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Profile: Gábor Forrai (University of Miskolc, Hungary)
  1. Gábor Forrai (2011). Grounding Concepts: The Problem of Composition. Philosophia 39 (4):721-731.
    In a recent book C.S. Jenkins proposes a theory of arithmetical knowledge which reconciles realism about arithmetic with the a priori character of our knowledge of it. Her basic idea is that arithmetical concepts are grounded in experience and it is through experience that they are connected to reality. I argue that the account fails because Jenkins’s central concept, the concept for grounding, is inadequate. Grounding as she defines it does not suffice for realism, and by revising the definition we (...)
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  2. Gábor Forrai (2010). Locke on Substance in General. Locke Studies 10:27-59.
    Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to the traditional one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, recurrent clusters. I will argue that both interpretation are partly right, and what is good (...)
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  3. Gabor Forrai (2010). Locke on Substance in General. Locke Studies 10 (27):27-59.
    Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. I will call this interpretation traditional, because it has already been formulated by Leibniz. According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, recurrent clusters. I (...)
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  4. Gábor Forrai (2010). What Mathematicians' Claims Mean : In Defense of Hermeneutic Fictionalism. Hungarian Philosophical Review 54 (4):191-203.
    Hermeneutic fictionalism about mathematics maintains that mathematics is not committed to the existence of abstract objects such as numbers. Mathematical sentences are true, but they should not be construed literally. Numbers are just fictions in terms of which we can conveniently describe things which exist. The paper defends Stephen Yablo’s hermeneutic fictionalism against an objection proposed by John Burgess and Gideon Rosen. The objection, directed against all forms of nominalism, goes as follows. Nominalism can take either a hermeneutic form and (...)
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  5. Gabor Forrai (2009). Brandom on Two Problems of Conceptual Role Semantics. In Barbara Merker (ed.), Vertehen nach Heidegger und Brandom.
    The paper examines how Brandom can respond to two objections raised against another sort of inferentialism, conceptual role semantics. After a brief explanation of the difference between the motivations and the nature of the two accounts (I), I argue that externalism can be accommodated within Brandomian inferentialism (II). Then I offer a reconstruction of how Brandom tries to explain mutual understanding (III-IV). Finally I point out a problem in Brandom’s account, which is this. Brandom’s inferential roles are social and normative, (...)
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  6. Gabor Forrai (2008). Conceptual Role Semantics and Naturalizing Meaning. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (24):337-348.
    In this paper I will do three things. One, to explain why conceptual role semantics seems an attractive theory of meaning (I). Two, to sketch a version of it which has a good chance of withstanding some of the standard objections (II-III). Three, to see what follows from this version with respect to the naturalization of meaning (IV).
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  7. Gabor Forrai (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.
    The present volume has grown out of a conference organized jointly by the History of Philosophy Department of the University of Miskolc and the History and Philosophy of Science Department of Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), which took place in June 2002. The aim of the conference was to explore the various angles from which intentionality can be studied, how it is related to other philosophical issues, and how it figures in the works of major philosophers in the past. It also (...)
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  8. Gabor Forrai (2002). Lakatos, Reason, and Rationality. In G. Kampis L. Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology, and the Man. Kluwer.
  9. Gabor Forrai (2002). Review of Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews--Online.
    The book is an outgrowth of a 1998 conference held at the Nicholas Copernicus University in Toru (Poland), for which Hilary Putnam was the keynote speaker. It contains eleven papers with responses by Putnam, and is divided into two parts, one on pragmatism and one on realism. Each part is prefaced by a short and well-focused introduction by Urszula M. Zeglen, which may be useful for those who did not keep up with the development of Putnam’s thought since the late (...)
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  10. Gábor Forrai (1993). From the Method of Proofs and Refutations to the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):161-175.
    Abstract The paper is an attempt to interpret Imre Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) on the basis of his mathematical methodology, the method of proofs and refutations (MPR). After sketching MSRP and MPR and analysing their relationship to Popper's and Poly a's work, I argue that MSRP was originally conceived as a methodology in the same sense as MPR. The most conspicuous difference between the two, namely that MSRP is fundamentally backward?looking, whereas MPR is primarily forward?looking, is due (...)
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