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Profile: G. F. Schueler (University of Delaware)
  1.  55
    G. F. Schueler (2003). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Oxford University Press.
    People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact (...)
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  2.  54
    G. F. Schueler (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. MIT Press.
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...)
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  3.  66
    G. F. Schueler (1988). Modus Ponens and Moral Realism. Ethics 98 (3):492-500.
  4.  81
    G. F. Schueler (1995). Why "Oughts" Are Not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me About Practical Reason). Mind 104 (416):713-723.
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  5. Tamar Schapiro, A. John Simmons, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Sarah Buss, Julia Driver, G. F. Schueler, James Montmarquet, Mark van Roojen & Samantha Brennan (1999). 10. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Pp. 917-919). [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (4).
     
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  6. G. F. Schueler (2009). The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
    In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an (...)
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  7. G. F. Schueler (1991). Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit. Mind 100 (400):277-81.
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  8.  6
    G. F. Schueler (2016). In Praise of Desire, by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder. Mind 125 (497):241-244.
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  9. G. F. Schueler (1979). `X's Reason for Φ-Ing Was P'. Mind 88 (349):111-114.
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  10.  62
    G. F. Schueler (2010). Motivational Internalism and Externalism. In Timothy O. Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell 293-300.
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  11.  28
    G. F. Schueler (1997). Why Modesty is a Virtue. Ethics 107 (3):467-485.
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  12.  30
    G. F. Schueler (2004). Doing Things for Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):495-497.
  13.  41
    G. F. Schueler (1999). Why IS Modesty a Virtue? Ethics 109 (4):835-841.
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  14.  46
    G. F. Schueler (2009). Interpretative Explanations. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  15.  99
    G. F. Schueler (2006). Review: Brute Rationality. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (458):412-415.
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  16.  15
    G. F. Schueler (1991). Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit. Mind 100 (2):277 - 281.
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  17.  17
    G. F. Schueler (2013). Direction of Fit. In Huge LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” (...)
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  18.  29
    G. F. Schueler (1978). Harman on Moral Relativism. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3):99-103.
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  19.  34
    G. F. Schueler (2011). Review of Three Faces of Desire by Timothy Schroeder. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):249-260.
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  20.  21
    G. F. Schueler (1992). Weakness of the Will. Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):502-504.
  21.  11
    G. F. Schueler (2013). Review of Joshua Gert: Normative Bedrock: Resopnse-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013 (05.24).
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  22.  10
    G. F. Schueler (1991). Practical Reasoning. Review of Metaphysics 45 (1):155-156.
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  23.  8
    G. F. Schueler (2013). Intentionality. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
  24.  17
    G. F. Schueler (2007). Is It Possible to Follow One's Conscience? American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):51 - 60.
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  25.  22
    G. F. Schueler (2007). Rationality and Character Traits. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):261-278.
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  26.  15
    G. F. Schueler (2010). Review of Sergio Tenenbaum (Ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (11).
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  27.  13
    G. F. Schueler (1989). Consequences and Agent-Centered Restrictions. Metaphilosophy 20 (1):77–83.
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  28.  14
    G. F. Schueler (2009). Comments on Sergio Tenenbaum: Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Dialogue 48 (2):387.
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  29.  11
    G. F. Schueler (1988). The Evaluation of Teaching in Philosophy. Teaching Philosophy 11 (4):345-348.
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  30.  13
    G. F. Schueler (2004). Alfred R. Mele, Motivation and Agency: Mele, Alfred R. Motivation and Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 264. $49.95 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (1):145-148.
  31. G. F. Schueler (1979). Exclusionary Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):407.
     
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  32.  13
    G. F. Schueler (1976). Nagel on the Rationality of Prudence. Philosophical Studies 29 (1):69 - 73.
  33.  9
    G. F. Schueler (1983). Akrasia Revisited. Mind 92 (368):580-584.
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  34.  8
    G. F. Schueler (1984). Some Reasoning About Preferences. Ethics 95 (1):78-80.
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  35.  3
    G. F. Schueler (1996). How Can Reason Be Practical? Critica 28 (84):41 - 62.
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  36.  1
    G. F. Schueler (1977). Moral Scepticism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):117-128.
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  37.  4
    G. F. Schueler (1983). How Not to Reply to a Moral Sceptic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):266 – 274.
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  38.  5
    G. F. Schueler (1997). Book Review:Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, Andy Clark. [REVIEW] Ethics 107 (2):349-.
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  39.  3
    G. F. Schueler (1974). The Notion of "Incitement". Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (2):89 - 97.
    The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how it is that a person who incites another to do something can be held morally responsible for this second person's acts. Professor bruce franklin's dismissal from stanford university is taken as the main example and it is argued that though those incited act 'because' of what the incitor does, This 'because' is not explainable on the standard models of physical causation, Coercion or hypnosis. It is closer to (...)
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  40. G. F. Schueler (2005). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Clarendon Press.
    People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the (...)
     
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  41. G. F. Schueler (1989). The Idea of a Reason for Acting. Mellen.