The first learning game to be developed to help students to develop and hone skills in constructing proofs in both the propositional and first-order predicate calculi. It comprises an autotelic (self-motivating) learning approach to assist students in developing skills and strategies of proof in the propositional and predicate calculus. The text of VALIDITY consists of a general introduction that describes earlier studies made of autotelic learning games, paying particular attention to work done at the Law School of Yale University, (...) called the ALL Project (Accelerated Learning of Logic). Following the introduction, the game of VALIDITY is described, first with reference to the propositional calculus, and then in connection with the first-order predicate calculus with identity. Sections in the text are devoted to discussions of the various rules of derivation employed in both calculi. Three appendices follow the main text; these provide a catalogue of sequents and theorems that have been proved for the propositional calculus and for the predicate calculus, and include suggestions for the classroom use of VALIDITY in university-level courses in mathematical logic. (shrink)

Several results about the game of cops and robbers on infinite graphs are analyzed from the perspective of computability theory. Computable robber-win graphs are constructed with the property that no computable robber strategy is a winning strategy, and such that for an arbitrary computable ordinal \, any winning strategy has complexity at least \}\). Symmetrically, computable cop-win graphs are constructed with the property that no computable cop strategy is a winning strategy. Locally finite infinite trees (...) and graphs are explored. The Turing computability of a binary relation used to classify cop-win graphs is studied, and the computational difficulty of determining the winner for locally finite computable graphs is discussed. (shrink)

The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this (...) result, we do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions. (shrink)

This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field (...) of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

People spontaneously discover new representations during problem solving. Discovery of a mathematical representation is of special interest, because it shows that the underlying structure of the problem has been extracted. In the current study, participants solved gear‐system problems as part of a game. Although none of the participants initially used a mathematical representation, many discovered a parity‐based, mathematical strategy during problem solving. Two accounts of the spontaneous discovery of mathematical strategies were tested. According to the automatic schema abstraction hypothesis, (...) experience with multiple, unique problem exemplars facilitates extraction of the parity relation. According to the comparison‐based abstraction hypothesis, explicitly comparing gear pathways that have different number, but the same parity, should result in extraction of parity. An event history analysis showed that accumulation of experiences with different‐number, same‐parity comparisons predicted discovery of parity; accumulation of unique exemplars did not. Results suggest that comparison‐based abstraction processes can lead to the discovery of a mathematical relation. (shrink)

There is no topic that attracts more attention, more energy and time and devotion, than love. As long as there's been recorded history, love has taken center seat as the inspiration for countless paintings, instigator of wars, muse of untold poets and musicians. And just as poetry, art and music have the ability to communicate something about love that is difficult to articulate with words, the same is true of mathematics. Of course, mathematics can't easily help us translate (...) the emotional side of love, emotions rarely behave in a neatly ordered, rational and easily predictable way. It is difficult to quantify the rollercoaster of romance or to define how lovers might feel via a set of simple equations. But that doesn't mean that mathematics isn't crucial to understanding love. Love, like most things in life, is full of patterns. And mathematics is ultimately the study of patterns, from predicting the weather to the fluctuations of the stock market, the movement of planets or the growth of cities. These patterns twist and turn and warp and evolve just as the rituals of love do. In [this book, the author] takes the listener on a fascinating journey through the patterns that define our love lives, tackling some of the most common yet complex questions pertaining to love: What's the chance of us finding love? What's the chance that it will last? How does online dating work, exactly? When should you settle down? How can you avoid divorce? When is it right to compromise? Can game theory help us decide whether or not to call? From evaluating the best strategies for online dating to defining the nebulous concept of beauty, Dr. Fry proves, with great insight, wit and fun, that math is a surprisingly useful tool to negotiate the complicated, often baffling, sometimes infuriating, always interesting, patterns of love. (shrink)

We present results concerning winning strategies and tactics in club games on [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL P]math imageλ. We show that there is generally no winning tactic for the player trying to get inside the club. The bound-countable game turns out to be rather fruitful and adds to some previous results about the construction of elementary substructures and their localization in certain intervals. We show that Player II has a winning strategy in the bound-countable game, thus establishing a new (...) ZFC result. The applications given are new proofs for two cardinal diamonds and the impossibility of collapsing cardinals to ℵ2 under certain conditions. (shrink)

The paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it provides what appears to be the first game-theoretic modeling of Napoleon’s last campaign, which ended dramatically on 18 June 1815 at Waterloo. It is specifically concerned with the decision Napoleon made on 17 June 1815 to detach part of his army against the Prussians he had defeated, though not destroyed, on 16 June at Ligny. Military historians agree that this decision was crucial but disagree about whether it was rational. (...) Hypothesizing a zero-sum game between Napoleon and Blücher, and computing its solution, we show that it could have been a cautious strategy on the former's part to divide his army, a conclusion which runs counter to the charges of misjudgement commonly heard since Clausewitz. On the other hand, the paper addresses methodological issues. We defend its case study against the objections of irrelevance that have been raised elsewhere against “analytic narratives”, and conclude that military campaigns provide an opportunity for successful application of the formal theories of rational choice. Generalizing the argument, we finally investigate the conflict between narrative accounts – the historians' standard mode of expression – and mathematical modeling. (shrink)

This paper does not deal with the applications of game theory for which this theory was first developed, that is, for modelling economic systems and rational decision making. But I do not want to consider games as abstract mathematical structures, either. I want to concentrate on what it is that makes a game actually playable. This playability means both the possibility of finding and formulating the strategy that a player uses and the feasibility of actually applying the (...) class='Hi'>strategy in question in making one’s moves. (shrink)

In this paper I present a game-theoretical approach to the problem of induction. I investigate the comparative success of prediction methods by mathematical analysis and computer programming. Hume's problem lies in the fact that although the success of object-inductive prediction strategies is quite robust, they cannot be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal, modulo short-run losses which are upper-bounded. I (...) then turn to the implications of my approach for the evolution of cognition. In the final section I suggest a revision of the paradigm of bounded rationality by introducing the distinction between local, general and universal prediction strategies. (shrink)

This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, (...) Gaifman and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of liar-like paradoxes including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxical statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides an understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices and institutions. (shrink)

We consider Effort Games, a game-theoretic model of cooperation in open environments, which is a variant of the principal-agent problem from economic theory. In our multiagent domain, a common project depends on various tasks; carrying out certain subsets of the tasks completes the project successfully, while carrying out other subsets does not. The probability of carrying out a task is higher when the agent in charge of it exerts effort, at a certain cost for that agent. A central authority, (...) called the principal, attempts to incentivize agents to exert effort, but can only reward agents based on the success of the entire project.We model this domain as a normal form game, where the payoffs for each strategy profile are defined based on the different probabilities of carrying out each task and on the boolean function that defines which task subsets complete the project, and which do not. We view this boolean function as a simple coalitional game, and call this game the underlying coalitional game. We suggest the Price of Myopia as a measure of the influence the model of rationality has on the minimal payments the principal has to make in order to motivate the agents in such a domain to exert effort.We consider the computational complexity of testing whether exerting effort is a dominant strategy for an agent, and of finding a reward strategy for this domain, using either a dominant strategy equilibrium or using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We show these problems are generally #P-hard, and that they are at least as computationally hard as calculating the Banzhaf power index in the underlying coalitional game. We also show that in a certain restricted domain, where the underlying coalitional game is a weighted voting game with certain properties, it is possible to solve all of the above problems in polynomial time. We give bounds on PoM in weighted voting effort games, and provide simulation results regarding PoM in another restricted class of effort games, namely effort games played over Series-Parallel Graphs. (shrink)

This work is a complete mathematical guide to lottery games, covering all of the problems related to probability, combinatorics, and all parameters describing the lottery matrices, as well as the various playing systems. The mathematics sections describe the mathematical model of the lottery, which is in fact the essence of the lotto game. The applications of this model provide players with all the mathematical data regarding the parameters attached to the gaming events and personal playing systems. By applying (...) these data, one can find all the winning probabilities for the play with one line, and how these probabilities change with playing the various types of systems containing several lines, depending on their structure. Also, each playing system has a formula attached that provides the number of possible multiple prizes in various circumstances. Other mathematical parameters of the playing systems and the correlations between them are also presented. The generality of the mathematical model and of the obtained formulas allows their application for any existent lottery and any playing system. Each formula is followed by numerical results covering the most frequent lottery matrices worldwide and by multiple examples predominantly belonging to the 6/49 lottery. The listing of the numerical results in dozens of well-organized tables, along with instructions and examples of using them, makes possible the direct usage of this guide by players without a mathematical background. The author also discusses from a mathematical point of view the strategies of choosing involved in the lotto game. The book does not offer so-called winning strategies, but helps players to better organize their own playing systems and to confront their own convictions with the incontestable reality offered by the direct applications of the mathematical model of the lotto game. As a must-have handbook for any lottery player, this book offers essential information about the game itself and can provide the basis for gaming decisions of any kind. (shrink)

Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy (...) of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. I prove new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and explore in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. I argue that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, I argue, has been rather successful in achieving this aim. "The 'epistemic' approach to game theory has emerged over the past twenty-five years. What is this approach? How does it differ from the conventional equilibrium-based approach to game theory? What have been its strengths and weaknesses to date? To find out, read this comprehensive and excellently written account". Adam Brandenburger, J. P. Valles Professor of Business Economics and Strategy, Stern School of Business, New York University "Reading Boudewijn de Bruin's book should be rewarding both for game theorists interested in the conceptual foundations of their discipline and for philosophers who want to learn more about formal analysis of strategic interaction. It provides an in-depth logical study of the currently dominant epistemic approaches to non-cooperative games, with an eye both to the attractions and to the serious challenges facing the Epistemic Programme". Wlodek Rabinowicz, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Lund University . (shrink)

We analyze the cognitive strategies underlying performance in the Number task, a Math game that requires both arithmetic fluency and mathematical creativity. In this game all elements in a set of numbers have to be used precisely once to create a target number with basic arithmetic operations. We argue that some instances of this game are NP complete, by showing its relation to the well-known Partition problem. We propose heuristics based on the distinction in forward and backward reasoning. The Number (...) Game is part of Math Garden, a popular online educational platform for practicing and monitoring math skills using innovations in computerized adaptive testing. These educational games generate enormous amounts of rich data on children's cognitive development. We found converging evidence for the use of forward proximity heuristics in the data of Math Garden, consisting of more than 20 million answers to 1,700 items. Item difficulties and the structure of correct answers were analyzed. (shrink)

We analyze the cognitive strategies underlying performance in the Number task, a Math game that requires both arithmetic fluency and mathematical creativity. In this game all elements in a set of numbers have to be used precisely once to create a target number with basic arithmetic operations. We argue that some instances of this game are NP complete, by showing its relation to the well-known Partition problem. We propose heuristics based on the distinction in forward and backward reasoning. The Number (...) Game is part of Math Garden, a popular online educational platform for practicing and monitoring math skills using innovations in computerized adaptive testing. These educational games generate enormous amounts of rich data on children's cognitive development. We found converging evidence for the use of forward proximity heuristics in the data of Math Garden, consisting of more than 20 million answers to 1,700 items. Item difficulties and the structure of correct answers were analyzed. (shrink)

The fetching title of this little book is explained by the fact that its author, an esteemed philosopher of science, was made Knightsbridge professor of moral philosophy. His inaugural lecture seems to show the unwisdom of such a proceeding in these difficult days of philosophical specialisation. The author maintains that the mathematical theory of games, elaborated in recent years by Von Neumann and Borel for fields as diverse as economics and military strategy, will provide an exact solution of (...) the problems of “fair play” with which he supposes the “moralist” to deal. (shrink)

This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction (...) is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. *Received November 2005; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, Duesseldorf, Germany D-40225; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

For X a separable metric space and $\alpha$ an infinite ordinal, consider the following three games of length $\alpha$ : In $G^{\alpha}_1$ ONE chooses in inning $\gamma$ an $\omega$ –cover $O_{\gamma}$ of X; TWO responds with a $T_{\gamma}\in O_{\gamma}$ . TWO wins if $\{T_{\gamma}:\gamma<\alpha\}$ is an $\omega$ –cover of X; ONE wins otherwise. In $G^{\alpha}_2$ ONE chooses in inning $\gamma$ a subset $O_{\gamma}$ of ${\sf C}_p(X)$ which has the zero function $\underline{0}$ in its closure, and TWO responds with a (...) function $T_{\gamma}\in O_{\gamma}$ . TWO wins if $\underline{0}$ is in the closure of $\{T_{\gamma}:\gamma<\alpha\}$ ; otherwise, ONE wins. In $G^{\alpha}_3$ ONE chooses in inning $\gamma$ a dense subset $O_{\gamma}$ of ${\sf C}_p(X)$ , and TWO responds with a $T_{\gamma}\in O_{\gamma}$ . TWO wins if $\{T_{\gamma}:\gamma<\alpha\}$ is dense in ${\sf C}_p(X)$ ; otherwise, ONE wins. After a brief survey we prove: 1. If $\alpha$ is minimal such that TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_1$ , then $\alpha$ is additively indecomposable (Theorem 4) 2. For $\alpha$ countable and minimal such that TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_1$ on X, the following statements are equivalent (Theorem 9): a) TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_2$ on ${\sf C}_p(X)$ . b) TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_3$ on ${\sf C}_p(X)$ . 3. The Continuum Hypothesis implies that there is an uncountable set X of real numbers such that TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\omega^2}_1$ on X (Theorem 10). (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 03, December 2022. Hirschfeldt and Jockusch (2016) introduced a two-player game in which winning strategies for one or the other player precisely correspond to implications and non-implications between [math] principles over [math]-models of [math]. They also introduced a version of this game that similarly captures provability over [math]. We generalize and extend this game-theoretic framework to other formal systems, and establish a certain compactness result that shows that if an implication [math] between two (...) principles holds, then there exists a winning strategy that achieves victory in a number of moves bounded by a number independent of the specific run of the game. This compactness result generalizes an old proof-theoretic fact noted by H. Wang (1981), and has applications to the reverse mathematics of combinatorial principles. We also demonstrate how this framework leads to a new kind of analysis of the logical strength of mathematical problems that refines both that of reverse mathematics and that of computability-theoretic notions such as Weihrauch reducibility, allowing for a kind of fine-structural comparison between [math] principles that has both computability-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and can help us distinguish between these, for example by showing that a certain use of a principle in a proof is “purely proof-theoretic”, as opposed to relying on its computability-theoretic strength. We give examples of this analysis to a number of principles at the level of [math], uncovering new differences between their logical strengths. (shrink)

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of (...) philosophy. No criticism is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence, liberalism and efficiency, Hume’s concept of convention, morality and rationality, and distributive justice and egalitarianism. A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. (shrink)

The descriptive complexity of a problem is the complexity of describing the problem in some logical formalism. One of the few techniques for proving separation results in descriptive complexity is to make use of games on graphs played between two players, called the spoiler and the duplicator. There are two types of these games, which differ in the order in which the spoiler and duplicator make various moves. In one of these games, the rules seem to be (...) tilted towards favoring the duplicator. These seemingly more favorable rules make it easier to prove separation results, since separation results are proven by showing that the duplicator has a winning strategy. In this paper, the relationship between these games is investigated. It is shown that in one sense, the two games are equivalent. Specifically, each family of graphs used in one game to prove a separation result can in principle be used in the other game to prove the same result. This answers an open question of Ajtai and the author from 1989. It is also shown that in another sense, the games are not equivalent, in that there are situations where the spoiler requires strictly more resources to win one game than the other game. This makes formal the informal statement that one game is easier for the duplicator to win. (shrink)

The Erasmus + Play4Guidance project introduces an online business game, designed to help teach entrepreneurial, transversal and mathematical skills using a real-world business environment. This paper explains how the Business Model Canvas strategy tool facilitated student understanding of real life business development prior to playing the game. An initial mapping exercise was conducted to find out if the Business Model Canvas could transform the experience of playing the game by providing an overview of real life business strategy, and (...) explain the crucial role that markets and customers play in business growth. As a result of the mapping exercise a workshop session was developed to ensure that students could enact the real life business scenarios presented in the game. Three different types of videos were produced and integrated into the workshop to demonstrate key entrepreneurial competencies and graphically illustrate the nine key building blocks of the BMC. Survey responses from a student cohort evidenced that the workshop was central in helping them to understand real life business strategy prior to playing the game. (shrink)

The stationary set splitting game is a game of perfect information of length ω1 between two players, unsplit and split, in which unsplit chooses stationarily many countable ordinals and split tries to continuously divide them into two stationary pieces. We show that it is possible in ZFC to force a winning strategy for either player, or for neither. This gives a new counterexample to Σ22 maximality with a predicate for the nonstationary ideal on ω1, and an example of a (...) consistently undetermined game of length ω1 with payoff de.nable in the second-order monadic logic of order. We also show that the determinacy of the game is consistent with Martin's Axiom but not Martin's Maximum. (shrink)

An important appeal of strategy-proofness is the robustness that it implies. Under a strategy-proof voting rule, every individual has an optimal strategy independently of the behavior of all other voters, namely truth-telling. In particular, optimal play is robust with respect to the beliefs voters may have about the type and the behavior of the other voters. Following Blin and Satterthwaite (Economet J Economet Soc 45(4):881–888, 1977), we call this logically weaker property “belief-independence.” In this paper, we give (...) a number of examples of voting rules that are belief-independent but not strategy-proof. However, we also show that belief-independence implies strategy-proofness under a few natural additional conditions. The notion of belief-independence naturally leads to a the strengthening of strategy-proofness to “robust” strategy-proofness which requires that no voter whose true preference may come from a restricted domain can benefit by submitting any unrestricted preference ordering given any unrestricted preference profile for all other voters. There are examples of strategy-proof voting rules (on a restricted domain) that are not robustly strategy-proof, but under natural additional conditions the two properties are shown to be equivalent. (shrink)

Let κ be a singular cardinal. Karp's notion of a chain model of size κ is defined to be an ordinary model of size κ along with a decomposition of it into an increasing union of length cf. With a notion of satisfaction and -isomorphism such models give an infinitary logic largely mimicking first order logic. In this paper we associate to this logic a notion of a dynamic EF-game which gauges when two chain models are chain-isomorphic. To this game (...) is associated a tree which is a tree of size κ with no κ-branches -branches). The measure of how non-isomorphic the models are is reflected by a certain order on these trees, called reduction. We study the collection of trees of size κ with no κ-branches under this notion and prove that when cf = ω this collection is rather regular; in particular it has universality number exactly κ+. Such trees are then used to develop a descriptive set theory of the space cf κ. The main result of the paper gives in the case of κ strong limit singular an exact connection between the descriptive set-theoretic complexity of the chain isomorphism orbit of a model, the reduction order on the trees and winning strategies in the corresponding dynamic EF games. In particular we obtain a neat analog of the notion of Scott watershed from the Scott analysis of countable models. (shrink)

The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally (...) reliable (Hume's insight) nor to be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods that are accessible to her. By means of mathematical analysis and computer simulations of prediction games I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal among all accessible prediction strategies, modulo a small short-run loss. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. In the final section I draw conclusions about the significance of meta-induction for the social spread of knowledge and the cultural evolution of cognition, and I relate my results to other simulation results which utilize meta-inductive learning mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper has two parts. The first is concerned with a variant of a family of games introduced by Holy and Schlicht, that we call Welch games. Player II having a winning strategy in the Welch game of length [Formula: see text] on [Formula: see text] is equivalent to weak compactness. Winning the game of length [Formula: see text] is equivalent to [Formula: see text] being measurable. We show that for games of intermediate length [Formula: see (...) text], II winning implies the existence of precipitous ideals with [Formula: see text]-closed, [Formula: see text]-dense trees. The second part shows the first is not vacuous. For each [Formula: see text] between [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text], it gives a model where II wins the games of length [Formula: see text], but not [Formula: see text]. The technique also gives models where for all [Formula: see text] there are [Formula: see text]-complete, normal, [Formula: see text]-distributive ideals having dense sets that are [Formula: see text]-closed, but not [Formula: see text]-closed. (shrink)

The Battle of the Sexes game, which captures both coordination and conflict problems, has been applied to a wide range of situations. We show that, by reducing distributional conflict and enhancing coordination, turn taking supported by a “turn taking with independent randomizations” strategy allows players to engage in intertemporal sharing of the gain from cooperation. Using this insight, we decompose the benefit from turn taking into conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing components. Our analysis suggests that an equilibrium measure of the “degree (...) of intertemporal conflict” provides an intuitive way to understand the sources of welfare gain from turn taking in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We find that when this equilibrium measure is lower, players behave less aggressively and the welfare gain from turn taking is higher. (shrink)

It was proved recently that Telgársky’s conjecture, which concerns partial information strategies in the Banach–Mazur game, fails in models of \. The proof introduces a combinatorial principle that is shown to follow from \, namely: \::Every separative poset \ with the \-cc contains a dense sub-poset \ such that \ for every \. We prove this principle is independent of \ and \, in the sense that \ does not imply \, and \ does not imply \ assuming the consistency (...) of a huge cardinal. We also consider the more specific question of whether \ holds with \ equal to the weight-\ measure algebra. We prove, again assuming the consistency of a huge cardinal, that the answer to this question is independent of \. (shrink)

We associate with any game G another game, which is a variant of it, and which we call . Winning strategies for have a lower recursive degree than winning strategies for G: if a player has a winning strategy of recursive degree 1 over G, then it has a recursive winning strategy over , and vice versa. Through we can express in algorithmic form, as a recursive winning strategy, many common proofs of non-constructive Mathematics, namely exactly (...) the theorems of the sub-classical logic Limit Computable Mathematics [6], Hayashi and Nakata [7]). (shrink)

Here we argue that the concept of strategies, as it was introduced into biology by John Maynard Smith, is a prime illustration of the four dimensions of theoretical biology in the post-genomic era. These four dimensions are: data analysis and management, mathematical and computational model building and simulation, concept formation and analysis, and theory integration. We argue that all four dimensions of theoretical biology are crucial to future interactions between theoretical and empirical biologists as well as with philosophers of biology.

This is a two-volume set that provides an introduction to non-cooperative Game Theory. Volume 1 covers the basic concepts, while Volume 2 is devoted to advanced topics. The book is richly illustrated with approximately 400 figures. It is suitable for both self-study and as the basis for an undergraduate course in game theory as well as a first-year graduate-level class. It is written to be accessible to anybody with high-school level knowledge of mathematics. At the end of each chapter (...) there is a collection of exercises accompanied by detailed answers. The book contains approximately 180 exercises. (shrink)

We define a new type of two player game occurring on a tree. The tree may have no root and may have arbitrary degrees of nodes. These games extend the class of games considered by Gurevich-Harrington in [5]. We prove that in the game one of the players has a winning strategy which depends on finite bounded information about the past part of a play and on future of each play that is isomorphism types of tree nodes. (...) This result extends further the Gurevich-Harrington determinacy theorem from [5]. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, gamblers have begun taking mathematics into account more seriously than ever before. While probability theory is the only rigorous theory modeling the uncertainty, even though in idealized conditions, numerical probabilities are viewed not only as mere mathematical information, but also as a decision-making criterion, especially in gambling. This book presents the mathematics underlying the major games of chance and provides a precise account of the odds associated with all gaming events. It begins (...) by explaining in simple terms the meaning of the concept of probability for the layman and goes on to become an enlightening journey through the mathematics of chance, randomness and risk. It then continues with the basics of discrete probability, combinatorics and counting arguments for those interested in the supporting mathematics. These mathematic sections may be skipped by readers who do not have a minimal background in mathematics; these readers can skip directly to the Guide to Numerical Results to pick the odds and recommendations they need for the desired gaming situation. Doing so is possible due to the organization of that chapter, in which the results are listed at the end of each section, mostly in the form of tables. The chapter titled The Mathematics of Games of Chance presents these games not only as a good application field for probability theory, but also in terms of human actions where probability-based strategies can be tried to achieve favorable results. Through suggestive examples, the reader can see what are the experiments, events and probability fields in games of chance and how probability calculus works there. The main portion of this work is a collection of probability results for each type of game. Each game s section is packed with formulas and tables. Each section also contains a description of the game, a classification of the gaming events and the applicable probability calculations. The primary goal of this work is to allow the reader to quickly find the odds for a specific gaming situation, in order to improve his or her betting/gaming decisions. Every type of gaming event is tabulated in a logical, consistent and comprehensive manner. The complete methodology and complete or partial calculations are shown to teach players how to calculate probability for any situation, for every stage of the game for any game. Here, readers can find the real odds, returned by precise mathematical formulas and not by partial simulations that most software uses. Collections of odds are presented, as well as strategic recommendations based on those odds, where necessary, for each type of gaming situation. The book contains much new and original material that has not been published previously and provides great coverage of probabilities for the following games of chance: Dice, Slots, Roulette, Baccarat, Blackjack, Texas Hold em Poker, Lottery and Sport Bets. Most of games of chance are predisposed to probability-based decisions. This is why the approach is not an exclusively statistical one, but analytical: every gaming event is taken as an individual applied probability problem to solve. A special chapter defines the probability-based strategy and mathematically shows why such strategy is theoretically optimal.". (shrink)

Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied (...) by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks and the. (shrink)

We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibria, the strong $$\beta$$ -hybrid solution, which is a refinement of the hybrid solution introduced by Zhao. Zhao’s solution is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. This paper’s solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, assigns to each coalition a strategy profile that is strongly Pareto optimal. Moreover, like the $$\beta$$ -core, deviations by subcoalitions of any existing coalition are deterred by (...) the threat of a unique counter-strategy available to the non-deviating players. Zhao proved the existence of existence of strong $$\beta$$ -hybrid solution for transferable utility games with compact and convex strategy spaces and concave continuous payoff functions. Here, we extend his result to non-transferable utility games. (shrink)

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and (...) going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics. (shrink)

This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions to finite normal form games under the assumption that strategy choices can be described as choices among lotteries where players have security- and potential level preferences over lotteries (e.g., Cohen, Theory and Decision, 33, 101–104, 1992, Gilboa, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 32, 405–420, 1988, Jaffray, Theory and Decision, 24, 169–200, 1988). Since security- and potential level preferences require discontinuous utility representations, standard existence results for Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, (...) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48–49, 1950a, Non-Cooperative Games, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University Press, 1950b) or for equilibria in beliefs (Crawford, Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 127–154, 1990) do not apply. As a key insight this paper proves that non-existence of equilibria in beliefs, and therefore non-existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, is possible in finite games with security- and potential level players. But, as this paper also shows, rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, Econometrica, 52, 1007–1028, 1984, Moulin, Mathematical Social Sciences, 7, 83–102, 1984, Pearce, Econometrica, 52, 1029–1050, 1984) exist for such games. Rationalizability rather than equilibrium in beliefs therefore appears to be a more favorable solution concept for games with security- and potential level players. (shrink)

We study stable strategy profiles in a pure exchange game of bads, where each player dumps his or her bads such as garbage onto someone else. Hirai et al. (Mathematical Social Sciences 51(2):162–170, 2006) show that cycle dumping, in which each player follows an ordering and dumps his or her bads onto the next player, is a strong Nash equilibrium and that self-disposal is $$\alpha $$ -stable for some initial distributions of bads. In this paper, we show that a (...) strategy profile of bullying, in which all players dump their bads onto a single player, becomes $$\alpha $$ -stable for every exchange game of bads. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be $$\alpha $$ -stable in an exchange game of bads. In addition, we show that repeating an exchange after the first exchange makes self-disposal stationary. (shrink)

A hyperfinitely long coin flipping game between the Gambler and the Casino, associated with a given set A, is considered. It turns out that the Gambler has a winning strategy if and only if A has Loeb measure 0. The Casino has a winning strategy if and only if A contains an internal subset of positive Loeb measure.

In this article, I focus on the role of computer simulations as exploratory strategies. I begin by establishing the non-theory-driven nature of simulations. This refers to their ability to characterize phenomena without relying on a predefined conceptual framework that is provided by an implemented mathematical model. Drawing on Steinle’s notion of exploratory experimentation and Gelfert’s work on exploratory models, I present three exploratory strategies for computer simulations: (1) starting points and continuation of scientific inquiry, (2) varying the parameters, and (3) (...) scientific prototyping. (shrink)

We describe the constructive content of proofs in a fragment of propositional Infinitary Linear Logic in terms of strategies for a suitable class of games. Such strategies interpret linear proofs as parallel algorithms as long as the asymmetry of the connectives ? and ! allows it.

Continuing his series of books on the mathematics of gambling, the author shows how a simple-rule game such as roulette is suited to a complex mathematical model whose applications generate improved betting systems that take into account a player's personal playing criteria. The book is both practical and theoretical, but is mainly devoted to the application of theory. About two-thirds of the content is lists of categories and sub-categories of improved betting systems, along with all the parameters that might (...) stand as the main objective criteria in a personal strategy - odds, profits and losses. The work contains new and original material not published before. The mathematical chapter describes complex bets, the profit function, the equivalence between bets and all their properties. All theoretical results are accompanied by suggestive concrete examples and can be followed by anyone with a minimal mathematical background because they involve only basic algebraic skills and set theory basics. The reader may also choose to skip the math and go directly to the sections containing applications, where he or she can pick desired numerical results from tables. The book offers no new so-called winning strategies, although it discusses them from a mathematical point of view. It does, however, offer improved betting systems and helps to organize a player's choices in roulette betting, according to mathematical facts and personal strategies. It is a must-have roulette handbook to be studied before placing your bets on the turn of either a European or American roulette wheel. (shrink)

We introduce possibilistic beliefs into strategic games, describing a player’s belief about his opponents’ strategies as the set of their strategies he regards as possible. We formulate possibilistic strategic games where each player has preferences over his own strategies conditional on his possibilistic belief about his opponents’ strategies. We define several solution concepts for possibilistic strategic games such as (strict) equilibria, rationalizable sets, iterated elimination of never-best responses, and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and we study (...) their properties and relationships. We develop a class of possibilistic strategic games called possibilistic supermodular games to relate supermodular games to possibilistic strategic games. Lastly, we discuss a direction of extending our possibilistic framework to games with incomplete information. (shrink)

Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game‐theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e., the existence of a winning strategy in games that involve two players and two outcomes saying who wins. In a multi‐outcome setting, the notion of winning strategy is irrelevant yet usually replaced faithfully with the notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium. This article shows that (...) every determinacy result over an arbitrary game structure, e.g., a tree, is transferable into existence of multi‐outcome (pure) Nash equilibrium over the same game structure. The equilibrium‐transfer theorem requires cardinal or order‐theoretic conditions on the strategy sets and the preferences, respectively, whereas counter‐examples show that every requirement is relevant, albeit possibly improvable. When the outcomes are finitely many, the proof provides an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium without significant complexity loss compared to the two‐outcome case. As examples of application, this article generalises Borel determinacy, positional determinacy of parity games, and finite‐memory determinacy of Muller games. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type game that is played on two classes of models rather than just two models. This game extends and generalizes the known Ajtai-Fagin game to the case when there are several alternating moves played in different models. The game allows Duplicator to delay her choices of the models till the very end of the game, making it easier for her to win. This adds on the toolkit of winning strategies for Duplicator in Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type (...) games and opens up new methods for tackling some open problems in descriptive complexity theory. As an application of the class game, it is shown that, if m is a power of a prime, then first order logic augmented with function quantifiers F1n of arity 1 and height n < m can not express that the size of the model is divisible by m. This, together with some new expressibility results for Henkin quantifiers H1n gives some new separation results on the class of finite models among various F1n on one hand and between F1n and H1n on the other. Since function quantifiers involve a bounded type of second order existential quantifiers, the class game solves an open problem raised by Fagin, which asks for some inexpressibility result using a winning strategy by Duplicator in a game that involves more than one coloring round. (shrink)

First we show that the classical two-player semantic game actually corresponds to a three-valued logic. Then we generalize this result and give an n-player semantic game for an n + 1-valued logic with n binary connectives, each associated with a player. We prove that player i has a winning strategy in game G if and only if the truth value of φ is $t_i $ in the model M, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and none of the players (...) has a winning strategy in G if and only if the truth value of φ is $t_o $ in M. (shrink)