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Fred Dretske [119]Fred I. Dretske [28]
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Profile: Fred Dretske (Duke University)
  1. Fred Dretske (forthcoming). Awareness of Thingss. Mind:283.
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  2. Fred Dretske (2013). Justified True Belief. The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):31-36.
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  3. Fred Dretske (2012). Awareness and Authority: Skeptical Doubts About Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 49.
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  4. Fred Dretske (2012). Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  5. Fred Dretske (2012). Doubts About Cogito. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):1-17.
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  6. Fred Dretske (2010). About Self-Knowledge. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 425.
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  7. Fred Dretske (2010). 9 Knowing It Hurts. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Mit Press. 203.
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  8. Fred Dretske (2010). What We See : The Texture of Conscious Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Fred Dretske (2010). What We See. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 54.
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  10. Fred Dretske (2009). Information-Theoretic Semantics. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  11. Fred Dretske (2009). What Must Actions Be for Reasons to Explain Them? In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 13--21.
  12. Fred Dretske (2007). What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
  13. Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  14. Fred Dretske (2006). Minimal Rationality. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Fred Dretske (2006). Perception Without Awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 147--180.
  16. Fred Dretske (2006). Representation, Teleosemantics, and the Problem of Self-Knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.
  17. Fred Dretske (2005). Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 13-26.
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  18. Fred Dretske (2005). Review of Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  19. Fred Dretske (2005). Reply to Hawthorne. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 43--46.
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  20. Fred Dretske (2005). The Epistemology of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 3-20.
     
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  21. Fred I. Dretske (2005). ``The Case Against Closure&Quot;. In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. 13--25.
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  22. Fred Dretske (2004). Change Blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  23. Fred Dretske (2004). Externalism and Modest Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173 - 186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  24. Fred Dretske (2004). Knowing What You Think Vs. Knowing That You Think It. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
  25. Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are (what I call) triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and (what I call) structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts (how an (...)
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  26. Fred Dretske (2003). Burge on Mentalistic Explanations, or Why I Am Still Epiphobic. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
     
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  27. Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
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  28. Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
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  29. Fred Dretske (2003). Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  30. Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 1--14.
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  31. Fred Dretske (2003). Sensation and Perception (1981). In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
  32. Fred Dretske (2003). Skepticism: What Perception Teaches. In The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
     
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  33. Fred Dretske (2003). The Intentionality of Perception. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  34. Fred Dretske (2003). The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
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  35. Fred Dretske (2002). A Recipe for Thought. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa.
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  36. Fred Dretske (2001). First Person Warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (11).
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  37. Fred Dretske (2001). Norms, History, and the Mental. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 87-104.
  38. Fred Dretske (2001). Where is the Mind? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.
  39. David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, Alvin Goldman, Robert Nozick & Marshall Swain (2000). Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue. In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  40. Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.) (2000). Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this anthology, distinguished editors Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske offer the most comprehensive review available of contemporary epistemology. They bring together the most important and influential writings in the field, including frequently neglected topics such as dominant responses to skepticism, introspection, memory, and testimony. Knowledge is divided into fifteen subject areas and includes forty-one readings by eminent contributors. An accessible introduction to each subject area outlines the problems discussed in the essays that follow so that students can focus on (...)
     
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  41. Fred Dretske (2000). Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
  42. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  43. Fred Dretske (2000). Reply to Lopes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455-459.
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  44. Robert Audi, Frank B. Dilley, John McCumber, Fred Dretske, John Lachs, Philip Quinn & Eric Hoffman (1999). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5):133 - 138.
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  45. Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. In Kevin A. Stoehr (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  46. Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  47. Fred Dretske (1999). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
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  48. Fred I. Dretske (1999). Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
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