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  1. Frederik Kaufman (2011). Late Birth, Early Death, and the Problem of Lucretian Symmetry. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):113-127.
    Lucretius famously argued that if we think death is bad because it deprives us of time we could have had by living longer than we do, then when we are born must be bad too, since we could have been born earlier than we were, and so be deprived of that time as well. John Martin Fischer thinks Lucretius’s symmetry argument fails because we have a bias toward the future. I argue that Fischer’s approach does not answer Lucretius. In contrast (...)
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  2. Frederik Kaufman (2010). Steven Luper, the Philosophy of Death. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):535-538.
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  3. Frederik Kaufman (2004). The Art of Life by John Kekes. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):299-303.
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  4. Frederik Kaufman (2000). Thick and Thin Selves: Reply to Fischer and Speak. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):94–97.
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  5. Frederik Kaufman (1999). Pre-Vital and Post-Mortem Non-Existence. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):1 - 19.
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  6. Frederik Kaufman (1998). Speciesism and the Argument From Misfortune. Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):155–163.
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  7. Frederik Kaufman (1996). Callicott on Native American Attitudes. Environmental Ethics 18 (4):437-438.
  8. Frederik Kaufman (1996). Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius' Symmetry Argument Fails. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):305 – 312.
  9. Frederik Kaufman (1995). An Answer to Lucretius' Symmetry Argument Against the Fear of Death. Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1):57-64.
  10. Frederik Kaufman (1994). Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality. Environmental Ethics 16 (1):57-70.
    Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue (...)
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  11. Frederik Kaufman (1994). Warren on the Logic of Domination. Environmental Ethics 16 (3):333-334.
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  12. Frederik Kaufman (1992). Moral Realism and Moral Judgments. Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112.
    For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
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  13. Frederik Kaufman (1990). Conceptual Necessity, Causality and Self-Ascriptions of Sensation. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
  14. Frederik Kaufman (1990). The Fetus's Mother. Hastings Center Report 20 (3):3-4.
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