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Profile: Gary Merrill (North Carolina State University)
  1.  83
    G. H. Merrill (1980). The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81.
    In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can (...)
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  2.  60
    G. H. Merrill (1979). On the Uniqueness of the Identity Relation. Analysis 39 (3):133 - 136.
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  3.  10
    G. H. Merrill (1980). Three Forms of Realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):229 - 235.
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  4.  32
    G. H. Merrill (1979). What a Sentence Says. Philosophical Studies 35 (4):405 - 412.
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  5.  9
    G. H. Merrill (1976). "Aspects of the Problem of Universals," by Donald Brownstein. Modern Schoolman 53 (3):291-292.
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  6.  15
    G. H. Merrill (1978). Formalization, Possible Worlds and the Foundations of Modal Logic. Erkenntnis 12 (3):305 - 327.
  7.  11
    G. H. Merrill (1980). Book Review:Theory of Science George Gale. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 47 (4):667-.
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  8.  7
    G. H. Merrill (1976). "Aspects of the Problem of Universals," by Donald Brownstein. Modern Schoolman 53 (3):291-292.
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  9.  6
    G. H. Merrill (1980). Moderate Historicism and the Empirical Sense of 'Good Science'. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:223 - 235.
    Unlike the radical historicist and the radical logicist, the moderate historicist in the philosophy of science adopts the position that neither purely a priori (i.e., logical or philosophical) nor purely historical considerations alone determine the acceptability of a philosophical analysis of science. A dilemma arising from the nature of this position is first described and then it is argued that what is perhaps the most plausible way of avoiding this dilemma is doomed to failure. A particular example of this attempt (...)
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  10.  25
    G. H. Merrill (1979). A Note on Proxies. Erkenntnis 14 (3):371 - 372.
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  11.  5
    G. H. Merrill (1975). "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language," by James Bogen. Modern Schoolman 52 (2):207-211.
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  12.  12
    G. H. Merrill (1975). Peirce on Probability and Induction. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 11 (2):90 - 109.
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  13.  17
    G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
    It is argued that Hempel's original rejection of the prediction criterion of confirmation in [8] (on the grounds that it leads to a circular definition of confirmation) was ill-conceived, and that his own approach exhibits undesirable consequences to the degree that it deviates from this criterion. A version of the prediction criterion is formulated which, in addition to being-non circular, escapes the criticisms advanced against Hempel's satisfaction criterion, offers certain clear advantages over alternative approaches, and may serve as the basis (...)
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  14.  3
    G. H. Merrill (1975). "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language," by James Bogen. Modern Schoolman 52 (2):207-211.
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  15.  6
    G. H. Merrill (1975). A Free Logic with Intensions as Possible Values of Terms. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (3):293 - 326.
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