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George Bealer [58]G. Bealer [5]
  1. George Bealer, Analyticity.
    1. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced the term ‘analytic’ for judgments whose truth is guaranteed by a certain relation of ‘containment’ between the constituent concepts, and ‘synthetic’ for judgments which are not like this. Closely related terms were found in earlier writings of Locke, Hume and Leibniz. In Kant’s definition, an analytic judgment is one in which ‘the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A’ ([1781/1787] 1965: 48). Kant (...)
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  2. George Bealer, A Priori Knowledge: Replies to Lycan and Sosa.
    This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...)
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  3. George Bealer (2012). The Philosophical Review: Vol. 106, No.1, January 1997. Review of Metaphysics 51 (1):208-208.
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  4. Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.) (2010). The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting.
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  5. George Bealer (2009). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  6. Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (2009). Preface. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  7. George Bealer (2008). Intuition and Modal Error. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  8. George Bealer (2008). Modal Error. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oup Oxford.
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  9. George Bealer (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):23–54.
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  10. George Bealer (2006). A Definition of Necessity. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):17–39.
    In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of definitions of necessity have been ventured. Most people, however, find these definitions either circular or subject to counterexamples. I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free definition.
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  11. George Bealer (2004). An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
  12. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  13. George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71.
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  14. George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.
    The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism.
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  15. G. Bealer, D. Braun, G. Ebbs, C. L. Elder, A. S. Gillies, J. Jones, M. A. Khalidi, K. Levy, M. K. McGowan & C. L. Stephens (2001). Kalderon, ME, 129. Philosophical Studies 105 (311).
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  16. George Bealer (2001). The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties canbe defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction ofontologically prior realizations. Ideological (or nonreductive)functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only bedefined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of theirinteraction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argumentestablishes: (1) ontological functionalism is mistaken because itsproposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mentalproperties) into the contents of self-consciousness; (2)ideological (nonreductive) functionalism is the only viable alternativefor functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique misses the (...)
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  17. George Bealer (2000). A Priori Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:1-12.
    This paper has three parts. First, a discussion of our use of intuitions as evidence (reasons) in logic, mathematics, philosophy (hereafter, “the a priori disciplines”). Second, an explanation of why intuitions are evidence. The explanation is provided by modal reliabilism—the doctrine that there is a certain kind of qualified modal tie between intuitions and the truth. Third, an explanation of why there should be such a tie between intuitions and the truth. This tie is a consequence of what, by definition, (...)
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  18. George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
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  19. George Bealer (2000). Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh. Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author'ss paper "Self-consciousness.".
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  20. George Bealer (1999). A Theory of the Apri. In James Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology. Blackwell. 29--56.
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  21. George Bealer (1999). The a Priori. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. 2004.
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  22. George Bealer (1998). A Theory of Concepts and Concepts Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:261-301.
  23. George Bealer (1998). Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:331-338.
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  24. George Bealer (1998). Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Blackwell.
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  25. George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Rethinking Intuition. 201-239.
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  26. George Bealer (1998). Mind Association. Mind 107:425.
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  27. George Bealer (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...)
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  28. George Bealer (1998). State of the Art Essay. In S. Laurence C. MacDonald (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Basil Blackwell. 131.
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  29. George Bealer (1998). Universals and Properties. In Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Blackwell.
    This paper summarizes and extends the transmodal argument for the existence of universals (developed in full detail in "Universals"). This argument establishes not only the existence of universals, but also that they exist necessarily, thereby confirming the ante rem view against the post rem and in re views (and also anti-existentialism against existentialism). Once summarized, the argument is extended to refute the trope theory of properties and is also shown to succeed even if possibilism is assumed. A nonreductionist theory of (...)
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  30. George Bealer, Robert Cummings, Michael DePaul, Richard Foley, Alvin Goldman, Alison Gopnik, George Graham, Gary Gutting, Tery Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Hilary Kornblith, Joel Pust, E. Rosch, Eldar Shafir, Stephen Stitch, Ernest Sosa & Edward Wisniewkski (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  31. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
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  32. G. Bealer (1996). A-Priori Knowledge, Replies to Lycan, William and Sosa, Ernest. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174.
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  33. G. Bealer & A. Priori Knowledge (1996). The Scope of Philosophy'. Philosophical Studies 81:164-74.
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  34. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
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  35. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174.
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  36. George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
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  37. George Bealer (1996). On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.
    The paper elaborates upon various points and arguments in the author's "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy".
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  38. George Bealer (1996). Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
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  39. George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
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  40. George Bealer (1994). Property Theory: The Type-Free Approachv. The Church Approach. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.
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  41. George Bealer (1994). The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  42. George Bealer (1994). The Rejection of the Identity Thesis. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  43. George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...)
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  44. George Bealer (1993). Universals. Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32.
    Presented here is an argument for the existence of universals. Like Church's translation-test argument, the argument turns on considerations from intensional logic. But whereas Church's argument turns on the fine-grained informational content of intensional sentences, this argument turns on the distinctive logical features of 'that'-clauses embedded within modal contexts. And unlike Church's argument, this argument applies against truth-conditions nominalism and also against conceptualism and in re realism (the doctrine that universals are ontologically dependent upon the existence of instances). So (...)
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  45. George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
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  46. George Bealer (1989). On the Identification of Properties and Propositional Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.
    Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would (...)
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  47. George Bealer & Uwe Mönnich (1989). Property Theories. In. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Kluwer. 133--251.
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  48. George Bealer (1987). The Boundary Between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Journal of Philosophy 84 (10):553-55.
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