27 found
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  1. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1994). Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
  2.  37
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2000). When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. MIT Press.
  3.  29
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (1994). Self-Consciousness, Mental Agency, and the Clinical Psychopathology of Thought-Insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10.
  4. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1993). Mind and Mine. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press
  5. G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2007). The Delusional Stance. In Man Cheung Chung, K. W. M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), Reconceiving Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press
  6. G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2004). Reconceiving Delusions. International Review of Psychiatry 16:236-241.
     
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  7.  24
    George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1985). Are Qualia a Pain in the Neck for Functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):73-80.
  8.  6
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (2007). Philosophical Psychopathology and Self-Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 194--208.
  9.  15
    Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.) (2007). Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press.
    Philosophers and behavioral scientists discuss what, if anything, of the traditional concept of individual conscious will can survive recent scientific ...
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  10.  8
    G. Lynn Stephens (2000). Thought Insertion and Subjectivity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):203-205.
  11.  10
    George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1987). Minding Your P's and Q's: Pain and Sensible Qualities. Noûs 21 (September):395-405.
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  12.  15
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (1987). Minding Your P's and Q's: Pain and Sensible Qualities. Noûs 21 (3):395-405.
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  13.  8
    G. Lynn Stephens (1996). Commentary on "Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):97-98.
  14.  7
    G. Lynn Stephens (1985). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Modern Schoolman 63 (1):81-82.
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  15.  4
    G. Lynn Stephens (1984). The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore. By David O'Connor. Modern Schoolman 61 (4):272-272.
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  16.  3
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (1995). Ultimate Differences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):698.
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  17.  14
    George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1995). Book Review:First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Stephen F. Braude. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):655-.
  18.  3
    G. Lynn Stephens (1984). The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore. By David O'Connor. Modern Schoolman 61 (4):272-272.
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  19.  2
    G. Lynn Stephens (1985). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Modern Schoolman 63 (1):81-82.
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  20.  14
    Herbert Heidelberger & G. Lynn Stephens (1978). Transparency and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (4):549.
  21.  8
    G. Lynn Stephens (1980). Peirce on Psychological Self-Knowledge. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16 (3):212 - 224.
    Discusses the psychological self-knowledge of philosopher G. Lynn Stephens who contends that both the overarching assertion that humans have psychological stress at all and each specific ascription of a psychological state to oneself requires justification by inference. Objectivity of moral and aesthetic values and the analysis of modal discourse; Role of certain qualities of objects in interactions among objects; Irrefragable reasons requirement of each psychological self-ascription.
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  22.  4
    G. Lynn Stephens (1991). Review: Are Colors in the Head? [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):83 - 85.
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  23.  6
    G. Lynn Stephens (1985). Noumenal Qualia: C.S. Peirce on Our Epistemic Access to Feelings. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 21 (1):95 - 108.
  24.  6
    G. Lynn Stephens (1981). Cognition and Emotion in Peirce's Theory of Mental Activity. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 17 (2):131 - 140.
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  25.  2
    G. Lynn Stephens (1999). Defining Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):25-25.
  26.  1
    G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham (1994). Commentary on Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental Unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):115-116.
  27.  3
    Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.) (2007). Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. A Bradford Book.
    Recent scientific findings about human decision making would seem to threaten the traditional concept of the individual conscious will. The will is threatened from "below" by the discovery that our apparently spontaneous actions are actually controlled and initiated from below the level of our conscious awareness, and from "above" by the recognition that we adapt our actions according to social dynamics of which we are seldom aware. In Distributed Cognition and the Will, leading philosophers and behavioral scientists consider how much, (...)
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