Search results for 'Frege-Geach problem' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Gottlob Frege, P. T. Geach & Max Black (1951). On Concept and Object. Mind 60 (238):168-180.score: 2400.0
  2. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.score: 1890.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.score: 1890.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Geach (1958). Imperative and Deontic Logic. Analysis 18 (3):49-56.score: 1890.0
    The author contends that moral utterances and imperatives have different logical features. He discusses r m hare's "language of morals" in terms of his distinction between plain imperatives and deontic utterances. (staff).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.score: 720.0
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.score: 720.0
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz (2013). Unity and the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.score: 624.0
    The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.score: 540.0
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.score: 540.0
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.score: 540.0
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.score: 450.0
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mark Eli Kalderon (2008). Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. Analysis 68 (298):133–143.score: 450.0
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. P. T. Geach (1979). Russell and Frege Again. Analysis 39 (3):159 - 160.score: 420.0
    ......Mathematics coincides with Frege's theory of Sinn and Bedeutung...argued that in cases where Frege would say we recognize over...successful.) With this sort of elucidation, then, I indeed proposed to...use of . . .', or between Frege's 'einen Sinn ausdruckeri.....
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Dave Beisecker (2011). The Force and Content of the Geach-Frege Problem. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):93-97.score: 405.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.score: 390.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. P. T. Geach (1956). On Frege's Way Out. Mind 65 (259):408-409.score: 360.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. P. T. Geach (1951). Frege's Grundlagen. Philosophical Review 60 (4):535-544.score: 360.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. C. J. F. Williams, G. E. M. Anscombe & P. T. Geach (1963). Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):270.score: 360.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Peter Geach & Max Black (1952). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Philosophical Library.score: 360.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Peter T. Geach (1981). La cuantificación de segundo orden de Frege. Teorema 11 (2-3):167-177.score: 360.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Mark Schroeder, Finagling Frege.score: 315.0
    Michael Ridge claims to have ‘finessed’ the Frege-Geach Problem ‘on the cheap’. In this short paper I explain a couple of the reasons why this thought is premature.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Graham Oddie & Dan Demetriou (2007). The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485 - 498.score: 315.0
    According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Nicholas Unwin (2001). Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):60-75.score: 315.0
    A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Ian Proops, What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?score: 279.0
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in the Tractatus (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.score: 270.0
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Nicholas Unwin (2008). Divine Hoorays: Some Parallels Between Expressivism and Religious Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):659-684.score: 270.0
    Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expressing an attitude, and to address the Frege-Geach problem. Divine law (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.score: 270.0
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler solution to the (...) problem. The hybrid theory has three advantages over pure error theory, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express attitudes, hybrid theorists can more easily explain moral motivation, and hybrid theorists can avoid the implausible claim that all moral discourse is radically mistaken. Accordingly, such a hybrid theory should be more attractive than pure expressivism or pure error theory to philosophers who are skeptical about moral facts and truth. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Mark Bryant Budolfson (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.score: 270.0
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Caj Strandberg (forthcoming). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-21.score: 270.0
    In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straightforward way of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I provide a systematic examination of different versions of hybrid expressivism with particular regard to how they are assumed to evade this problem. The major conclusion is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Gottlob Frege (1980). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell.score: 240.0
  31. Stéphane Courtois (2008). Le cognitivisme moral de Habermas fait-il face au problème de Frege-Geach? Philosophiques 35 (2):561-579.score: 238.3
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Zuzanna Kasprzyk & Katarzyna Kus (2009). The Frege-Geach Objection-Semantic Problems of Expressivism. Filozofia Nauki 17 (4):131.score: 238.3
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jeremy Schwartz & Christopher Hom (2014). Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism. Noûs 48 (2).score: 234.0
    The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non-normative (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Caj Strandberg (forthcoming). Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized? Acta Analytica:1-15.score: 234.0
    One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding problem. It is widely presumed that the reason why expressivism faces this difficulty is that it claims that moral sentences express non-cognitive states, or attitudes, which constitute their meaning. In this paper, it is argued that the reason why the embedding problem constitutes a challenge to expressivism is another than what it usually is thought to be. Further, when we have seen the real reason why expressivism (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) (1997). The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishers.score: 210.0
    This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Gottlob Frege (1895). The Frege-Hilbert Correspondence. In Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel, Albert Veraart, Brian McGuinness & Hans Kaal (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Blackwell. 33--51.score: 210.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Arvid Båve (2013). Compositional Semantics for Expressivists. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):633-659.score: 183.0
    I here propose a hitherto unnoticed possibility of solving embedding problems for noncognitivist expressivists in metaethics by appeal to Conceptual Role Semantics. I show that claims from the latter as to what constitutes various concepts can be used to define functions from states expressed by atomic sentences to states expressed by complex sentences, thereby allowing an expressivist semantics that satisfies a rather strict compositionality constraint (as well as a further, substantial explanatory constraint). The proposal can be coupled with several different (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.score: 180.0
    Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Neil Sinclair (2011). Moral Expressivism and Sentential Negation. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):385-411.score: 180.0
    This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to explain why sentences and their negations are inconsistent, and inconsistent in virtue of the meaning of negation (the Semantic Condition). Third, the ability of the account to generalize regardless of the topic of the negated sentence (the Generality Condition). The paper discusses three accounts of negation (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. John R. Searle (1962). Meaning and Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 71 (4):423-432.score: 180.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Tempered Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.score: 180.0
    The basic idea of expressivism is that for some sentences ‘P’, believing that P is not just a matter of having an ordinary descriptive belief. This is a way of capturing the idea that the meaning of some sentences either exceeds their factual/descriptive content or doesn’t consist in any particular factual/descriptive content at all, even in context. The paradigmatic application for expressivism is within metaethics, and holds that believing that stealing is wrong involves having some kind of desire-like attitude, with (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.score: 180.0
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Michael P. Lynch (2013). Expressivism and Plural Truth. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.score: 180.0
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Carl Baker (2011). Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.score: 180.0
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Gunnar Björnsson (2001). Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):81 - 108.score: 180.0
    Emotivists hold that moral opinions are wishes and desires, and that the function of moral language is to “express” such states. But if moral opinions were but wishes or desires, why would we see certain opinions as inconsistent with, or following from other opinions? And why should our reasoning include complex opinions such as the opinion that a person ought to be blamed only if he has done something wrong? Indeed, why would we think that anything is conditional on his (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Derek Baker & Jack Woods (forthcoming). How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. Ethics.score: 180.0
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Patricia Marino (2006). Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):517 - 533.score: 180.0
    On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.score: 174.0
    After presenting a simple expressivist account of reports of probabilistic judgements, I explore a classic problem for it, namely the Frege-Geach problem. I argue that it is a problem not just for expressivism but for any reasonable account of ascriptions of graded judgements. I suggest that the problem can be resolved by appropriately modelling imprecise credences.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. J. Skorupski (2012). The Frege-Geach Objection to Expressivism: Still Unanswered. Analysis 72 (1):9-18.score: 168.0
    I consider a recent attempt by Mark Schroeder in his book Being For to provide an expressivist semantics for the connectives, and I argue that it does not, as it claims, answer the ‘Frege-Geach objection&rsquo.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. William P. Alston & Jonathan Bennett (1984). Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege. Philosophical Review 93 (4):553-567.score: 144.0
    P. T. Geach, notoriously, holds the Relative Identity Thesis, according to which a meaningful judgment of identity is always, implicitly or explicitly, relative to some general term. ‘The same’ is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean ‘the same X’, where ‘X’ represents a general term (what Frege calls a Begriffswort or Begriffsausdruck). (P. T. Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 69. I maintain that it makes no sense to judge whether (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000