Search results for 'Game Theory, Epistemology, Interactive Epistemology, Bounded Rationality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  24
    Robert C. Robinson (2006). Bounded Epistemology. Ssrn Elibrary.
    Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of (...)
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  2.  55
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme in game theory was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the 20th century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate game theoretic solution concept for (...)
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  3.  82
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2010). Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory. Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic (...)
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  4.  52
    Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only (...)
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  5.  13
    Paolo Galeazzi & Emiliano Lorini (2016). Epistemic Logic Meets Epistemic Game Theory: A Comparison Between Multi-Agent Kripke Models and Type Spaces. Synthese 193 (7):2097-2127.
    In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers :149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42:863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal (...)
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  6.  57
    Herbert A. Simon (2000). Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and Tomorrow. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 1 (1):25-39.
    With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available (...)
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  7.  6
    Cristina Bicchieri (2004). Rationality and Game Theory. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 182--205.
    Bicchieri's topic is the modeling of interaction between decision makers in situations in which the outcome of the interaction depends on what the parties jointly do. Examples include chess, firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, jury members deciding on a verdict, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships. Rationality assumptions are a basic ingredient of game theory, but though rational choice might be unproblematic in normative decision theory, it becomes (...)
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  8.  16
    Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor (2011). Bounded Rationality in the Centipede Game. Episteme 8 (3):262-280.
    Normative game theory unsatisfactorily explains rational behavior. Real people do not behave as predicted, and what is prescribed as rational behavior is normally unattainable in real-life. The problem is that current normative analysis does not account for people's cognitive limitations – their bounded rationality. However, this paper develops an account of bounded rationality that explains the rationality of more realistic behavior. I focus on the Centipede Game, in which boundedly rational players explore and (...)
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  9.  37
    Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While (...)
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  10.  46
    Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While (...)
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  11. Boudewijn de Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of (...)
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  12. Paul Weirich (2007). Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Cambridge University Press.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In (...)
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  13.  36
    Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass & Lior Seeman (2014). Decision Theory with Resource‐Bounded Agents. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (2):245-257.
    There have been two major lines of research aimed at capturing resource-bounded players in game theory. The first, initiated by Rubinstein (), charges an agent for doing costly computation; the second, initiated by Neyman (), does not charge for computation, but limits the computation that agents can do, typically by modeling agents as finite automata. We review recent work on applying both approaches in the context of decision theory. For the first approach, we take the objects of choice (...)
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  14.  55
    Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk (2016). A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement. Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.
    In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational (...)
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  15.  73
    Don Ross (2008). Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions. Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive (...)
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  16.  53
    Christian W. Bach & Jérémie Cabessa (2012). Common Knowledge and Limit Knowledge. Theory and Decision 73 (3):423-440.
    We study the relationship between common knowledge and the sequence of iterated mutual knowledge from a topological point of view. It is shown that common knowledge is not equivalent to the limit of the sequence of iterated mutual knowledge. On that account the new epistemic operator limit knowledge is introduced and analyzed in the context of games. Indeed, an example is constructed where the behavioral implications of limit knowledge of rationality strictly refine those of common knowledge of rationality. (...)
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  17.  44
    Cristina Bicchieri, Dalla Chiara & Maria Luisa (eds.) (1992). Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press.
    In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, (...)
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  18.  17
    Frédéric Laville (2000). Should We Abandon Optimization Theory? The Need for Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (3):395-426.
    This paper makes explicit the rhetoric of optimization. Various arguments are examined, in order to determine whether we should retain optimization theory or assume bounded rationality. Empirical evidence confounds optimization theory; in the face of experimental studies, an empirical dilemma emerges, according to which we should discard either the theory of expected utility or the criterion of empirical refutation. Methodological criticisms attack optimization theory's epistemological status; together, they give rise to a methodological trilemma, according to which optimization theory (...)
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  19.  41
    Ann E. Cudd (1993). Game Theory and the History of Ideas About Rationality: An Introductory Survey. Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):101.
    Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality (...)
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  20.  8
    Reinhard Selten (1998). Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:9-34.
    In this paper I want to deal with game theory, experience and rationality, and I will try to put these into historical perspective.
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  21. John C. Harsanyi, Werner Leinfellner & Eckehart Köhler (1998). Game Theory, Experience, Rationality Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics : In Honor of John C. Harsanyi.
     
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  22.  77
    Leigh Tesfatsion (1984). Games, Goals, and Bounded Rationality. Theory and Decision 17 (2):149-175.
    A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by "policies," i. e., end-mean pairs of candidate goals and "controls" (partial contingency plans). The existence of individual objective functions over the joint policy choice set is axiomatized in terms of primitive preference and probability orders. Conditions are given for the existence of pure policy Nash equilibrium points in n-person games, and (...)
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  23.  14
    Emiliano Lorini (2016). A Minimal Logic for Interactive Epistemology. Synthese 193 (3):725-755.
    We propose a minimal logic for interactive epistemology based on a qualitative representation of epistemic individual and group attitudes including knowledge, belief, strong belief, common knowledge and common belief. We show that our logic is sufficiently expressive to provide an epistemic foundation for various game-theoretic solution concepts including “1-round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, followed by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies” ) and “2-rounds of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, followed by iterated deletion of strongly dominated (...)
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  24.  16
    Brian Skyrms (2000). Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Game theory based on rational choice is compared with game theory based on evolutionary, or other adaptive, dynamics. The Nash equilibrium concept has a central role to play in both theories, even though one makes extremely strong assumptions about cognitive capacities and common knowledge of the players, and the other does not. Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two theories. These differences are illustrated in a number of games that model types of interaction that are key (...)
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  25. Paul Weirich (1999). [Book Review] Equilibrium and Rationality, Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (3):684-686.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In (...)
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  26. Paul Weirich (2011). Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Cambridge University Press.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In (...)
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  27. Paul Weirich (1998). Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Cambridge University Press.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In (...)
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  28.  83
    Giacomo Bonanno (2002). Modal Logic and Game Theory: Two Alternative Approaches. Risk Decision and Policy 7:309-324.
    Two views of game theory are discussed: (1) game theory as a description of the behavior of rational individuals who recognize each other’s rationality and reasoning abilities, and (2) game theory as an internally consistent recommendation to individuals on how to act in interactive situations. It is shown that the same mathematical tool, namely modal logic, can be used to explicitly model both views.
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  29.  21
    Andrew M. Colman (2003). Beyond Rationality: Rigor Without Mortis in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
    Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas (...)
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  30.  51
    Boudewijn De Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of (...)
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  31.  28
    Andrew M. Colman (2007). Love is Not Enough: Other-Regarding Preferences Cannot Explain Payoff Dominance in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23.
    Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  32.  14
    Daniel Cownden, Kimmo Eriksson & Pontus Strimling (forthcoming). The Implications of Learning Across Perceptually and Strategically Distinct Situations. Synthese:1-18.
    Game theory is a formal approach to behavior that focuses on the strategic aspect of situations. The game theoretic approach originates in economics but has been embraced by scholars across disciplines, including many philosophers and biologists. This approach has an important weakness: the strategic aspect of a situation, which is its defining quality in game theory, is often not its most salient quality in human cognition. Evidence from a wide range of experiments highlights this shortcoming. Previous theoretical (...)
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  33.  70
    Richard Foley, The Foundational Role of Epistemology in a General Theory of Rationality.
    A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments often have a quasi-ethical (...)
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  34.  4
    James E. Martin, George B. Kleindorfer & William R. Brashers Jr (1987). The Theory of Bounded Rationality and the Problem of Legitimation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (1):63–82.
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  35.  9
    Julian Nida-rümelin (1998). Structural Rationality in Game Theory. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:81-93.
    When I began to think about normative questions of rationality and morality, I soon became a consequentialist. This is the natural result of questioning socially established institutional and moral rules and their metaphysical underpinnings. A critical mind cannot accept a duty to do this or that just because it is told that this duty is implied by some general principle. The immediate question is: Where does this principle come from and how is it justified? And if this question cannot (...)
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  36.  10
    Stefano Fiori (2009). Hayek's Theory on Complexity and Knowledge: Dichotomies, Levels of Analysis, and Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):265-285.
    Hayek maintains that models of complexity must consider two closely interrelated factors: the large number of variables and the connections among them. These two conditions, which define complex phenomena, exhibit a different logical dimension. The former (the ?large number of variables?) describes complexity in quantitative (numerical) terms; the latter provides a view of complex phenomena in logical-relational terms, and it is evoked to explain the emergent properties of the whole. Despite the close relation between these concepts, the first notion essentially (...)
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  37.  18
    Ariel Rubinstein, New Directions in Economic Theory- Bounded Rationality.
    Resumert Este trabajo presenta varios modelos que destacan el contraste entre las teorias de la decision y de los juegos, por una parte, y la intuicidn y los datos empiricos y experimentales, por otra. Estos ejemplos estimulan la adopcion del punto de vista de la ra-.
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  38. Guy Axtell, Thinking Twice About Virtue and Vice.
    This chapter provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Alfano’s the-ses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. It also develops a Nar-row-Broad Spectrum of agency-ascriptions in reply to Olin and Doris’ ‘trade-off problem.’ In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between VE and dual-process theories (DPT) in cognitive psychology. A genuine convergence between VE and DPT is (...)
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  39.  19
    Robert Sugden (2001). Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Philosophical Review 110 (3):425-427.
  40.  7
    Anatol Rapoport (1984). Game Theory Without Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):114.
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  41.  2
    J. Maynard Smith (1984). Game Theory Without Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):117.
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  42.  5
    Peter Vallentyne (1999). Paul Weirich, Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Ethics 109 (3):684-686.
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  43. Robert Sugden & Paul Weirich (2001). Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Philosophical Review 110 (3):425.
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  44. E. van Damme (2000). Theoretical Analyses of Bounded Rationality and Learning A Review of Ariel Rubinstein's Modeling Bounded Rationality and Drew Fundenberg and David K. Levine's The Theory of Learning in Games. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1):141-145.
     
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  45.  37
    Sean Duffy, Tyson Hartwig & John Smith (2014). Costly and Discrete Communication: An Experimental Investigation. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 76 (3):395-417.
    Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment designed to capture this feature of communication. The messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world; however, the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. Here the sender learns the state of the world, then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and (...)
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  46. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 26. Epistemology Within a General Theory of Rationality. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press 124-133.
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  47. Adelheid Voskuhl (2014). Emancipation in the Industrial Age: Technology, Rationality, and the Cold War in Habermas’s Early Epistemology and Social Theory. Modern Intellectual History:1-27.
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  48.  61
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents. In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer
    I argue that game theoretic explanations of human actions make implausible epistemological assumptions. A logical analysis of game theoretic explanations shows that they do not conform to the belief-desire framework of action explanation. Epistemic characterization theorems (specifying sufficient conditions for game theoretic solution concepts to obtain) are argued to be the canonical way to make game theory conform to that framework. The belief formation practices implicit in epistemic characterization theorems, however, disregard all information about players except (...)
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  49. Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.) (2008). Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the (...)
     
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  50. Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.) (2008). Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the (...)
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