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  1. Frederick R. Adams, Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.
  2. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa, Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
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  3. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to Active Externalism. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge.
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  4. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  5. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  6. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
  7. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  8. Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties (and events). Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal (...)
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  9. Frederick R. Adams (2003). The Informational Turn in Philosophy. Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  10. Frederick R. Adams (2002). Mental Representation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  11. Frederick R. Adams (2002). The Nature of Meaningfulness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):484-488.
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  12. Frederick R. Adams (2001). Empathy, Neural Imaging and the Theory Versus Simulation Debate. Mind and Language 16 (4):368-392.
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  13. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437.
  14. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
  15. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1994). 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  16. Frederick R. Adams (1993). Fodor's Modal Argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
    What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of (...)
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  17. Frederick R. Adams (1993). Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.
     
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  18. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and "Block's Problem". Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  19. Frederick R. Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1993). Thoughts Without Objects. Mind and Language 8 (1):90-104.
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  20. Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (1992). 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  21. Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller (1992). Rules in Programming Languages and Networks. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  22. Frederick R. Adams & Gary Fuller (1992). Names, Contents, and Causes. Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.
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  23. Frederick R. Adams, Robert A. Stecker & Gary Fuller (1992). The Semantics of Thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):375-389.
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  24. Frederick R. Adams (1991). Causal Contents. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
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  25. Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
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  26. Frederick R. Adams (1979). A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):493 - 518.
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  27. Frederick R. Adams (1979). Properties, Functionalism, and the Identity Theory. Eidos 1 (December):153-79.