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  1. Frederick F. Schmitt (2014). Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oup Oxford.
    Frederick F. Schmitt offers a new account of Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature, which alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism. Critics have emphasised one of these positions over the others, but Schmitt argues that they can be reconciled by tracing them to an underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability.
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  2. Frederick F. Schmitt (2010). The Assurance View of Testimony. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup Oxford. 216--242.
     
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  3. Oliver R. Scholz & Frederick F. Schmitt (2010). Introduction: The History of Social Epistemology. Episteme 7 (1):1-6.
    Social epistemology is a burgeoning branch of contemporary epistemology. Since the 1970s, philosophers have taken an ever-increasing interest in such topics as the epistemic value of testimony, the nature and function of expertise, the proper distribution of cognitive labor and resources among individuals in communities, and the status of group reasoning and knowledge. This trend emerged against the resistance of the widely shared view that social considerations are largely irrelevant to epistemological concerns. The trend was stimulated by diverse approaches to (...)
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  4. Frederick F. Schmitt (2009). Review of Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume Ii. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8).
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  5. Frederick F. Schmitt (2008). Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):232–234.
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  6. Frederick F. Schmitt & Reza Lahroodi (2008). The Epistemic Value of Curiosity. Educational Theory 58 (2):125-148.
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  7. Frederick F. Schmitt (2007). Introduction: Epistemic Relativism. Episteme 4 (1):91-94.
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  8. Frederick F. Schmitt (2007). Review of Nicholas Rescher, Error: On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
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  9. Frederick F. Schmitt (2006). Testimonial Justification and Transindividual Reasons. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 193--224.
     
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  10. Frederick F. Schmitt (2005). Social Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):495-498.
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  11. Frederick F. Schmitt (2005). Social Empiricism. Miriam Solomon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: A Bradford Book, the MIT Press, 2001. Pp. 175. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):495–498.
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  12. Frederick Schmitt (2004). What Are the Aims of Education? Episteme 1 (3):223-234.
    Theorists of education have long debated the ultimate aims of education, often proposing one or another cognitive aim, such as true belief or critical thinking. I will argue first that there are no ultimate aims common to all kinds of education, apart from the vacuous ones of transmitting cognition and improving the student's cognition. In light of this conclusion, the matter to investigate is the ultimate aims of certain broad kinds of education. I will restrict my inquiry here to cognitive (...)
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  13. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). Epistemology and Cognitive Science. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 841--918.
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  14. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). Introduction. Episteme 1 (2):91-94.
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  15. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 30 (2):297-327.
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  16. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004). What is Wrong with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.
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  17. Michael Williams, Frederick F. Schmitt, Erin I. Kelly & Louis E. Loeb (2004). A Symposium on Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 30 (2):265-404.
     
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  18. Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt (2003). Comment on John Greco's "Putting Skeptics in Their Place". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457 - 465.
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  19. Frederick Schmitt (2003). Joint Action: From Individualism to Supraindividualism. In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics : The Nature of Social Reality. Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91. 129--166.
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  20. Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) (2003). Theories of Truth. Blackwell Pub..
  21. Frederick Schmitt (2002). Justification and Consensus: The Peircean Approach. ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 16.
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  22. Frederick F. Schmitt (2002). Testimonial Justification: The Parity Argument. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):385-406.
    On an individualist view of testimonial justification, a subject’s belief based on testimony is justified ultimately on the basis of nontestimonial beliefs alone. The prevailing version of individualism has been inductive individualism, according to which the nontestimonial basis for a testimonial belief is an inductively based belief in the reliability of the testifier. Here I consider an alternative to inductive individualism, which I call the parity account. This is the view, endorsed in various forms by Allan Gibbard, Richard Foley and (...)
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  23. Frederick Schmitt (2001). Epistemic perspectivism. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell Publishers. 180--206.
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  24. Frederick F. Schmitt (2001). Intelligence. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):345-382.
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  25. Frederick F. Schmitt (2000). Veritistic Value. Social Epistemology 14 (4):259 – 280.
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  26. Frederick F. Schmitt (1998). Realism, Antirealism and Epistemic Truth. Social Epistemology 12 (3):267 – 287.
  27. Frederick F. Schmitt (1997). A Realist Conception of Truth. Philosophical Review 106 (4):617-619.
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  28. Frederick F. Schmitt (1995). Truth: A Primer. Westview Press.
    The concept of truth lies at the heart of philosophy; whether one approaches it from epistemology or metaphysics, from the philosophy of language or the philosophy of science or religion, one must come to terms with the nature of truth.In this brisk introduction, Frederick Schmitt covers all the most important historical and contemporary theories of truth. Along the way he also sheds considerable light on such closely related issues as realism and idealism, absolutism and relativism, and the nature of contemporary (...)
     
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  29. Frederick Schmitt (1994). Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction Through Two Sample Issues. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield. 1--28.
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  30. Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) (1994). Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield.
    Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction through Two Sample Issues Frederick F. Schmitt Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the ...
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  31. Frederick F. Schmitt (1992). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (403):555-559.
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  32. Frederick F. Schmitt (1992). Knowledge and Belief. Routledge.
    In Knowledge and Belief, Frederick Schmitt explores the nature and value of knowledge and justified belief through an examination of the dispute between epistemological internalism and externalism. Knowledge and justified belief are naturally viewed as belief of a sort likely to be true--an externalist view. It is also intuitive, however, to view them as an internal matter; justification must be accessible to the subject or constituted by the subject's epistemic perspective. The author argues against the view that internalism is the (...)
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  33. Frederick Schmitt (1991). Social Epistemology and Social Cognitive Psychology. Social Epistemology 5 (2):111 – 120.
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  34. Robert Ackermann, Brian Baigrie, Harold I. Brown, Michael Cavanaugh, Paul Fox-Strangways, Gonzalo Munevar, Stephen David Ross, Philip Pettit, Paul Roth, Frederick Schmitt, Stephen Turner & Charles Wallis (1988). Responses to 'in Defense of Relativism'. Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
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  35. Frederick Schmitt (1988). On the Road to Social Epistemic Interdependence. Social Epistemology 2 (4):297 – 307.
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  36. Frederick Schmitt (1988). Testimony and Evidence: A Rebuttal. Social Epistemology 2 (4):323 – 326.
  37. Frederick F. Schmitt (1988). Epistemic Dimensions of Self-Deception. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. 183--204.
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  38. Frederick Schmitt (1987). Special Issue on Social Epistemology. Synthese 73 (1):1-204.
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  39. Frederick F. Schmitt (1987). Introduction. Synthese 73 (1):1-2.
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  40. Frederick F. Schmitt (1987). Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy. Synthese 73 (1):43 - 85.
    Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there (...)
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  41. Frederick F. Schmitt (1985). Consensus, Respect, and Weighted Averaging. Synthese 62 (1):25 - 46.
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  42. Frederick F. Schmitt (1985). Knowledge as Tracking? Topoi 4 (1):73-80.
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  43. Frederick F. Schmitt (1984). Reliability, Objectivity and the Background of Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):1 – 15.
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  44. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Against Epistemic Indolence. Mind 92 (367):424-429.
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  45. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Events. Erkenntnis 20 (3):281 - 293.
    Despite important similarities, events differ from states of affairs. Recent theories of events (Davidson's, Kim's) have ignored the distinction, preferring to focus on relations of composition between events and states, indifferently conceived, and properties, objects, and times. It might be proposed, however, that events and states can be distinguished by their composition. I argue against a compositional approach, in favor of a modal approach, on which events are distinguished from states in virtue of being essentially dynamic. This view locates the (...)
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  46. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Knowledge, Justification, and Reliability. Synthese 55 (2):209 - 229.
    Recent epistemology divides theories of knowledge according to their diagnoses of cases of failed knowledge, Gettier cases. Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. Justificationism traces the failure to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief. My aim is to reconcile these camps by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of (...)
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  47. Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Reasons and Knowledge" by Marshall Swain. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):139.
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  48. Frederick F. Schmitt (1981). Justification as Reliable Indication or Reliable Process? Philosophical Studies 40 (3):409 - 417.
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  49. Frederick F. Schmitt (1978). Change. Philosophical Studies 34 (4):401 - 416.
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