Search results for 'Free will and determinism History' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. On Free Will, Bio-Cultural Evolution Hans Fink, Niels Henrik Gregersen & Problem Torben Bo Jansen (1991). Free Will and Determinism. Zygon 26 (3):447.score: 4635.0
  2. Yair Schlein (2014). Fatalism, Determinism and Free Will as the Axiomatic Foundations of Rival Moral World Views. Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 22 (1):53-62.score: 996.0
    One of the prominent questions of moral thought throughout history is the question of moral responsibility. In other words, to what measure do human actions result from free will rather than from being subordinate to a common “predetermined” law. In ancient Greece, this question was associated with mythical figures like Moira and Ananke while in recent times it is connected with concepts such as determinism and compatibilism. The argument between these two world views crosses cultures and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gerald B. Dworkin (ed.) (1970). Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Prentice-Hall.score: 996.0
    Of liberty and necessity, by D. Hume.--The doctrine of necessity examined, by C. S. Peirce.--Determinism in history, by E. Nagel.--Some arguments for free will, by T. Reid.--Has the self free will? by C. A. Campbell.--Dialogue on free will, by L. de Valla.--Can the will be caused? by C. Ginet.--Free will, by G. E. Moore.--A modal muddle, by S. N. Thomas.--Determinism, indeterminism, and libertarianism, by C. D. Broad.--An empirical disproof (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.score: 912.0
    I’ve been told that in the good old days of the 1970s, when Quine’s desert landscapes were regarded as ideal real estate and David Lewis and John Rawls had not yet left a legion of influential students rewriting the terrain of metaphysics and ethics respectively, compatibilism was still compatibilism about free will. And, of course, incompatibilism was still incompatibilism about free will. That is, compatibilism was the view that free will was compatible with (...). Incompatibilism was the view that free will was incompatible with determinism.1 What philosophers argued about was whether free will was compatible with determinism. Mostly, this was an argument about how to understand claims that one could do otherwise. You needn’t have bothered to talk about moral responsibility, because it was just obvious that you couldn’t have moral responsibility without free will. The literature was a temple of clarity. Then, somehow, things began to go horribly wrong. To be sure, there had been some activity in the 1960s that would have struck some observers as ominous. Still, it was not until the 1980s that those initial warning signs gave way to real trouble. The meanings of terms twisted. (shrink)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ilham Dilman (1999). Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.score: 780.0
    The debate between free will and its opposing doctrine, determinism, is one of the key issues in philosophy. Ilham Dilman brings together all the dimensions of the problem of free will with examples from literature, ethics and psychoanalysis, and draws out valuable insights from both sides of the freedom-determinism divide. The book provides a comprehensive introduction to this highly important question and examines the contributions made by sixteen of the most outstanding thinkers from the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 699.8
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Robert Kane (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford University Press.score: 699.0
    Accessible to students with no background in the subject, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will provides an extensive and up-to-date overview of all the latest views on this central problem of philosophy. Opening with a concise introduction to the history of the problem of free will--and its place in the history of philosophy--the book then turns to contemporary debates and theories about free will, determinism, and related subjects like moral responsibility, coercion, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael A. Slote (1969). Free Will, Determinism, and the Theory of Important Criteria. Inquiry 12 (1-4):317-38.score: 695.3
    The Theory of Important Criteria is used to argue that the age?old problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism turns on the question of the importance of causal indeterminacy of choice as a criterion of being able to do otherwise. One's answer to this question depends in turn on one's evaluation of certain moral issues and of the force and significance of certain similes, analogies and diagrams in terms of which one can ?depict? a deterministic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano (2013). Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science:17-37.score: 688.5
    The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact “natural compatibilists”. To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly (section 1) or indirectly (section 2) upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim (section 3). However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Peter van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.score: 684.0
    In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call 'determinism', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do (i.e., is incompatible with 'free will'). Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call 'determinism', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called 'determinism' without (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.score: 684.0
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Clifford E. Williams (1980). Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue. Hackett.score: 684.0
    FREE WILL and DETERMINISM A Dialogue Participants: FREDERICK: Free-willist DANIEL: Determinist CAROLYN: Compatibilist INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FREDERICK: Here ..
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Galen Strawson (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.score: 684.0
    This article begins with some brief reflexions on the definition of determinism (II), on the notion of the subject of experience (III), and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events (IV). The main discussion (V?XIII) focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ?life?hopes'). (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Clement Dore (1963). Is Free Will Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501.score: 684.0
    If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marvin Zimmerman (1966). Is Free Will Incompatible with Determinism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.score: 684.0
    If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Fritz J. McDonald (2014). Review of Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 7 (2):251-252.score: 684.0
    The Self Beyond Itself is a defense of an incompatibilist, hard determinist view of free will. Free will is here defined in a very strong sense, as the existence of actions that do not result from any causes other than the agent herself. The question of how to define free will, especially whether it consists in the ability to do otherwise, and what the ability to do otherwise amounts to, is not given much consideration (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Maria De Cillis (2014). Free Will and Predestination in Iislamic Thought: Theoretical Compromises in the Works of Avicenna, Ghazali and Ibn Arabi. Routledge.score: 672.0
  18. Benjamin Vilhauer (2010). The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):45-71.score: 624.0
    In this paper, I discuss a problem for Kant's strategy of appealing to the agent qua noumenon to undermine the significance of determinism in his theory of free will. I then propose a solution. The problem is as follows: given determinism, how can some agent qua noumenon be 'the cause of the causality' of the appearances of that agent qua phenomenon without being the cause of the entire empirical causal series? This problem has been identified in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Robert H. Kane (2002). Free Will, Determinism, and Indeterminism. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 371--406.score: 618.8
  20. Thomas Pink (2004). Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.score: 612.0
    Every day we seem to make and act upon all kinds of free choices: some trivial, others so consequential that they change the course of one's life, or even the course of history. But are these choices really free, or are we compelled to act the way we do by factors beyond our control? Is the feeling that we could have made different decisions just an illusion? And if our choices are not free, is it legitimate (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robert H. Kane (1999). New Directions on Free Will. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 135-142.score: 612.0
    Libertarian or incompatibilist conceptions of free will (according to which free will is incompatible with determinism) have been under withering attack in the modern era of Western philosophy as obscure and unintelligible and have been dismissed as outdated by many twentieth century philosophers and scientists because of their supposed lack of fit with modern images of human beings in the natural and human sciences. In a recent book (The Significance of Free Will), I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Charles B. Guignon (2002). Ontological Presuppositions of the Determinism--Free Will Debate. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 321--338.score: 607.5
  23. John V. Canfield (1962). The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368.score: 598.5
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Philippa Foot (1957). Free Will as Involving Determinism. Philosophical Review 66 (October):439-50.score: 598.5
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Gregory Harding (1997). Free Will and Determinism: Why Compatibilism is False. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):311-349.score: 598.5
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. André Gallois (1977). Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):99-105.score: 598.5
  27. Gardner Williams (1941). Free-Will and Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 38 (December):701-711.score: 598.5
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John V. Canfield (1963). Free Will and Determinism: A Reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.score: 598.5
  29. Peter van Inwagen (1974). A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism. Theoria 40 (1):9-22.score: 598.5
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John V. Canfield (1961). Determinism, Free Will and the Ace Predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.score: 598.5
  31. Allan Macgregor Munn (1960). Free-Will And Determinism. University Of Toronto Press,.score: 598.5
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Donald W. Viney (1986). William James on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:555-565.score: 598.5
  33. A. J. Ayer (1991). Free-Will and Determinism. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.score: 598.5
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Bruce Bassoff (1964). Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Existentialism 4:259-262.score: 598.5
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Bernard Berofsky (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row.score: 598.5
  36. Martin Davidson (1937). Free Will or Determinism. London, Watts & Co..score: 598.5
  37. David J. Hanson (1970). Science, Determinism and Free Will. Journal of Social Research 13 (March):49-54.score: 598.5
  38. John Thorp (1980). Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge.score: 598.5
  39. Peter van Inwagen (1972). Lehrer on Determinism, Free Will, and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 23 (October):351-357.score: 598.5
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Peter van Inwagen (1977). Reply to Gallois's Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):107-111.score: 598.5
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ariel Yadin (2004). Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism. Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.score: 598.5
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Eddy Nahmias (2011). Intuitions About Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press.score: 564.8
    It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Ari Maunu (1999). Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will. Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)score: 531.0
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Robert H. Kane (1999). Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.score: 517.5
    Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Nicola Ciprotti & Tommaso Piazza (forthcoming). Alethic Determinism. Or: How to Make Free Will Inconsistent with Timeless Truth. Logique and Analyse.score: 517.5
    The paper purports to show that truth-atemporalism, the thesis that truth is timeless, is incompatible with power to do otherwise. Since a parallel and simpler argument can be run to the effect that truth-omnitemporalism, the thesis that truth is sempiternal, is incompatible with power to do otherwise, our conclusion achieves greater generality, and the possible shift from the claim that truth is omnitemporal to the claim that it is atemporal becomes useless for the purpose to resist it. On the other (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Patricia S. Greenspan, Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem(S).score: 513.0
    I was led to this clarificatory job initially by some puzzlement from a philosopher's standpoint about just why free will questions should come up particularly in connection with the genome project, as opposed to the many other scientific research programs that presuppose determinism. The philosophic concept of determinism involves explanation of all events, including human action, by prior causal factors--so that whether or not human behavior has a genetic basis, it ultimately gets traced back to _something_ (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Richard Holton (2009). Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will. Inquiry 52 (4):412-428.score: 513.0
    Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or engage in vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible. I suggest a different explanation, and in doing so try to shed some light on the phenomenology of free will. I contend (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Norman Swartz, Lecture Notes on Free Will and Determinism.score: 513.0
    For an expansion of the discussion of Sections 2-5 (Logical Determinism, Epistemic Determinism, and Modal Concepts) see Foreknowledge and Free Will ", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Antony Eagle, Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Hume and Frankfurt.score: 513.0
    Hume begins his discussion of ‘liberty and necessity’ with some philosophical methodology that it is wise to keep in mind—namely, that in philosophical discussions it is of the first importance to get clear on what the terms under discussion mean, if we are to avoid ‘obscure sophistry’ or ‘beat[ing] the air in. . . fruitless contests’ (¶1–2).1 Hume’s hope in this particular instance is that with intelligible definitions, the controversy over the compatibility of free will and determinism (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Luis Xavier López-Farjeat (2007). Determinism and Free Will in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic Tradition. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:161-177.score: 513.0
    The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, precisely, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000