Search results for 'Game Theory' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  13
    Gianfranco Gambarelli & Guillermo Owen (2004). The Coming of Game Theory. Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):1-18.
    This is a brief historical note on game theory. We cover its historical roots (prior to its formal definition in 1944), and look at its development until the late 1960's.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  14
    Luca Zarri (2010). On Social Utility Payoffs in Games: A Methodological Comparison Between Behavioural and Rational Game Theory. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 69 (4):587-598.
    Are the recent findings of Behavioural Game Theory (BGT) on unselfish behaviours relevant for the progress of game theory? Is the methodology of BGT, centred around the attempt to study theoretically players’ utility functions in the light of the feedback that experimental evidence can produce on the theory, a satisfactory one? Or is the creation of various types of ‘social preferences’ just wasteful tinkering? This article compares BGT with the methodology of Rational Game (...) (RGT). BGT is viewed as a more promising and constructive approach, with regard to the relationship between experimental data and theoretical modelling. However, I also argue that today RGT and BGT are closer to one another than often thought. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  28
    Mohammed Dore (1997). On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract. Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.
    This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  7
    Hannah Rubin (2016). The Phenotypic Gambit: Selective Pressures and ESS Methodology in Evolutionary Game Theory. Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):551-569.
    The ‘phenotypic gambit,’ the assumption that we can ignore genetics and look at the fitness of phenotypes to determine the expected evolutionary dynamics of a population, is often used in evolutionary game theory. However, as this paper will show, an overlooked genotype to phenotype map can qualitatively affect evolution in ways the phenotypic approach cannot predict or explain. This gives us reason to believe that, even in the long-term, correspondences between phenotypic predictions and dynamical outcomes are not robust (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  85
    Gustavo Cevolani (2011). Hayek in the Lab. Austrian School, Game Theory, and Experimental Economics. Logic and Philosophy of Science 9 (1):429-436.
    Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Boudewijn de Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  42
    Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  8.  77
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2010). Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory. Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  9. Tomislav Bracanovic (2002). The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory. Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  60
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
    The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive (...) theory gives bad advice in some cases, is reducible to rational choice theory in other cases, while it makes no sense in yet other cases. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  6
    Paolo Galeazzi & Emiliano Lorini (2016). Epistemic Logic Meets Epistemic Game Theory: A Comparison Between Multi-Agent Kripke Models and Type Spaces. Synthese 193 (7):2097-2127.
    In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers :149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42:863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  50
    Don Ross (2008). Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions. Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  40
    Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin (1997). Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-Ordination: Recent Lessons From Game Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):171-90.
    The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  33
    Julius Sensat (1997). Game Theory and Rational Decision. Erkenntnis 47 (3):379-410.
    In its classical conception, game theory aspires to be a determinate decision theory for games, understood as elements of a structurally specified domain. Its aim is to determine for each game in the domain a complete solution to each player's decision problem, a solution valid for all real-world instantiations, regardless of context. "Permissiveness" would constrain the theory to designate as admissible for a player any conjecture consistent with the function's designation of admissible strategies for the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15.  48
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme in game theory was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the 20th century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate game theoretic solution concept for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  18
    Paddy Jane McShane (2014). Game Theory and Belief in God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):3-12.
    In the last few decades game theory has emerged as a powerful tool for examining a broad range of philosophical issues. It is unsurprising, then, that game theory has been taken up as a tool to examine issues in the philosophy of religion. Economist Steven Brams (1982), (1983) and (2007), for example, has given a game theoretic analysis of belief in God, his main argument first published in this journal and then again in both editions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  41
    Alasdair I. Houston & John M. McNamara (2005). John Maynard Smith and the Importance of Consistency in Evolutionary Game Theory. Biology and Philosophy 20 (5):933-950.
    John Maynard Smith was the founder of evolutionary game theory. He has also been the major influence on the direction of this field, which now pervades behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. In its original formulation the theory had three components: a set of strategies, a payoff structure, and a concept of evolutionary stability. These three key components are still the basis of the theory, but what is assumed about each component is often different to the original (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  24
    John Douglas Bishop (2006). Moral Intuitions Versus Game Theory: A Response to Marcoux on Résumé Embellishing. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 67 (2):181 - 189.
    Marcoux argues that job candidates ought to embellish non-verifiable information on their résumés because it is the best way to coordinate collective action in the résumé ‚game’. I do not dispute his analysis of collective action; I look at the larger picture, which throws light on the role game theory might play in ethics. I conclude that game theory’s conclusions have nothing directly to do with ethics. Game theory suggests the means to certain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  16
    Zachary Ernst (2005). Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1187-1196.
    A variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Paul Weirich (2007). Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Cambridge University Press.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  8
    Bernard Walliser (2011). Learning Versus Evolution: From Biology to Game Theory. Biological Theory 6 (4):311-319.
  22.  2
    Matthew Kopec, Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy.
    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  35
    Emiliano Lorini (2010). A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic Dla {\Mathcal{Dla}} , Coalition Logic, and Game Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):327-351.
    We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called ( Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency ) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  24.  54
    Graham G. Dodds & David W. Shoemaker (2002). Why We Can't All Just Get Along: Human Variety and Game Theory in Hobbes's State of Nature. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):345-374.
    This paper critically examines several game theoretic interpretations of Hobbes' state of nature, including Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance Game, and argues instead that the best matrix is that of a combination of the two, an Assurance Dilemma. This move is motivated by the fact that Hobbes explicitly notes two distinct personality types, with different preference structures, in the state of nature: dominators and moderates. The former play as if in a Prisoner's Dilemma, the latter play as if in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  25.  24
    Dirk Helbing (1996). A Stochastic Behavioral Model and A?Microscopic? Foundation of Evolutionary Game Theory. Theory and Decision 40 (2):149-179.
  26.  11
    Ariel Dinar, Aharon Ratner & Dan Yaron (1992). Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in Water Resources. Theory and Decision 32 (1):1-20.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  8
    Adam Morton (1994). Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation. Ratio 7 (1):14-25.
    I discuss how simulating another agent can be useful in some game-theoretical situations, particularly iterated games such as the centipede game.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  64
    Daniel Rothschild (2013). Game Theory and Scalar Implicatures. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):438-478.
  29.  6
    J. Maynard Smith (1984). Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):95.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  30.  18
    Eric Pacuit (2015). On the Use of Logic in Game Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):741-753.
    IntroductionA quick glance at the opening paragraphs in many of the classic logic textbooks reveals a common view: Logical methods highlight the reasoning patterns of a single agent engaged in some form of mathematical thinking.A sampling from my bookshelf: Shoenfield’s Mathematical Logic: “Logic is the study of reasoning; and mathematical logic is the study of the type of reasoning done by mathematicians”; Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction of Logic: “Symbolic logic is a mathematical model of deductive thought”; and Chiswell and Hodges (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  60
    Robin Clark & Prashant Parikh (2007). Game Theory and Discourse Anaphora. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 16 (3):265-282.
    We develop an analysis of discourse anaphora—the relationship between a pronoun and an antecedent earlier in the discourse —using games of partial information. The analysis is extended to include information from a variety of different sources, including lexical semantics, contrastive stress, grammatical relations, and decision theoretic aspects of the context.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  11
    Mirsad Hadzikadic, Ted Carmichael & Charles Curtin (2010). Complex Adaptive Systems and Game Theory: An Unlikely Union. Complexity 16 (1):34-42.
  33. John C. Harsanyi, Werner Leinfellner & Eckehart Köhler (1998). Game Theory, Experience, Rationality Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics : In Honor of John C. Harsanyi.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. Jerzy Stelmach & Wojciech Załuski (eds.) (2011). Game Theory and the Law. Copernicus Center Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  20
    Theodore M. Benditt (2004). Acting in Concert or Going It Alone: Game Theory and the Law. Law and Philosophy 23 (6):615 - 630.
    In recent years a number of writers have maintained that law can usefully be illuminated by game theory. Some believe that game theory can provide guidance in formulating rules for dealing with specific problems. Others advance the philosophically ambitious contention that we can gain a better understanding and/or appreciation of law by seeing it in terms of game-theoretic ideas. My purpose in this article is to examine some claims of the latter sort, and in particular (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  1
    D. S. Bridges (2004). First Steps in Constructive Game Theory. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (4):501.
    The minimax theorem of matrix game theory is examined from a constructive point of view. It is then shown that the existence of solutions for matrix games cannot be proved constructively, but that a 2-by-2 game with at most one solution has a constructible solution.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  11
    Michael Bacharach (2006). Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton University Press.
    This is a revision of game theory which takes account of agents' own descriptions of their situations, and which allows people to reason as members of groups.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   41 citations  
  38.  15
    Michael Bacharach (1994). The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game. Theory and Decision 37 (1):7-48.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39.  34
    Colin F. Camerer (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Plausible Formal Models That Predict Accurately. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):157-158.
    Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  40. Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden (2003). Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):175-210.
    David Lewis is widely credited with the first formulation of common knowledge and the first rigorous analysis of convention. However, common knowledge and convention entered mainstream game theory only when they were formulated, later and independently, by other theorists. As a result, some of the most distinctive and valuable features of Lewis' game theory have been overlooked. We re-examine this theory by reconstructing key parts in a more formal way, extending it, and showing how it (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  41.  24
    Ariel Rubinstein, Comments On the Interpretation of Game Theory.
    The paper is a discussion of the interpretation of game theory. Game theory is viewed as an abstract inquiry into the concepts used in social reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict and not as an attempt to predict behavior. The first half of the paper..
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  42. Ken Binmore (2007). Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games, carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  43. S. M. Huttegger & K. J. S. Zollman (2013). Methodology in Biological Game Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):637-658.
    Game theory has a prominent role in evolutionary biology, in particular in the ecological study of various phenomena ranging from conflict behaviour to altruism to signalling and beyond. The two central methodological tools in biological game theory are the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy. While both were inspired by a dynamic conception of evolution, these concepts are essentially static—they only show that a population is uninvadable, but not that a population is likely to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44.  3
    Ken Binmore (2016). Patrick Suppes and Game Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):241-251.
    This article is a contribution to a symposium celebrating the life of Patrick Suppes. It describes the context in which he made contributions relevant to two extremes of the game theory spectrum. At one extreme, he made an experimental study of whether laboratory subjects learn to use Von Neumann’s minimax theory in games of pure conflict. At the other extreme, he invented a theory of empathetic identification that lies at the root of an approach to making (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  77
    Francesco Guala (2006). Has Game Theory Been Refuted? Journal of Philosophy 103 (5):239-263.
    The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  46.  49
    Margaret Gilbert (1981). Game Theory Andconvention. Synthese 46 (1):41 - 93.
    A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  47.  30
    Kevin Nicholas Thomson (2008). Universal Game Theory. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 34:57-61.
    Universal Game Theory - The theory that all of life is a game played by consciousness’es, (Living Beings). The board is a dream like structure of the universe. The progression is through an active process of intent witnessing, and passive meditation. Which releases the tension in the nerves of the body and leads to selfless actions, moral goodness, and eventually the finish, Enlightenment. Just like a wounded creature only cares about it’s own self. Man in tensionthrough (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  65
    Daniel M. Hausman (2000). Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  49. David M. Kreps (1992). Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  50.  64
    Don Ross (2006). Evolutionary Game Theory and the Normative Theory of Institutional Design: Binmore and Behavioral Economics. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):51-79.
    In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore 's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the ‘scale-relativity’ considerations built into Binmore 's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000