Search results for 'Functionalism (Psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  26
    Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Functionalism, Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):147-67.
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  2. Norman Malcolm (1980). `Functionalism' in Philosophical Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:211-30.
     
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  3.  15
    K. V. Wilkes (1981). Functionalism, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):147-167.
  4. Rt Nunn (1979). Functionalist Psychology-Limiting the Range of Physical Law. Journal of Thought 14 (3):182-186.
  5.  7
    L. E. Braddock (2006). Psychoanalysis as Functionalist Social Science: The Legacy of Freud's 'Project for a Scientific Psychology'. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (3):394-413.
    The paper links Freud’s early work in the ‘Project for a scientific psychology’ with the psychoanalytic psychology of Kleinian object relations theory now current. Freud is often accused of introducing mechanism into his psychology and installing at its core an irreconcilable dichotomy of two disparate ways of explaining human behaviour. I suggest that Freud’s early mechanistic thinking is an attempt at what he only partly achieves, a functional account of the ‘mental apparatus’. I consider whether this way of conceptualising the (...)
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  6.  13
    Lawrence A. Shapiro (1994). Behavior, ISO Functionalism, and Psychology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (2):191-209.
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  7.  1
    Norman Malcolm (1980). XIII—‘Functionalism’ in Philosophy of Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1):211-230.
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  8.  8
    E. Lafuente, J. C. Loredo & J. Castro (2015). Citizens at Work: Evolutionism, Functionalism, Progressivism and Industrial Psychology in the Writings of Arland D. Weeks. History of the Human Sciences 28 (1):84-97.
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  9. Patricia Kitcher (1991). Narrow Psychology and Wide Functionalism. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press 671--85.
  10.  8
    Norman Malcolm (1979). 'Functionalism' in Philosophy of Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:211 - 229.
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  11. L. E. Braddock (2006). Psychoanalysis as Functionalist Social Science: The Legacy of Freud’s ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (3):394-413.
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  12. T. Leiber (1995). Functionalism and Emergence in Aristotle Psychology of the Philosophy of Nature. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 102 (2):380-401.
  13. Robert H. Wozniak (ed.) (1884). Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: Functionalism, the Critique of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.
    While John B. Watson articulated the intellectual commitments of behaviorism with clarity and force, wove them into a coherent perspective, gave the perspective a name, and made it a cause, these commitments had adherents before him. To document the origins of behaviorism, this series collects the articles that set the terms of the behaviorist debate, includes the most important pre-Watsonian contributions to objectivism, and reprints the first full text of the new behaviorism. Contents: Functionalism, the Critque of Introspection, and (...)
     
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  14. Ned Block (ed.) (1980). Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    ... PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY is the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in..
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  15. Andrew Ward (1989). Philosophical Functionalism. Behaviorism 17 (2):155-8.
    In his recent article "The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism," Richard Double argues that there are some fairly forceful a priori arguments showing that Philosophical Functionalism cannot provide adequate explanations for phenomenal states, the nonphenomenal conscious states of common sense, and the theoretical states of cognitive psychology and linquistics. In this paper it is argued that none of Double's arguments are successful.
     
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  16.  38
    Andrew Kernohan (1990). Lewis's Functionalism and Reductive Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):235-46.
  17. Ned Block (1980). Functionalism. In Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain (...)
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  18. A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  19. William Kalke (1969). What's Wrong with Fodor's and Putnam's Functionalism. Noûs 3 (February):83-93.
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  20.  46
    Catherine Driscoll (2004). Can Behaviors Be Adaptations? Philosophy of Science 71 (1):16-35.
    Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths (Sterelny 1992, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) have argued that sociobiology is unworkable because it requires that human behaviors can be adaptations; however, behaviors produced by a functionalist psychology do not meet Lewontin's quasi-independence criterion and therefore cannot be adaptations. Consequently, an evolutionary psychologywhich regards psychological mechanisms as adaptationsshould replace sociobiology. I address two interpretations of their argument. I argue that the strong interpretation fails because functionalist psychology need not prevent behaviors from evolving independently, and it (...)
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  21. Michael W. Martin (1979). Factor's Functionalist Account of Self-Deception. Personalist 60 (July):336-342.
     
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  22. Eric T. Olson (2002). What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity? Noûs 36 (4):682-698.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells (...)
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  23. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
  24. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.) (1995). Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Blackwell.
    Many philosophers and psychologists argue that normal adult human beings possess a primitive or 'folk' psychological theory. Recently, however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human bings are able to predict and explain each others' actions by using the resources of their own minds to simuate the psychological etiology of the actions of others. The thirteen essays in this volume present the foundations of theory of mind debate, and are accompanied by (...)
     
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  25.  86
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1988). Functionalism and Broad Content. Mind 97 (July):318-400.
  26.  28
    Martin Roth (2013). Folk Psychology as Science. Synthese 190 (17):3971-3982.
    There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of science over folk psychological explanations of human action: do the (perhaps implicit) generalizations that underwrite such explanations purport to state contingent, empirically established connections between beliefs, desires, and actions, or do such generalizations serve rather to define, at least in part, what it is to have a belief or desire, or perform an action? This question has proven important because of certain traditional assumptions made about the (...)
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  27. Joseph Owens (1983). Functionalism and the Propositional Attitudes. Noûs 17 (November):529-49.
  28.  87
    Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
  29.  64
    William G. Lycan (1979). A New Lilliputian Argument Against Machine Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):279-87.
  30. Joseph Margolis (1984). Philosophy Of Psychology. Englewood: Cliffs Prentice-Hall.
  31. David W. Hamlyn (1957). The Psychology Of Perception: A Philosophical Examination Of Gestalt Theory And Derivative Theories Of Perception. The Humanities Press.
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  32.  4
    Andrew Kernohan (1985). Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous? Dialogue 24 (3):427-42.
  33. Richard Double (1989). Reply to Ward's Philosophical Functionalism. Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
     
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  34. Patricia Kitcher (1980). Discussion: How to Reduce a Functional Psychology? Philosophy of Science 47 (March):134-140.
     
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  35. Philip Pettit (2000). How the Folk Understand Folk Psychology. Protosociology 14:26-38.
     
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  36. Cameron Buckner (2015). Functional Kinds: A Skeptical Look. Synthese 192 (12):3915-3942.
    The functionalist approach to kinds has suffered recently due to its association with law-based approaches to induction and explanation. Philosophers of science increasingly view nomological approaches as inappropriate for the special sciences like psychology and biology, which has led to a surge of interest in approaches to natural kinds that are more obviously compatible with mechanistic and model-based methods, especially homeostatic property cluster theory. But can the functionalist approach to kinds be weaned off its dependency on laws? Dan Weiskopf has (...)
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  37.  49
    H. Jacoby (1990). Empirical Functionalism and Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.
    Functionalism, the philosophical theory that defines mental states in terms of their causal relations to stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states, has often been accused of being unable to account for the qualitative character of our experimential states. Many times such objections to functionalism take the form of conceivability arguments. One is asked to imagine situations where organisms who are in a functional state that is claimed to be a particular experience either have the qualitative character (...)
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  38. William S. Robinson (2004). Colors, Arousal, Functionalism, and Individual Differences. Psyche 10 (2).
    Some philosophers have regarded the connection between hues and certain arousal or affective qualities as so intimate as to make them inseparable, and this “necessary concomitance view” has been invoked to defend functionalism against arguments based on inverted spectra. Support for the necessary concomitance view has sometimes been thought to accrue from experiments in psychology. This paper examines three experiments, two of which apparently offer support for the view. It argues that careful consideration of these experiments undermines this appearance (...)
     
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  39.  89
    Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
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  40. P. S. Kitcher (1985). Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism. Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97.
    Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in (...)
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  41.  64
    Domenic Marbaniang, Psychology of Religion.
    Psychology of religion tries to understand the cause-effect relationships of religious experiences and religious consciousness so as to be able to predict behaviors. It aims to study the religious consciousness with investigations in religious behavior patterns. -/- The major systems of psychology are: structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt School of Psychology. Obviously, each system has its own way of understanding religious consciousness.
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  42. George Bealer (1978). An Inconsistency in Functionalism. Synthese 38 (July):333-372.
    This paper demonstrates that there is an inconsistency in functionalism in psychology and philosophy of mind. Analogous inconsistencies can be expected in functionalisms in biology and social theory. (edited).
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  43.  71
    Daniel F. Hartner (2013). Conceptual Analysis as Armchair Psychology: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):921-937.
    Three proponents of the Canberra Plan, namely Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, have developed a collective functionalist program—Canberra Functionalism—spanning from philosophical psychology to ethics. They argue that conceptual analysis is an indispensible tool for research on cognitive processes since it reveals that there are some folk concepts, like belief and desire, whose functional roles must be preserved rather than eliminated by future scientific explanations. Some naturalists have recently challenged this indispensability argument, though the point of that challenge has been blunted (...)
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  44.  60
    Marco Ernandes (2005). Artificial Intelligence & Games: Should Computational Psychology Be Revalued? Topoi 24 (2):229-242.
    The aims of this paper are threefold: To show that game-playing (GP), the discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI) concerned with the development of automated game players, has a strong epistemological relevance within both AI and the vast area of cognitive sciences. In this context games can be seen as a way of securely reducing (segmenting) real-world complexity, thus creating the laboratory environment necessary for testing the diverse types and facets of intelligence produced by computer models. This paper aims to promote (...)
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  45.  97
    Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and Self-Consciousness. Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could (...)
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  46.  73
    Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In Gurol Irzik & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer
    I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims (...)
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  47.  56
    Derk Pereboom (1991). Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist. Synthese 88 (September):341-58.
    According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that (...)
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  48.  4
    William M. Reddy (2010). Neuroscience and the Fallacies of Functionalism. History and Theory 49 (3):412-425.
    Smail's "On Deep History and the Brain" is rightly critical of the functionalist fallacies that have plagued evolutionary theory, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology. However, his attempt to improve on these efforts relies on functional explanations that themselves oversimplify the lessons of neuroscience. In addition, like explanations in evolutionary psychology, they are highly speculative and cannot be confirmed or disproved by evidence. Neuroscience research is too diverse to yield a single picture of brain functioning. Some recent developments in neuroscience research, however, (...)
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  49.  14
    John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.) (2009). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into eight clear parts: historical background the status of psychological theories models of the mind behaviour, development and the brain thought and language perception and consciousness the inner world psychology and the Self. The Companion covers (...)
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  50.  6
    Gregory Johnson (2016). Methodological Functionalism and the Description of Natural Systems. Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):374-389.
    The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations (...)
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