Introducing Ergo. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1.
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  35.  39
    Franz Huber, Confirmation and Induction. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  36.  50
    Franz Huber (2008). Reply to Crupi Et Al.'S "Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215.
    Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for (...)
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  37.  43
    Franz Huber (2005). The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment. In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. Filosofia
    This paper discusses an almost sixty year old problem in the philosophy of science -- that of a logic of confirmation. We present a new analysis of Carl G. Hempel's conditions of adequacy (Hempel 1945), differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his Logical Foundations of Probability (1962). Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts (...)
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  38.  11
    Franz Huber (2006). Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 26 (4):257-259.
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  39.  25
    Franz Huber (2006). Review of Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology (Cambridge University Press 2006). [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 26 (4):257-259.
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  40.  1
    Franz Huber (2008). Hempel’s Logic of Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181-189.
    This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another (...)
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  41.  19
    Franz Huber, Discussion: Milne's Measure.
    In his (1996) Peter Milne shows that r (H, E, B) = log [Pr (H | E ∩ B) / Pr (H | B)] is the one true measure of confirmation in the sense that r is the only function satisfying the following five constraints on measures of confirmation C.
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  42.  10
    Franz Huber, Confirmation. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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  43.  5
    Franz Huber (1980). Central Pattern Generators From the Viewpoint of a Behavioral Physiologist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (4):553.
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  44.  3
    Franz Huber (1984). Neuroethology, According to Hoyle. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):391.
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  45.  4
    Franz Huber (2003). Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg
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  46. Franz Huber (2006). Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 26:257-259.
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