Search results for 'Frege-Geach problem' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gottlob Frege, P. T. Geach & Max Black (1951). On Concept and Object. Mind 60 (238):168-180.
  2. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
  3. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
  4.  47
    Peter Geach (1958). Imperative and Deontic Logic. Analysis 18 (3):49-56.
    The author contends that moral utterances and imperatives have different logical features. He discusses r m hare's "language of morals" in terms of his distinction between plain imperatives and deontic utterances. (staff).
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  5. Gottlob Frege (1952). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Edited by Peter Geach and Max Black. Blackwell.
     
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  6. Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
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  7. Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
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  8.  39
    Mark Douglas Warren (2015). Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the (...)
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  9. Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz (2013). Unity and the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.
    The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, (...)
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  10. Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great (...)
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  11.  70
    John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually (...)
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  12. Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
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  13.  10
    Peter Geach & Max Black (1952). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Philosophical Library.
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  14. Mark Eli Kalderon (2008). Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. Analysis 68 (298):133–143.
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
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  15. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
  16.  6
    Mark Silcox (2011). The Cry of Nature: Dissolving the Frege/Geach Problem. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):215-223.
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  17. M. E. Kalderon (2008). Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. Analysis 68 (2):133-143.
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  18.  18
    Thorsten Sander (2014). A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism. Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.
    According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.
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  19.  52
    P. T. Geach (1979). Russell and Frege Again. Analysis 39 (3):159 - 160.
    ......Mathematics coincides with Frege's theory of Sinn and Bedeutung...argued that in cases where Frege would say we recognize over...successful.) With this sort of elucidation, then, I indeed proposed to...use of . . .', or between Frege's 'einen Sinn ausdruckeri.....
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  20.  14
    Dave Beisecker (2011). The Force and Content of the Geach-Frege Problem. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):93-97.
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  21. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
  22.  9
    P. T. Geach (1965). Ontologia E Conoscenza Matematica: Un Saggio Su Gottlob Frege. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 62 (10):276-277.
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  23.  21
    C. J. F. Williams, G. E. M. Anscombe & P. T. Geach (1963). Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):270.
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  24.  62
    P. T. Geach (1956). On Frege's Way Out. Mind 65 (259):408-409.
  25.  3
    P. T. Geach & G. E. M. Anscombe (1968). Frege. Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):140-141.
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  26.  13
    P. T. Geach (1951). Frege's Grundlagen. Philosophical Review 60 (4):535-544.
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  27. P. T. Geach (1976). DUMMETT, M. "Frege: Philosophy of Language". [REVIEW] Mind 85:436.
     
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  28.  2
    Peter T. Geach (1981). La cuantificación de segundo orden de Frege. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 11 (2-3):167-177.
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  29. Gottlob Frege (1951). On Concept and Object. Translation: P. T. Geach. Mind 60:168.
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  30. M. C. Geach (1984). ANALYSIS Competition 'Problem' No. 20. Analysis 44 (3):97.
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  31. Peter T. Geach (1985). Dummett on Frege: A Review Discussion. The Thomist 49 (1):116.
     
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  32.  97
    Nicholas Unwin (2001). Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):60-75.
    A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.
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  33.  5
    Thorsten Sander (forthcoming). The Case of the Disappearing Semicolon: Expressive-Assertivism and the Embedding Problem. Philosophia:1-21.
    Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.
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  34. Mark Schroeder, Finagling Frege.
    Michael Ridge claims to have ‘finessed’ the Frege-Geach Problem ‘on the cheap’. In this short paper I explain a couple of the reasons why this thought is premature.
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  35. Graham Oddie & Dan Demetriou (2007). The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485 - 498.
    According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach (...)
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  36. Stéphane Courtois (2008). Le cognitivisme moral de Habermas fait-il face au problème de Frege-Geach? Philosophiques 35 (2):561-579.
    L’article cherche à fournir une défense de la théorie discursive de la morale de Habermas contre une critique importante formulée récemment par J. G. Finlayson, lequel soutient que Habermas rejetterait ce qu’il appelle le « cognitivisme métaéthique » et qu’un tel rejet le confronterait au problème de Frege-Geach. L’article démontre en détail que cette critique est non fondée. Il montre de plus que la seule forme de cognitivisme rejetée par Habermas est le descriptivisme moral en ce que cette approche (...)
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  37. Caj Strandberg (2015). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
    In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straightforward way of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I provide a systematic examination of different versions of hybrid expressivism with particular regard to how they are assumed to evade this problem. The major conclusion is (...)
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  38.  64
    Gottlob Frege (1980). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell.
  39. Ian Proops, What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in (...)
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  40. Neil Sinclair (2009). Recent Work in Expressivism. Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
    This paper is a concise survey of recent expressivist theories of discourse, focusing on the ethical case. For each topic discussed recent trends are summarised and suggestions for further reading provided. Issues covered include: the nature of the moral attitude; ‘hybrid’ views according to which moral judgements express both beliefs and attitudes; the quasi-realist programmes of Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard; the problem of creeping minimalism; the nature of the ‘expression’ relation; the Frege-Geach problem; the problem (...)
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  41. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...)
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  42. Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and hybrid theorists can provide a simpler solution to the (...) problem. The hybrid theory has three advantages over pure error theory, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express attitudes, hybrid theorists can more easily explain moral motivation, and hybrid theorists can avoid the implausible claim that all moral discourse is radically mistaken. Accordingly, such a hybrid theory should be more attractive than pure expressivism or pure error theory to philosophers who are skeptical about moral facts and truth. (shrink)
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  43.  76
    Mark Bryant Budolfson (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that (...)
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  44.  2
    Daniel Eggers (forthcoming). Nothing New in Ecumenia? Hare, Hybrid Expressivism and de Dicto Beliefs. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    One important trend in the debate over expressivism and cognitivism is the emergence of ‘hybrid’ or ‘ecumenical’ theories. According to such theories, moral sentences express both beliefs, as cognitivism has it, and desire-like states, as expressivism has it. One may wonder, though, whether the hybrid move is as novel as its advocates seem to take it to be—or whether it simply leads us back to the conceptions of early expressivists, such as Charles Stevenson or Richard Hare. Michael Ridge has recently (...)
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  45.  91
    Nicholas Unwin (2008). Divine Hoorays: Some Parallels Between Expressivism and Religious Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):659-684.
    Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expressing an attitude, and to address the Frege-Geach problem. Divine law (...)
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  46. Stephen J. Barker (2007). Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press
    At the heart of semantics in the 20th century is Frege’s distinction between sense and force. This is the idea that the content of a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One part, the sense, is the proposition that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it as its semantic interpretation. The second component is S’s illocutionary force. Illocutionary forces correspond to the three basic kinds of sentential speech acts: assertions, orders, and (...)
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  47.  87
    Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) (1997). The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishers.
    This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...
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  48. Gottlob Frege & Gottfried Gabriel (2000). Gottlob Frege Werk Und Wirkung : Mit den Unveröffentlichten Vorschlägen Für Ein Wahlgesetz von Gottlob Frege.
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  49.  98
    Jeremy Schwartz & Christopher Hom (2014). Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism. Noûs 48 (2):824-845.
    The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non-normative (...)
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  50.  23
    Caj Strandberg (2015). Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized? Acta Analytica 30 (1):1-15.
    One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding problem. It is widely presumed that the reason why expressivism faces this difficulty is that it claims that moral sentences express non-cognitive states, or attitudes, which constitute their meaning. In this paper, it is argued that the reason why the embedding problem constitutes a challenge to expressivism is another than what it usually is thought to be. Further, when we have seen the real reason why expressivism (...)
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