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Profile: Fred Dretske (Duke University)
  1. Fred I. Dretske (2005). ``The Case Against Closure&Quot;. In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. 13--25.
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  2. Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.) (2000). Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this anthology, distinguished editors Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske offer the most comprehensive review available of contemporary epistemology. They bring together the most important and influential writings in the field, including frequently neglected topics such as dominant responses to skepticism, introspection, memory, and testimony. Knowledge is divided into fifteen subject areas and includes forty-one readings by eminent contributors. An accessible introduction to each subject area outlines the problems discussed in the essays that follow so that students can focus on (...)
     
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  3. Fred I. Dretske (1999). Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):523-535.
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  4. Fred I. Dretske (1986). Stalking Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):142.
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  5. Fred I. Dretske (1985). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):79-81.
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  6. Fred I. Dretske (1983). The Epistemology of Belief. Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
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  7. Fred I. Dretske (1982). A Cognitive Cul-de-Sac. Mind 91 (361):109-111.
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  8. Fred I. Dretske (1981). Scepticism: A Critical Appraisal. Philosophical Topics 12 (2):299-303.
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  9. Fred I. Dretske (1979). Simple Seeing. In. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer. 1--15.
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  10. Fred I. Dretske (1978). Perception. International Studies in Philosophy 10:199-201.
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  11. Fred I. Dretske (1978). Reply to Niiniluoto. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):440-444.
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  12. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Causal Theories of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):621-625.
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  13. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  14. Fred I. Dretske (1977). Referring to Events. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
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  15. Fred I. Dretske (1976). Comments on Shapere and Hesse. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:299 - 303.
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  16. Fred I. Dretske & Aaron Snyder (1973). Causality and Sufficiency: Reply to Beauchamp. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):288-291.
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  17. Fred I. Dretske (1972). Contrastive Statements. Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
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  18. Fred I. Dretske & Aaron Snyder (1972). Causal Irregularity. Philosophy of Science 39 (1):69-71.
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  19. Fred I. Dretske (1971). ``Conclusive Reasons&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49:1-22.
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  20. Fred I. Dretske (1971). Perception From an Epistemological Point of View. Journal of Philosophy 68 (19):584-591.
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  21. Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
    Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only (...)
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  22. Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  23. Fred I. Dretske (1970). ``Epistemic Operators&Quot;. Journal of Philosophy 67:1007-1023.
  24. Fred I. Dretske (1968). Reasons and Consequences. Analysis 28 (5):166 - 168.
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  25. Fred I. Dretske (1965). Reasons and Falsification. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (58):20-34.
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  26. Fred I. Dretske (1964). Particular Reidentification. Philosophy of Science 31 (2):133-142.
    A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the "same place" at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that "objects with some endurance through time" must be accepted as fundamental is (...)
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  27. Fred I. Dretske (1962). Moving Backward in Time. Philosophical Review 71 (1):94-98.
  28. Fred I. Dretske (1961). Particulars and the Relational Theory of Time. Philosophical Review 70 (4):447-469.
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