The paper reviews links between Bernard Lonergan's theory of innovative economic growth and cycles, and the ideas of FriedrichHayek, John Maynard Keynes, and Joseph Schumpeter. They were contemporary economists, who remain influential today. For Lonergan, although markets define what is bought and sold in an exchange economy, production decisions are more fundamental. These decisions are choices about the direction of development, the standard of living, and variations in the distribution of wealth in a modern society. The paper (...) shows how Lonergan's pure cycle theory extends mainstream theory to include a broader view of human behaviour and choice. (shrink)
This paper compares Hayek and Polanyi on spontaneous social order. Although Hayek is widely believed to have first both coined the name and explicated the idea of ?spontaneous order?, it is in fact Michael Polanyi who did so. Numerous differences emerge between the two thinkers. The characterisation of spontaneous order in Hayek, for example, involves different types of freedom to those advanced by Polanyi. Whereas Hayek (usually) portrays spontaneous order as a single entity, which is equivalent (...) to free society as a whole ? the free?catallactic society ? Polanyi by contrast is disposed to conceive of spontaneous orders as sub?units or components within free society as a whole. These and other aspects of their thought ? including the distinction between spontaneous and planned social orders ? are reviewed and criticised. (shrink)
Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.
This paper examines the theoretical ideas of Friedrich von Hayek, arguably the key progenitor of the global economic orthodoxy of the past two decades. It assesses Hayek's thought as he presents it: namely as a form of liberalism. Section I argues that Hayek's thought, if liberal, is hostile to participatory democracy. Section II then argues the more radical thesis that neoliberalism is also in truth an illiberal doctrine. Founded not in any social contract doctrine, but a (...) form of constructivism, neoliberal thought at its base accepts the paradoxical need to "discipline subjects for freedom", however this might contravene peoples' natural, social inclinations. The argument is framed by reference to Aristophanes' great comedy, The Birds, whose off shore borderless empire ironically prefigures the dream of neoliberal social engineers, and their corporate supporters. . (shrink)
There is much in The Sensory Order that recommends the oft-made claim that Hayek anticipated connectionist theories of mind. To the extent that this is so, contemporary arguments against and for connectionism, as advanced by Jerry Fodor, Zenon Pylyshyn, and John Searle, are shown as applicable to theoretical psychology. However, the ﬁnal section of this chapter highlights an important disanalogy between theoretical psychology and connectionist theories of mind.
This article argues that Hayek's Road to Serfdom should be read in the light of his contemporaneous studies in the history of European social and political thought, and traces the affinities between his and Halévy's work on the history of socialism. Both saw Saint-Simonism rather than Marxism as embodying the essence of socialism, and both saw the cult of `organization', rather than the idea of class conflict, as its most characteristic feature. It is tentatively suggested that Halévy's writings exercised (...) a significant influence on the formulation of Hayek's most famous work. (shrink)
I argue that social-contract theory cannot succeed because reasonable people may always disagree, and that social-contract theory is irrelevant to the problem of the legitimacy of a form of government or of a system of moral rules. I note the weakness of the appeal to implicit agreement, the conflation of legitimacy with stability, the undesirability of “public justification” and the apparent blindness to the evolutionary critical-rationalist approach of Hayek and Popper. I employ that approach to sketch answers to the (...) theoretical, historical and practical questions about the legitimacy of government or of systems of moral rules. (shrink)
In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot accommodate (...) weakness of will, because they are inconsistent with agency, which requires free will, because ends, obligations and values cannot be reduced to desires, and because maximisation is often not possible. Further, Lester’s claim that agents are self-interested is vacuous, his attempted reduction of moral behaviour to want-satisfaction fails, and his contention, that agents always do what they genuinely think to be morally required, seems untenable. A defence of freedom that depends on homo economicus is far from promising. (shrink)
Meta-analytic findings have suggested that individual differences are relatively weaker predictors of academic dishonesty than are situational factors. A robust literature on deviance correlates and workplace integrity testing, however, demonstrates that individual difference variables can be relatively strong predictors of a range of counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). To the extent that academic cheating represents a kind of counterproductive behavior in the work role of "student", employment-type integrity measures should be strong predictors of academic dishonesty. Our results with a college student (...) sample showed that integrity test scores were moderate to strong correlates of self-reported academic cheating and that these relationships persisted even after controlling for a variety of measurement concerns such as item format similarity, concurrent assessment, and socially desirable responding. Implications for institutional honor codes and the broader relations between educational and workplace dishonesty are discussed. (shrink)
I summarise a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...) is unsound, because it confuses an absolute reason for an obligation with a reason for an absolute obligation, and because it overlooks the possibility that priority rules may be rules for ordering pro-tanto obligations rather than rules for eliminating contenders for the status of absolute obligation. (shrink)
This note deals with the prepositional uniformity principlep-UP: p x N A (p, x) x N p A (p, x) ( species of all propositions) in intuitionistic mathematics.p-UP is implied by WC and KS. But there are interestingp-UP-cases which require weak KS resp. WC only. UP for number species follows fromp-UP by extended bar-induction (ranging over propositions) and suitable weak continuity. As corollaries we have the disjunction property and the existential definability w.r.t. concrete objects. Other consequences are: there is no (...) non-trivial countable partition of;id is the only injective function from to; there are no many-place injective prepositional functions; card () is incomparable with the cardinality of all metric spaces containing at least three elements. (shrink)
Friedrich A. von Hayek influenced many areas of inquiry including economics, psychology and political theory. This article will offer one possible interpretation of the ethical foundation of Hayek’s political and social contributions to libertarianism and free market capitalism by analyzing several of his important non-economic publications, primarily The Road to Serfdom, The Fatal Conceit, The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty. While Hayek did not offer a particular ethical foundation for free market capitalism, he (...) argued consistently that free markets are liberating and, for the markets to be truly free and for individuals to participate freely in markets, they should be subject to little control. Beyond some very basic principles, such as the protection of private property, that enable the free market to function properly, individuals are both free to and required to determine their own ethical compass. The central question, then, is what are the ethical principles that underlie Hayek’s view of the successful organization and operation of a free market? If formal rules and regulations must be kept to a minimum, then ethical behavior is an individual choice as well as an important foundation for the self-regulating free market. This article will argue that one possible ethical foundation underlying Hayek’s libertarian justification for free market capitalism are Friedrich Nietzsche’s “will to power” and noble/slave ethics. This article will rely primarily on Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals, Beyond Good and Evil, Zarathustra, and the Will to Power. (shrink)
The theory of cultural evolution proposed by economist Friedrich August von Hayek is without doubt the most harshly criticized component in his highly prolific intellectual corpus. Hayek depicted the emergence of the market order as the unintended consequence of an evolutionary process in which groups whose rules of behavior led to a comparative increase in population and wealth were favored over others. Key to Hayek’s theory was the claim that the rules of the market, on which (...) modern civilization relies, evolved at the meta-individual level and therefore surpass human reason. Hayek believed that his theory provided scientific explanation for the superiority of the market order over rational planning. In this article, I conduct a selective comparison between Hayek’s and Darwin’s theories of cultural group selection and analyze the role that demographic growth and reason play in their respective accounts. I first present Hayek’s theory of cultural group selection, its sources of inspiration, and its important place in his intellectual legacy. I then compare Hayek’s claims to Darwin’s views and highlight fundamental differences in their evaluation of the role of reason in moral evolution. Finally, I offer some comments concerning the place assigned to demographic growth in Hayek’s theory and his over-reliance on economics in explaining cultural evolution. (shrink)
One of the most vexing problems in contemporary liberal democratic theory and practice is the relation between ethics and economics. This article presents a way of bringing this relation into focus in the terms offered by two incredibly influential but too-often neglected twentieth-century political philosophers: John Dewey and FriedrichHayek. I describe important points of contact between Dewey and Hayek that enable us to begin the project of reframing contemporary debates between ethical egalitarians and economic libertarians. Cautiously (...) recognizing these commonalities whilst remaining attentive to persisting differences enables us to better approach the difficult relations between morals and markets. Specifically, I argue for a Deweyan combination of fair trade and free trade motivated by taking seriously a Hayekian caution about states. The result is a democratic theory that importantly refuses to attribute too much political efficacy to the quintessential liberal distinction between public and private. (shrink)
Of the many twentieth-century Austrian intellectuals who have left an indelible mark, FriedrichHayek is without a doubt one of the most multidimensional, and for this reason also one of the most difficult to comprehend. Who was he, in fact? He presented himself as a fourth-generation economist trained in the famous “Austrian School” which Carl Menger had founded in 1871. Indeed, Hayek may well be its last representative, given his own opinion that after him the Austrian School (...) had more or less ceased to exist. (shrink)
The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 1944)2 is without a doubt the book that made FriedrichHayek world famous. But one must immediately add that Hayek the trained economist was far from being satisfied with this situation, at least at the beginning. “I have long resented”, writes Hayek, “being more widely known by what I regarded as a pamphlet for the time than by my strictly scientific work.” But he adds immediately: “After reexamining what I wrote (...) then in the light of some thirty years’ further study of the problems then raised, I no longer do so” (Hayek 1976: xxiv-xxv). (shrink)
In this article I summarize FriedrichHayek’s cultural group selection theory and describe the evidence gathered by current cultural group selection theorists within the behavioral and social sciences supporting Hayek’s main assertions. I conclude with a few comments on Hayek and libertarianism.
The background to this paper is as follows. In 1998 Glen Whitman published a paper in Constitutional Political Economy called ‘Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems’. At the same time and unaware of Whitman’s work, I posted my draft PhD chapter ‘FriedrichHayek: a Panglossian evolutionary theorist’ (Denis, 2001, contains the final version) on my web page. Alain Albert (personal communication), having read the PhD chapter, drew my attention to Whitman’s article, and the result was a paper (...) ‘Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman’ in the same journal in 2002. This in turn led to Whitman’s ‘Hayek Contra Pangloss: A Rejoinder’, also in Constitutional Political Economy, in December 2003. Now read on …. (shrink)
In promoting spontaneous orders – orders that evolve in a process of cultural evolution – as “efficient,” “beneficial,” and “advantageous,” Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) has often been attributed the belief that there is something desirable about them. For this reason, he has been accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, of trying to derive an “ought” from an “is.” It appears that Hayek was..
Ever since the collapse of Soviet-bloc socialism, and the associated breakup of the Soviet Union itself, it has been accepted by the vast majority of political economists that Friedrich A. Hayek and his fellow Austrians, notably his mentor, Ludwig von Mises, were the unequivocal victors in the famous “socialist calculation debate” that had raged for a good seven decades. It was over. The anti-socialist, Austrian position had won. Market capitalism was triumphant in both theory and practice. The combination (...) of lack of incentives and inevitably dispersed and asymmetric information had doomed command central planning of economies, especially in an increasingly complicated modern world economy (Rosser and Rosser, 2004, Chap. 3). (shrink)
Karl Popper and Friedrich von Hayek became close friends soon after they first met in the early 1930s. Ever since, they discussed their ideas intensively on many occasions. But even though an analysis of the origins and contents of their ideas and correspondence reveals a number of important and fundamental differences, they rarely criticize each other in their published work. The article analyzes in particular the different ideas they have on the role of reason in society and on (...) rationalism and the roots of these differences. Popper’s “Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition” of 1948 contains a criticism of Hayek’s idea—published, for instance, in “Individualism: True and False” of 1945—that we must accept tradition without trying to change it. An analysis of the differences between the two authors touches on topics such as the possibility of public intervention in society, the role of social science in this, the methodology of social science, and the differences between liberalism and social democracy. The article concludes with some possible explanations for Popper and Hayek downplaying their differences in public. The fact remains that they never resolved the tension between Popper’s critical rationalism and Hayek’s conservative rationalism. (shrink)
Friedrich von Hayek is mostly known as a staunch critic of naturalist fallacy. It is claimed in the article that having been heavily influenced by Epicurus, he commited an identical error that he himself criticized. This opinion is based on Hayek’s application of Ernst Mach mind-body dualism criticism, Epicurean theory of [...].
This paper traces the historical origins of Friedrich A. Hayek's theory of cultural evolution, and argues that Hayek's evolutionary thought was significantly inspired by Alexander M. Carr-Saunders and Oxford zoology. While traditional Hayek scholarship emphasizes the influence of Carl Menger and the British eighteenth-century moral philosophers, I claim that these sources underdetermine what was most characteristic of Hayek's theory, viz. the idea that cultural evolution is a matter of group selection, and the idea that natural (...) selection operates on acquired as well as on inherited properties. (shrink)