47 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Frederick F. Schmitt [38]Frederick Schmitt [9]
  1. Frederick F. Schmitt (2014). Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oup Oxford.
    Frederick F. Schmitt offers a new account of Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature, which alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism. Critics have emphasised one of these positions over the others, but Schmitt argues that they can be reconciled by tracing them to an underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Frederick F. Schmitt (2010). The Assurance View of Testimony. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup Oxford. 216--242.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Oliver R. Scholz & Frederick F. Schmitt (2010). Introduction: The History of Social Epistemology. Episteme 7 (1):1-6.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Frederick F. Schmitt (2009). Review of Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume Ii. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8).
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Frederick F. Schmitt (2008). Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):232–234.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Frederick F. Schmitt & Reza Lahroodi (2008). The Epistemic Value of Curiosity. Educational Theory 58 (2):125-148.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Frederick F. Schmitt (2007). Introduction: Epistemic Relativism. Episteme 4 (1):91-94.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Frederick F. Schmitt (2007). Review of Nicholas Rescher, Error: On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Frederick F. Schmitt (2006). Testimonial Justification and Transindividual Reasons. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 193--224.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Frederick F. Schmitt (2005). Social Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):495-498.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Frederick F. Schmitt (2005). Social Empiricism. Miriam Solomon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: A Bradford Book, the MIT Press, 2001. Pp. 175. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):495–498.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Frederick Schmitt (2004). What Are the Aims of Education? Episteme 1 (3):223-234.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). Epistemology and Cognitive Science. In. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 841--918.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). Introduction. Episteme 1 (2):91-94.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 30 (2):297-327.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). What is Wrong with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Michael Williams, Frederick F. Schmitt, Erin I. Kelly & Louis E. Loeb (2004). A Symposium on Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 30 (2):265-404.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt (2003). Comment on John Greco's "Putting Skeptics in Their Place". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457 - 465.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Frederick Schmitt (2003). Joint Action: From Individualism to Supraindividualism. In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics : The Nature of Social Reality. Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91. 129--166.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) (2003). Theories of Truth. Blackwell Pub..
  21. Frederick F. Schmitt (2002). Testimonial Justification: The Parity Argument. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):385-406.
  22. Frederick Schmitt (2001). Epistemic perspectivism. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell Publishers. 180--206.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Frederick F. Schmitt (2001). Intelligence. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):345-382.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Frederick F. Schmitt (2000). Veritistic Value. Social Epistemology 14 (4):259 – 280.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Frederick F. Schmitt (1998). Realism, Antirealism and Epistemic Truth. Social Epistemology 12 (3):267 – 287.
  26. Frederick F. Schmitt (1997). A Realist Conception of Truth. Philosophical Review 106 (4):617-619.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Frederick F. Schmitt (1995). Truth: A Primer. Westview Press.
    The concept of truth lies at the heart of philosophy; whether one approaches it from epistemology or metaphysics, from the philosophy of language or the philosophy of science or religion, one must come to terms with the nature of truth.In this brisk introduction, Frederick Schmitt covers all the most important historical and contemporary theories of truth. Along the way he also sheds considerable light on such closely related issues as realism and idealism, absolutism and relativism, and the nature of contemporary (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Frederick Schmitt (1994). Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction Through Two Sample Issues. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield. 1--28.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) (1994). Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield.
    Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction through Two Sample Issues Frederick F. Schmitt Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Frederick F. Schmitt (1992). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (403):555-559.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Frederick F. Schmitt (1992). Knowledge and Belief. Routledge.
    In Knowledge and Belief, Frederick Schmitt explores the nature and value of knowledge and justified belief through an examination of the dispute between epistemological internalism and externalism. Knowledge and justified belief are naturally viewed as belief of a sort likely to be true--an externalist view. It is also intuitive, however, to view them as an internal matter; justification must be accessible to the subject or constituted by the subject's epistemic perspective. The author argues against the view that internalism is the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Frederick Schmitt (1991). Social Epistemology and Social Cognitive Psychology. Social Epistemology 5 (2):111 – 120.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Robert Ackermann, Brian Baigrie, Harold I. Brown, Michael Cavanaugh, Paul Fox-Strangways, Gonzalo Munevar, Stephen David Ross, Philip Pettit, Paul Roth, Frederick Schmitt, Stephen Turner & Charles Wallis (1988). Responses to 'in Defense of Relativism'. Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Frederick Schmitt (1988). On the Road to Social Epistemic Interdependence. Social Epistemology 2 (4):297 – 307.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Frederick Schmitt (1988). Testimony and Evidence: A Rebuttal. Social Epistemology 2 (4):323 – 326.
  36. Frederick F. Schmitt (1988). Epistemic Dimensions of Self-Deception. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. 183--204.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Frederick Schmitt (1987). Special Issue on Social Epistemology. Synthese 73 (1):1-204.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Frederick F. Schmitt (1987). Introduction. Synthese 73 (1):1-2.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Frederick F. Schmitt (1987). Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy. Synthese 73 (1):43 - 85.
    Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Frederick F. Schmitt (1985). Consensus, Respect, and Weighted Averaging. Synthese 62 (1):25 - 46.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Frederick F. Schmitt (1985). Knowledge as Tracking? Topoi 4 (1):73-80.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Frederick F. Schmitt (1984). Reliability, Objectivity and the Background of Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):1 – 15.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Against Epistemic Indolence. Mind 92 (367):424-429.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Events. Erkenntnis 20 (3):281 - 293.
    Despite important similarities, events differ from states of affairs. Recent theories of events (Davidson's, Kim's) have ignored the distinction, preferring to focus on relations of composition between events and states, indifferently conceived, and properties, objects, and times. It might be proposed, however, that events and states can be distinguished by their composition. I argue against a compositional approach, in favor of a modal approach, on which events are distinguished from states in virtue of being essentially dynamic. This view locates the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Knowledge, Justification, and Reliability. Synthese 55 (2):209 - 229.
    Recent epistemology divides theories of knowledge according to their diagnoses of cases of failed knowledge, Gettier cases. Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. Justificationism traces the failure to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief. My aim is to reconcile these camps by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Frederick F. Schmitt (1981). Justification as Reliable Indication or Reliable Process? Philosophical Studies 40 (3):409 - 417.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Frederick F. Schmitt (1978). Change. Philosophical Studies 34 (4):401 - 416.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation