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  1. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
  2.  32
    Adams, Frederick & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.
  3. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  4.  53
    Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  5. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a (...)
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  6.  89
    Alicia Juarrero & Frederick Adams (2001). Reviews-Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):635-640.
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  7.  38
    Fred Adams & Rebecca Garrison (2013). The Mark of the Cognitive. Minds and Machines 23 (3):339-352.
    It is easy to give a list of cognitive processes. They are things like learning, memory, concept formation, reasoning, maybe emotion, and so on. It is not easy to say, of these things that are called cognitive, what makes them so? Knowing the answer is one very important reason to be interested in the mark of the cognitive. In this paper, consider some answers that we think do not work and then offer one of our own which ties cognition to (...)
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  8. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic. Analysis 64 (3):268 - 276.
  9. Fred Adams (2010). Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
    Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some (...)
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  10. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 67--80.
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  11.  28
    Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli (2012). Towards Closure on Closure. Synthese 188 (2):179-196.
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...)
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  12. Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2009). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 78--95.
     
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  13. Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
    This article examines the intersection of the theory of extended mind/cognition and theory of knowledge. In the minds of some, it matters to conditions for knowing whether the mind extends beyond the boundaries of body and brain. I examine these intuitions and find no support for this view from tracking theories of knowledge. I then argue that the apparent difference extended mind is supposed to have for ability or credit theories is also illusory.
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  14.  87
    Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  15. Frederick R. Adams (2003). The Informational Turn in Philosophy. Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  16. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Causal Theories of Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs (...)
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  17.  75
    Fred Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). What's in a (N Empty) Name? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):125-148.
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  18. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
  19.  59
    Frederick Adams (1986). Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View. Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
  20.  89
    Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
    Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial.
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  21. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  22.  7
    Fred Adams (2016). Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme (1):67-73.
    In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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  23. Fred Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker (1997). The Semantics of Fictional Names. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):128–148.
    In this paper we defend a direct reference theory of names. We maintain that the meaning of a name is its bearer. In the case of vacuous names, there is no bearer and they have no meaning. We develop a unified theory of names such that one theory applies to names whether they occur within or outside fiction. Hence, we apply our theory to sentences containing names within fiction, sentences about fiction or sentences making comparisons across fictions. We then defend (...)
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  24. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  25.  67
    Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams (2007). Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers
    In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by Joshua Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Knobe’s surveys (...)
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  26. Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Bounds of Cognition. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  27. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Why the Mind is Still in the Head. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, (...)
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  28. Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Wiley-Blackwell.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  29.  71
    Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele (1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
  30.  37
    Fred Adams & Robert Stecker (1994). Vacuous Singular Terms. Mind and Language 9 (4):387-401.
  31. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to Active Externalism. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge
     
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  32.  69
    Frederick Adams (1991). He Doesn't Really Want to Try. Analysis 51 (2):109 - 112.
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  33.  41
    Fred Adams (2011). Husker Du? Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.
    Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.
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  34.  47
    John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  35. Frederick R. Adams (2001). Empathy, Neural Imaging and the Theory Versus Simulation Debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.
  36.  66
    Fred Adams (2005). Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):1-35.
    As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras (...)
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  37. Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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  38.  66
    Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273 - 281.
  39. Frederick R. Adams (2002). Mental Representation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
  40.  48
    Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele (1989). The Role of Intention in Intentional Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  41.  58
    Fred Adams & Gary Fuller (2007). Empty Names and Pragmatic Implicatures. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):449-461.
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  42.  48
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1992). 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  43.  63
    Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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  44. Frederick R. Adams, Robert A. Stecker & Gary Fuller (1992). The Semantics of Thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):375-389.
     
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  45.  9
    Ken Aizawa & Fred Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
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  46.  44
    Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
  47.  19
    Frederick Adams (2007). Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):1-5.
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  48.  55
    Fred Adams (2010). Information and Knowledge À la Floridi. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):331-344.
    Abstract: Luciano Floridi has impressively applied the concept of information to problems in semantics and epistemology, among other areas. In this essay, I briefly review two areas where I think one may usefully raise questions about some of Floridi's conclusions. One area is in the project to naturalize semantics and Floridi's use of the derived versus nonderived notion of semantic content. The other area is in the logic of information and knowledge and whether knowledge based on information necessarily supports closure, (...)
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  49.  79
    Fred Adams (2006). Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
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  50.  34
    Fred Adams & João Antonio de Moraes (2016). Is There a Philosophy of Information? Topoi 35 (1):161-171.
    In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...)
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