76 found
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  1. Gail Fine (2004). Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27 (1):41-81.
  2. Gail Fine (1992). Inquiry in the Meno. In R. Kraut (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge University Press
    In most of the Socratic dialogues, Socrates professes to inquire into some virtue. At the same time, he professes not to know what the virtue in question is. How, then, can he inquire into it? Doesn't he need some knowledge to guide his inquiry? Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge seems to preclude Socratic inquiry. This difficulty must confront any reader of the Socratic dialogues; but one searches them in vain for any explicit statement of the problem or for any explicit solution (...)
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  3. Gail Fine (2003). Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Plato on Knowledge and Forms brings together a set of connected essays by Gail Fine, in her main area of research since the late 1970s: Plato's metaphysics and epistemology. She discusses central issues in Plato's metaphysics and epistemology, issues concerning the nature and extent of knowledge, and its relation to perception, sensibles, and forms; and issues concerning the nature of forms, such as whether they are universals or particulars, separate or immanent, and whether they are causes. A specially written introduction (...)
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  4. Gail Fine (1978). Knowledge and Belief in Republic V. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (2):121-39.
  5. Gail Fine (1993). On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. Oxford University Press.
    The Peri ide^on is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work. She asks how, and how well, Aristotle understands Plato's theory of forms, and why and with what justification he favors an alternative metaphysical scheme. She examines the significance of the Peri ide^on for some central questions about Plato's theory of forms--whether, for example, there (...)
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  6. Gail Fine, Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
  7. Gail Fine (1981). Aristotle on Determinism: A Review of Richard Sorabji's Necessity, Cause, and Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 90 (4):561-579.
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  8. Gail Fine (2000). Skeptical Dogmata: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Méthexis 13:81-105.
  9. Gail Fine (2010). Aristotle on Knowledge. Elenchos 14:121-56.
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  10.  30
    Gail Fine (2007). Enquiry and Discovery: A Discussion of Dominic Scott's Plato's Meno. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32:331-367.
  11. Gail Fine (2010). Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'. Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  12. Gail Fine (1987). Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle. In A. Graeser (ed.), Mathematik und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles. Haupt
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  13. Gail Fine (1984). Separation. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2:31-87.
     
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  14.  66
    Gail Fine (1979). Knowledge and Logos in the Theaetetus. Philosophical Review 88 (3):366-397.
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  15.  87
    Gail Fine (2010). Aristotle's Two Worlds: Knowledge and Belief inPosterior Analytics 1.33. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):323-346.
    At the end of Republic 5, Plato distinguishes epistêmê from doxa, knowledge from belief. In Posterior Analytics 1.33, Aristotle provides his own distinction between epistêmê and doxa. I explore his way of distinguishing them and compare it with Plato's.
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  16.  55
    Gail Fine (1998). Plato's Refutation of Protagoras in the Theaetetus. Apeiron 31 (3):201-34.
  17.  73
    Gail Fine (2000). Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage? Philosophical Review 109 (2):195-234.
  18.  46
    Gail Fine (ed.) (1999). Plato, Volume 2: Ethics, Politics, Religious and the Soul. Oxford University Press.
    This series aims to bring together important recent writing in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.
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  19. Gail Fine (1983). Plato and Aristotle on Form and Substance. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 209:23-47.
  20.  25
    Gail Fine (2013). Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):131-144.
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  21.  22
    Gail Fine (1977). Plato on Naming. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):289-301.
  22. Gail Fine (1985). Separation: A Reply to Morrison. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3:159-65.
     
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  23. Gail Fine (2008). Does Socrates Claim to KNow That He Knows Nothing? Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35:49-85.
     
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  24. Gail Fine (1986). Immanence. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4:71-97.
     
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  25.  26
    Gail Fine (1984). Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione 9. History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):23 - 47.
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  26.  26
    Gail Fine (1996). Substance and Separation in Aristotle. Philosophical Review 105 (4):527-530.
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  27. Gail Fine (2003). Sextus and External World Skepticism. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy:341-85.
  28. Gail Fine (2010). Aristotle's Reply to the Aporema in the Meno. In V. Harte & M. M. McCabe (eds.), Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato, Bulletin of the Classical Institute.
  29. Gail Fine (1988). Plato on Perception: A Reply to Professor Turnbull,“Becoming and Intelligibility”. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy:15-28.
  30.  26
    Gail Fine (1980). The One Over Many. Philosophical Review 89 (2):197-240.
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  31.  23
    Gail Fine (2010). Aristotle's Two Worlds: Posterior Analytics 1.33. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):323-46.
  32.  8
    Gail Fine (1988). Owen's Progress: Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Philosophical Review 97 (3):373-99.
  33.  4
    R. S. Bluck, Benson Mates, William Prior, Gail Fine, Richard Parry, Richard Sharvy & Paul Schweizer (1997). How (Not) to Exempt Platonic Forms From Parmenides' Third Man. Phronesis 42 (1):1.
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  34.  16
    Gail Fine (1993). Vlastos on Socratic and Platonic Forms. Apeiron 26 (3/4):67 - 83.
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  35.  1
    Gail Fine, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Verity Harte, Tim O'Keefe, Tad Brennan, T. H. Irwin & Bob Sharples (1996). Brill Online Books and Journals. Phronesis 41 (3).
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  36.  18
    Gail Fine (1988). The Object of Thought Argument: Forms and Thoughts. Apeiron 21 (3):105 - 145.
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  37.  20
    Gail Fine (1982). Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man. Phronesis 27 (1):13 - 33.
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  38.  14
    Gail Fine (2003). Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes. In J. Miller & B. Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press
  39.  14
    Gail Fine (1990). Book Review. The Ascent From Nominalism. T Penner. [REVIEW] Noûs 25 (1):126-32.
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  40. Gail Fine (1994). Protagorean Relativisms. Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 10:211-43.
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  41. Gail Fine (1981). Armstrong on Relational and Nonrelational Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (3):262-71.
    This paper considers and criticizes david armstrong's defense in his book of an allegedly nonrelational version of realism, "universals and scientific realism". It also challenges his claim that plato, But not aristotle, Held a relational version of realism.
     
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  42.  10
    Gail Fine (1983). Relational Entities. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (3):225-49.
  43. Gail Fine (1992). Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy:13-41.
  44.  10
    Gail Fine (1992). Two Studies in the Early Academy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):393-409.
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  45.  10
    Gail Fine (2005). Book Review. The Midwife of Platonism. D Sedley. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):662-5.
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  46. Gail Fine (1998). Relativism and Self-Refutation: Plato, Protagoras, and Burnyeat. In J. Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Greek Philosophy. The Clarendon Press
  47.  8
    Gail Fine (1992). Book Review. The Theaetetus of Plato. Myles Burnyeat. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 101 (4):830-834.
  48.  10
    Gail Fine (1996). Nozick's Socrates. Phronesis 41 (3):233-244.
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  49.  7
    Gail Fine (1996). Book Review. Substance and Separation in Aristotle. Lynne Spellman. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 105 (4):527-30.
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  50.  5
    Gail Fine (1977). Book Review. Plato: Phaedo. David Gallop. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 86 (1):101-105.
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