Search results for 'Game theory' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Mohammed Dore (1997). On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract. Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.score: 186.0
    This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Luca Zarri (2010). On Social Utility Payoffs in Games: A Methodological Comparison Between Behavioural and Rational Game Theory. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 69 (4):587-598.score: 186.0
    Are the recent findings of Behavioural Game Theory (BGT) on unselfish behaviours relevant for the progress of game theory? Is the methodology of BGT, centred around the attempt to study theoretically players’ utility functions in the light of the feedback that experimental evidence can produce on the theory, a satisfactory one? Or is the creation of various types of ‘social preferences’ just wasteful tinkering? This article compares BGT with the methodology of Rational Game (...) (RGT). BGT is viewed as a more promising and constructive approach, with regard to the relationship between experimental data and theoretical modelling. However, I also argue that today RGT and BGT are closer to one another than often thought. (shrink)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gianfranco Gambarelli & Guillermo Owen (2004). The Coming of Game Theory. Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):1-18.score: 186.0
    This is a brief historical note on game theory. We cover its historical roots (prior to its formal definition in 1944), and look at its development until the late 1960's.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Boudewijn de Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.score: 180.0
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Boudewijn de Bruin (2010). Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory. Springer.score: 180.0
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.score: 180.0
    The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive (...) theory gives bad advice in some cases, is reducible to rational choice theory in other cases, while it makes no sense in yet other cases. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Tomislav Bracanovic (2002). The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory. Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.score: 180.0
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.score: 180.0
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme in game theory was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the 20th century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate game theoretic solution concept for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Alasdair I. Houston & John M. McNamara (2005). John Maynard Smith and the Importance of Consistency in Evolutionary Game Theory. Biology and Philosophy 20 (5):933-950.score: 180.0
    John Maynard Smith was the founder of evolutionary game theory. He has also been the major influence on the direction of this field, which now pervades behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. In its original formulation the theory had three components: a set of strategies, a payoff structure, and a concept of evolutionary stability. These three key components are still the basis of the theory, but what is assumed about each component is often different to the original (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gustavo Cevolani (2011). Hayek in the Lab. Austrian School, Game Theory, and Experimental Economics. Logic and Philosophy of Science 9 (1):429-436.score: 180.0
    Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Don Ross (2008). Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions. Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.score: 180.0
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.score: 180.0
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Julius Sensat (1997). Game Theory and Rational Decision. Erkenntnis 47 (3):379-410.score: 180.0
    In its classical conception, game theory aspires to be a determinate decision theory for games, understood as elements of a structurally specified domain. Its aim is to determine for each game in the domain a complete solution to each player's decision problem, a solution valid for all real-world instantiations, regardless of context. “Permissiveness” would constrain the theory to designate as admissible for a player any conjecture consistent with the solution function's designation of admissible strategies for (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. John Douglas Bishop (2006). Moral Intuitions Versus Game Theory: A Response to Marcoux on Résumé Embellishing. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 67 (2):181 - 189.score: 180.0
    Marcoux argues that job candidates ought to embellish non-verifiable information on their résumés because it is the best way to coordinate collective action in the résumé ‚game’. I do not dispute his analysis of collective action; I look at the larger picture, which throws light on the role game theory might play in ethics. I conclude that game theory’s conclusions have nothing directly to do with ethics. Game theory suggests the means to certain (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin (1997). Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-Ordination: Recent Lessons From Game Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):171-90.score: 180.0
    The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Paddy Jane McShane (2014). Game Theory and Belief in God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):3-12.score: 180.0
    In the last few decades game theory has emerged as a powerful tool for examining a broad range of philosophical issues. It is unsurprising, then, that game theory has been taken up as a tool to examine issues in the philosophy of religion. Economist Steven Brams (1982), (1983) and (2007), for example, has given a game theoretic analysis of belief in God, his main argument first published in this journal and then again in both editions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Emiliano Lorini (2010). A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic Dla {\Mathcal{Dla}} , Coalition Logic, and Game Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):327-351.score: 156.0
    We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called ( Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency ) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Dirk Helbing (1996). A Stochastic Behavioral Model and a ?Microscopic? Foundation of Evolutionary Game Theory. Theory and Decision 40 (2):149-179.score: 156.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Bernard Walliser (2011). Learning Versus Evolution: From Biology to Game Theory. Biological Theory 6 (4):311-319.score: 156.0
  20. Ariel Dinar, Aharon Ratner & Dan Yaron (1992). Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in Water Resources. Theory and Decision 32 (1):1-20.score: 156.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robin Clark & Prashant Parikh (2007). Game Theory and Discourse Anaphora. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 16 (3):265-282.score: 152.0
    We develop an analysis of discourse anaphora—the relationship between a pronoun and an antecedent earlier in the discourse—using games of partial information. The analysis is extended to include information from a variety of different sources, including lexical semantics, contrastive stress, grammatical relations, and decision theoretic aspects of the context.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Daniel Rothschild (2013). Game Theory and Scalar Implicatures. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):438-478.score: 150.0
  23. J. Maynard Smith (1984). Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):95.score: 150.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Mirsad Hadzikadic, Ted Carmichael & Charles Curtin (2010). Complex Adaptive Systems and Game Theory: An Unlikely Union. Complexity 16 (1):34-42.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jerzy Stelmach & Wojciech Załuski (eds.) (2011). Game Theory and the Law. Copernicus Center Press.score: 150.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Michael Bacharach (1994). The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game. Theory and Decision 37 (1):7-48.score: 138.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden (2003). Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):175-210.score: 120.0
    David Lewis is widely credited with the first formulation of common knowledge and the first rigorous analysis of convention. However, common knowledge and convention entered mainstream game theory only when they were formulated, later and independently, by other theorists. As a result, some of the most distinctive and valuable features of Lewis' game theory have been overlooked. We re-examine this theory by reconstructing key parts in a more formal way, extending it, and showing how it (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Don Ross (2006). Evolutionary Game Theory and the Normative Theory of Institutional Design: Binmore and Behavioral Economics. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1):51-79.score: 120.0
    In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the ‘scale-relativity’ considerations built into Binmore's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Thomas C. Schelling (2010). Game Theory: A Practitioner's Approach. Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):27-46.score: 120.0
    To a practitioner in the social sciences, game theory primarily helps to identify situations in which interdependent decisions are somehow problematic; solutions often require venturing into the social sciences. Game theory is usually about anticipating each other's choices; it can also cope with influencing other's choices. To a social scientist the great contribution of game theory is probably the payoff matrix, an accounting device comparable to the equals sign in algebra.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Brian Skyrms (1994). Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528.score: 120.0
    The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Ken Binmore, Game Theory and Institutions.score: 120.0
    This short paper begins with a summary of the views of a sympathetic game theorist on the current state of play in what is still called the New Institutional Economics. It continues with a much abbreviated summary of my own attempts to treat justice as a kind of institution in the hope that this will serve as a case study in how game theory can serve as a useful intellectual framework for the study of human institutions.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Bruno Verbeek, Game Theory and Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 120.0
    Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It should be distinguished from decision theory, the systematic study of individual (practical and epistemic) choice in parametric contexts (i.e., where the agent is choosing or deliberating independently of other agents). Decision theory has several applications to ethics (see Dreier 2004; Mele and Rawlings 2004). Game theory may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Daniel M. Hausman (2000). Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.score: 120.0
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Francesco Guala (2006). Has Game Theory Been Refuted? Journal of Philosophy 103 (5):239-263.score: 120.0
    The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Peter Vanderschraaf (1999). Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):325–358.score: 120.0
  36. Giacomo Bonanno (2002). Modal Logic and Game Theory: Two Alternative Approaches. Risk Decision and Policy 7:309-324.score: 120.0
    Two views of game theory are discussed: (1) game theory as a description of the behavior of rational individuals who recognize each other’s rationality and reasoning abilities, and (2) game theory as an internally consistent recommendation to individuals on how to act in interactive situations. It is shown that the same mathematical tool, namely modal logic, can be used to explicitly model both views.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Margaret Gilbert (1981). Game Theory Andconvention. Synthese 46 (1):41 - 93.score: 120.0
    A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Steven T. Kuhn (2004). Reflections on Ethics and Game Theory. Synthese 141 (1):1 - 44.score: 120.0
    Applications of game theory to moral philosophy are impededby foundational issues and troublesome examples. In the first part of this paper,questions are raised about the appropriate game-theoretical frameworks for applications to moralphilosophy and about the proper interpretations of the theoretical devices employed inthese frameworks. In the second part, five examples that should be of particular interest to thoseinterested in the connections between ethics and game theory are delineated and discussed. Thefirst example comprises games in which (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Peter Vanderschraaf (2008). Game Theory Meets Threshold Analysis: Reappraising the Paradoxes of Anarchy and Revolution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):579-617.score: 120.0
    I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. C. Maria Keet (2003). Towards a Resolution of Terrorism Using Game Theory. In Luke Ashworth & Maura Adshead (eds.), Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration.score: 120.0
    Both terrorism and game theory are contested concepts within the social sciences, but in this paper, I will show that a rational approach (game theory) towards the emotion-laden idea and practice of terrorism does aid understanding of the “terrorist theatre”. First, an outline will be provided on the type of actors (game players) that are, or may be, involved to a more or lesser extend in (supporting) terrorism. Then several game models will be assessed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Yanis Varoufakis (1993). Modern and Postmodern Challenges to Game Theory. Erkenntnis 38 (3):371 - 404.score: 120.0
    Equilibrium game theory borrows from neoclassical economics its rationality concept which it immediately puts to work in order to produce the basic results it needs for building an elaborate narrative of social interaction. This paper focuses on some recent objections to game theory's use of rationality assumptions in general, and of backward induction and subgame perfection in particular, and interprets them in the light of the postmodern critique of the grand meta-narratives which social theorists often rely (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. B. Verbeek (2002). Game Theory and Moral Norms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):337-352.score: 120.0
    This paper provides an overview of developments in the application of game theory to moral philosophy. Game theory has been used in moral theory in three ways. First, as a tool to analyze the function of moral norms. Secondly, to characterize bargaining about moral norms. Thirdly, the paper demonstrates how game theory can make sense of the authority of moral norms in a way that renders the concept suitable for further analysis.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Paul Weirich, Computer Simulations in Game Theory.score: 120.0
    A computer simulation runs a model generating a phenomenon under investigation. For the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory. The model must be isomorphic to the natural system that realizes the phenomenon. This paper elaborates the method of assessing a simulation's explanatory power. Then it illustrates the method by applying it to two simulations in game theory. The first is Brian Skyrms's (1990) simulation of interactive deliberations. It is intended to explain the emergence of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Herbert Gintis (2001). The Contribution of Game Theory to Experimental Design in the Behavioral Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):411-412.score: 120.0
    Methodological practices differ between economics and psychology because economists use game theory as the basis for the design and interpretation of experiments, while psychologists do not. This methodological choice explains the “four key variables” stressed by Hert-wig and Ortmann. Game theory is currently the most rigorous basis for modeling strategic choice.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Andrew M. Colman (2007). Love is Not Enough: Other-Regarding Preferences Cannot Explain Payoff Dominance in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23.score: 120.0
    Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Boudewijn De Bruin (2005). Game Theory in Philosophy. Topoi 24 (2):197-208.score: 120.0
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Till Grüne-Yanoff (2011). Evolutionary Game Theory, Interpersonal Comparisons and Natural Selection: A Dilemma. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):637-654.score: 120.0
    When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Derek Abbott & Paul C. W. Davies, Order From Disorder: The Role of Noise in Creative Processes. A Special Issue On Game Theory And.score: 120.0
    The importance of applying game theory to the evolution of information in the presence of noise has recently become widely recognized. This Special Issue addresses the theme of spontaneously emergent order in both classical and quantum systems subject to external noise, and includes papers directly related to game theory or the development of supporting techniques. In the following editorial overview we examine the broader context of the subject, including the tension between the destructive and creative aspects (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Daniel M. Hausman (2005). 'Testing' Game Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):211-223.score: 120.0
    This paper considers whether game theory can be tested, what difficulties experimenters face in testing it, and what can be learned from attempts to test it. I emphasize that tests of game theory rely on fallible assumptions concerning particular features of the strategic situation and of the players. These do not render game theory untestable in principle, but they create serious problems. In coping with these problems, experimenters may use game theory to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Ken Binmore (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. OUP Oxford.score: 120.0
    Games are everywhere: Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm negotiating next year's wage is playing a bargaining game. The opposing candidates in an election are playing a political game. The supermarket's price for corn flakes is decided by playing an economic game. -/- Game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way. Even when (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000