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Fred Dretske [124]Fred I. Dretske [31]Frederick Irwin Dretske [1]
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Profile: Fred Dretske (Duke University)
  1.  673 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1986). Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press 17--36.
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  2.  495 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1981/1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) (...)
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  3.  484 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2006). Perception Without Awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 147--180.
  4.  428 DLs
    Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  5.  412 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
  6.  407 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1993). Conscious Experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  7.  378 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
  8.  314 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2007). What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
  9.  275 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
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  10.  269 DLs
    Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  11.  254 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  12.  252 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  13.  249 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2006). Information and Closure. Erkenntnis 64 (3):409 - 413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  14.  238 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1989). Reasons and Causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  15.  234 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1999). The Mind's Awareness of Itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.
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  16.  213 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2012). Chris Hill's Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):497-502.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  17.  211 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2006). Representation, Teleosemantics, and the Problem of Self-Knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press
  18.  202 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1997). What Good is Consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.
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  19.  202 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2004). Knowing What You Think Vs. Knowing That You Think It. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter
  20.  199 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2000). Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
  21.  192 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  22.  188 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  23.  172 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1994). If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
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  24.  172 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
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  25.  162 DLs
    Fred Dretske & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout.
    ___ (i) There is a difference between hearing Clyde play the piano and seeing him play the piano. ___ (ii) A perceptual belief that he is playing the piano must also be distinguished from a perceptual experience of this same event.
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  26.  158 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2010). What We See : The Texture of Conscious Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press
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  27.  148 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2004). Change Blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  28.  141 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2004). Externalism and Modest Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173 - 186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  29.  138 DLs
    Fred I. Dretske (1972). Contrastive Statements. Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
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  30.  136 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1995). Dretske's Awful Answer. Philosophia 24 (3-4):459-464.
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  31.  129 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. In Kevin A. Stoehr (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr 81-88.
    Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional premise—namely, that behavior explained by (...)
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  32.  126 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2001). Where is the Mind? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli
  33.  124 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are (what I call) triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and (what I call) structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts (how an (...)
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  34.  123 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2002). A Recipe for Thought. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. OUP Usa
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  35.  123 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1973). Perception and Other Minds. Noûs 7 (March):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  36.  120 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1993). The Nature of Thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
  37.  111 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2001). Norms, History, and the Mental. In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 87-104.
    Many people think the mind evolved. Some of them think it had to evolve. They think the mind not only has a history, but a history essential to its very existence.
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  38.  110 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1996). Absent Qualia. Mind and Language 11 (1):78-85.
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  39.  107 DLs
    Fred I. Dretske (1977). Causal Theories of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):621-625.
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  40.  100 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2003). How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate 1--14.
  41.  97 DLs
    Fred I. Dretske (1983). The Epistemology of Belief. Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
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  42.  93 DLs
    Fred I. Dretske (1999). Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
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  43.  92 DLs
    Fred Dretske & Palle Yourgrau (1983). Lost Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):356-367.
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  44.  80 DLs
    Fred Dretske (2005). Review of Mohan Matthen, Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9).
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  45.  79 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1985). Machines and the Mental. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59 (1):23-33.
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  46.  79 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1998). Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer 157--173.
  47.  73 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1993). Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    1. Causal explanations depend on our interests, our purposes, and our prior knowledge. ⇒ No uniquely real causal explanation.
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  48.  73 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1980). The Intentionality of Cognitive States. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
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  49.  72 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1996). Reply to Commentators: [Horwich, Biro, Kim, Lara]. Philosophical Issues 7:179-183.
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  50.  69 DLs
    Fred Dretske (1993). Can Intelligence Be Artificial? Philosophical Studies 71 (2):201-16.
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1 — 50 / 155