Search results for 'Gap' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Max Seeger, The Reductive Explanation of Boiling Water in Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument.score: 24.0
    This paper examines a paradigm case of allegedly successful reductive explanation, viz. the explanation of the fact that water boils at 100°C based on facts about (...)H2O. The case figures prominently in Joseph Levines explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. It will turn out that there are two versions of the explanatory gap argument to be found in Levines writings. The earlier version relies heavily on conceptual analysis and construes reductive explanation as a process of deduction. The later version makes do without conceptual analysis and understands reductive explanations as based on theoretic reductions that are justified by explanatory power. Along the way will be shown that the bridge principleswhich are being neglected in the explanatory gap literatureplay a crucial role in the explanatory gap argument. (shrink)
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  2. David Papineau (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.score: 24.0
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with anexplanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell (...)us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of aexplanatory gaparises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mindbrain relation in a dualist way. (shrink)
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  3. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    According to the self-representational theory of consciousnessself- representationalism for shorta mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the (...) right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection4). (shrink)
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  4. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Constitution and the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 161 (2):183 - 202.score: 24.0
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to (...)
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  5. Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.score: 24.0
    I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current (...)
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  6. M. Scheele (2002). Never Mind the Gap: The Explanatory Gap as an Artifact of Naive Philosophical Argument. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):333-342.score: 24.0
    It is argued that the explanatory gap argument, according to which it is fundamentally impossible to explain qualitative mental states in a physicalist theory of mind, is (...)
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  7. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate (...)is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicatea series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some sense in which vague predicates are gappy which may be expressed neutrally by saying that on any appropriately constructed sorites series for a given vague predicate there will be a gap between the objects of which the predicate is definitely true and those of which it is definitely false. Taking as primitive the operatorit is definitely the case that’, abbreviated asD’, we may stipulate that a predicate F is definitely true (or definitely false) of an object just in caseDF (a)’, where a is a name for the object, is true (or false) simpliciter.1 This yields the following conditional formulation of agap principle’: ((x) ∧ D¬Φ(y)) → ¬R(x, y). HereΦis to be replaced with a vague predicate, whileRis to stand for a sorites relation for that predicate: a relation that can be used to construct a sorites series for the predicatesuch as the relation of being just one millimetre shorter than for the predicateis tall’. Disagreements about the sense in which it is correct to say that vague predicates are gappy can then be recast as disagreements about how to understand the definitely operator. One might give it, for example, a pragmatic construal such asit would not be misleading to assert that’; or an epistemic construal such asit is known thatorit is knowable that’; or a semantic construal such asit is true that’. (shrink)
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  8. Peter Fazekas (2011). Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.score: 24.0
    The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal (...) concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper. (shrink)
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  9. Brian Loar (1999). Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us? In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Philosophy Documentation Center. 99-104.score: 24.0
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that alldirect grasps of the essence (...)
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  10. Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.score: 24.0
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of (...) conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an intrinsic, experiential side. However, despite Strawson's suggestion to the contrary, Feigl distinguishes his view from panpsychism. In fact, twofold-access theory, as I construe it, does not so much imply a pan-psychism as a local- or neuropsychism: there are physical phenomena that are experiences, experiences only directly accessible to one when they are events in one's own brain and body. Strawson is also correct that there must be facts about the physical phenomena that constitute an experience that determine that it is the experiences it is -- or indeed any experience at all. Ultimately, however, Strawson fails to make the case that this relation of determination implies that physical ultimates are -- themselves -- subjects of experience. In fact, given what I call the Complex Subject Thesis, physical ultimates are the least likely candidates for being subjects of experience, for experience, I contend, is an embodied phenomenon. (shrink)
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  11. Gerd Grübler (2011). Beyond the Responsibility Gap. Discussion Note on Responsibility and Liability in the Use of Brain-Computer Interfaces. AI and Society 26 (4):377-382.score: 24.0
    The article shows where the argument of responsibility-gap regarding brain-computer interfaces acquires its plausibility from, and suggests why the argument is not plausible. As a way (...) of an explanation, a distinction between the descriptive third-person perspective and the interpretative first-person perspective is introduced. Several examples and metaphors are used to show that ascription of agency and responsibility does not, even in simple cases, require that people be in causal control of every individual detail involved in an event. Taking up the current debate on liability in BCI use, the article provides and discusses some rules that should be followed when potentially harmful BCI-based devices are brought from the laboratory into everyday life. (shrink)
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  12. Tone Kvernbekk (2012). Argumentation in Theory and Practice: Gap or Equilibrium? Informal Logic 32 (3):288-305.score: 24.0
    ABSTRACT: It is not uncommon, in argumentation and in various professions, to diagnose a gap between theory and practice; and in the next step argue that they (...)
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  13. Michal J. Carrington, Benjamin A. Neville & Gregory J. Whitwell (2010). Why Ethical Consumers Don'T Walk Their Talk: Towards a Framework for Understanding the Gap Between the Ethical Purchase Intentions and Actual Buying Behaviour of Ethically Minded Consumers. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 97 (1):139 - 158.score: 24.0
    Despite their ethical intentions, ethically minded consumers rarely purchase ethical products (Auger and Devinney: 2007, Journal of Business Ethics 76, 361-383). This intentions-behaviour gap is important (...) to researchers and industry, yet poorly understood (Belk et al.: 2005, Consumption, Markets and Culture 8(3), 275-289). In order to push the understanding of ethical consumption forward, we draw on what is known about the intentionbehaviour gap from the social psychology and consumer behaviour literatures and apply these insights to ethical consumerism. We bring together three separate insightsimplementation intentions (Gollwitzer: 1999, American Psychologist 54(7), 493-503), actual behavioural control (ABC) (Ajzen and Madden: 1986, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 22, 453-474; Sheeran et al.: 2003, Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 393-410) and situational context (SC) (Belk: 1975, Journal of Consumer Research 2, 157164) — to construct an integrated, holistic conceptual model of the intentionbehaviour gap of ethically minded consumers. This holistic conceptual model addresses significant limitations within the ethical consumerism literature, and moves the understanding of ethical consumer behaviour forward. Further, the operationalisation of this model offers insight and strategic direction for marketing managers attempting to bridge the intention-behaviour gap of the ethically minded consumer. (shrink)
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  14. Inmaculada Melo-Martín (2013). Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to Patent More? Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):491-504.score: 24.0
    The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which (...)
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  15. Michelle Amazeen (2011). Gap (RED): Social Responsibility Campaign or Window Dressing? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 99 (2):167 - 182.score: 24.0
    This study interrogates the Gap (RED) campaign from a political economic perspective to determine whether it goes beyond merely touting the virtuous line of social responsibility. Critics (...)
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  16. Inmaculada de Melo-Martín (2013). Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to Patent More? [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):491-504.score: 24.0
    The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which (...)
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  17. Tobias Matzner (forthcoming). The Model Gap: Cognitive Systems in Security Applications and Their Ethical Implications. [REVIEW] AI and Society:1-8.score: 24.0
    The use of cognitive systems like pattern recognition or video tracking technology in security applications is becoming ever more common. The paper considers cases in which the (...)
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  18. Vincenzo Crunelli Stuart W. Hughes, Magor L. Lőrincz, Kate Blethyn, Katalin A. Kékesi, Gábor Juhász, Mark Turmaine, John G. Parnavelas (2011). Thalamic Gap Junctions Control Local Neuronal Synchrony and Influence Macroscopic Oscillation Amplitude During EEG Alpha Rhythms. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 24.0
    Although EEG alpha () (8-13 Hz) rhythms are often considered to reflect anidlingbrain state, numerous studies indicate that they are also related to many aspects (...)
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  19. Nell Adkins & Robin R. Radtke (2004). Students' and Faculty Members' Perceptions of the Importance of Business Ethics and Accounting Ethics Education: Is There an Expectations Gap? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 51 (3):279-300.score: 21.0
    Despite a wealth of prior research (e.g., Wynd and Mager, 1989; Weber, 1990; <span class='Hi'>Harrisspan>, 1991; <span class='Hi'>Harrisspan> and Guffey, 1991; McCabe (...)et al., 1991; Murphy and Boatright, 1994; Gautschi and Jones, 1998), little consensus has arisen about the goals and effectiveness of business ethics education. Additionally, accounting academics have recently been questioned as to their commitment to accounting ethics education (Gunz and McCutcheon, 1998). The current study examines whether accounting students' perceptions of business ethics and the goals of accounting ethics education are fundamentally different from the perceptions of accounting faculty members. The study uses a survey instrument to elicit student and faculty responses to various questions concerning the importance of business ethics and accounting ethics education. Statistical analyses indicate that students consider both business ethics and the goals of accounting ethics education to be more important than faculty members. Implications of these results for accounting faculty members interested in accounting ethics education are discussed. (shrink)
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  20. Matthias Warken Andreas R. Schwerdtfeger, Catalina Schmitz (2012). Using Text Messages to Bridge the Intention-Behavior Gap? A Pilot Study on the Use of Text Message Reminders to Increase Objectively Assessed Physical Activity in Daily Life. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 21.0
    Sedentarism is a serious health concern in industrialized countries throughout the world. We examined whether a text message-based intervention, targeted at increasing daily levels of physical (...)activity, would be more effective than a standard psychoeducational intervention and a control condition. Sixty-three individuals (43 women) with a mean age of 23.7 years participated in the study. They were randomly assigned to a psychoeducational standard intervention; an augmented intervention with additional short text messages sent to the mobile phones to remind participants of their action plans, and a control condition. Objectively assessed physical activity and self-efficacy were assessed pre- and post-intervention. Participants in the control condition showed a significant decline in physical activity from pre- assessment to post-assessment, whereas participants in both intervention arms exhibited a slight increase. Moreover, the augmented intervention resulted in a marginally significant increase in self-efficacy, whereas the standard intervention resulted in a significant decrease. The findings suggest that short text messages reminding individuals of their action plans are not more effective than an intervention without text messages, although there seems to be a beneficial effect on self-efficacy, which might facilitate behavior change in the long-term. Challenging aspects of the research design (e.g., reactivity of the assessment protocol) are discussed and suggestions for future research are highlighted. (shrink)
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  21. Raphael Arlettaz, Michael Schaub, Jerome Fournier, Thomas S. Reichlin, Antoine Sierro, Jame E. M. Watson & Veronika Braunisch (2010). From Publications to Public Actions: When Conservation Biologists Bridge the Gap Between Research and Implementation. BioScience 60 (10):835-842.score: 21.0
    There is a vigorous debate about the capacity of conservation biology, as a scientific discipline, to effectively contribute to actions that preserve and restore biodiversity. Various factors (...)
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  22. David Birch, L. Thomas Clifford & Julie Butterfield (1961). Response Latency as a Function of Size of Gap in the Elevated Runway. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (2):179.score: 21.0
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  23. Tom McClelland (2011). Consciousness, Ignorance and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Writings Special Issue:45-57.score: 21.0
     
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  24. Bruno Mölder (2012). Explaining the Gap Intuition. In Oliver Petersen, Dagmar Borchers, Thomas Spitzley & Manfred Stöckler (eds.), Proceedings von GAP.7 Nachdenken Und Vordenken – Herausforderungen an Die Philosophie. Universität Duisburg-Essen. 395-409.score: 21.0
    An explanatory gap ensues when the truths constituting the explanans do not entail the explanandum. Attempts to give a physicalist account of consciousness seem to generate an (...)
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  25. Charles Morgan (1995). A Gap Cohomology Group. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 41 (4):564-570.score: 21.0
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  26. [deleted]Diana J. Tajik-Parvinchi & Paul Sandor (2013). Enhanced Antisaccade Abilities in Children with Tourette Syndrome: the Gap-Effect Reversal. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 21.0
  27. Ana S. L. Rodrigues, H. Resit Akcakaya, Sandy J. Andelman, Mohamed I. Bakarr, Luigi Boitani, Thomas M. Brooks, Janice S. Chanson, Lincoln D. C. Fishpool, Gustavo A. B. Da Fonseca, Kevin J. Gaston, Michael Hoffmann, Pablo A. Marquet, John D. Pilgrim, Robert L. Pressey, Jan Schipper, Wes Sechrest, Simon N. Stuart, Les G. Underhill, Robert W. Waller, Matthew E. J. Watts & Xie Yan (2004). Global Gap Analysis: Priority Regions for Expanding the Global Protected-Area Network. BioScience 54 (12):1092-1100.score: 21.0
    Protected areas are the single most important conservation tool. The global protected-area network has grown substantially in recent decades, now occupying 11.5% of Earth's land (...)
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  28. Robert van Gulick (1999). Taking a Step Back From the Gap. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr.score: 21.0
     
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  29. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.score: 18.0
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing (...) could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. (See Crick (1994).) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some (e.g. Nagel, 1974) say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. (McGinn, 1991) Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness. (shrink)
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  30. David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold (...)
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  31. Mahesh Ananth (2005). Psychological Altruism Vs. Biological Altruism: Narrowing the Gap with the Baldwin Effect. Acta Biotheoretica 53 (3).score: 18.0
    This paper defends the position that the supposed gap between biological altruism and psychological altruism is not nearly as wide as some scholars (e.g., Elliott Sober) (...)insist. Crucial to this defense is the use of James Mark Baldwin's concepts oforganic selectionandsocial heredityto assist in revealing that the gap between biological and psychological altruism is more of a small lacuna. Specifically, this paper argues that ontogenetic behavioral adjustments, which are crucial to individual survival and reproduction, are also crucial to species survival. In particular, it is argued that human psychological altruism is produced and maintained by various sorts of mimicry and self-reflection in the aid of both individual and species survival. The upshot of this analysis is that it is possible to offer an account of psychological altruism that is closelytethered to biological altruism without reducing entirely the former to thelatter. (shrink)
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  32. Tim Crane (2010). Cosmic Hermeneutics Vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oup Oxford.score: 18.0
    This paper is a defence of Terence Horgans claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from (what has been traditionally known as) emergentism. I (...)argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recentnonreductivephysicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The conclusion is that this is the real challenge posed by Joseph Levinesexplanatory gapargument: if physicalists cannot close the explanatory gap in Levines preferred way, they must find some other way to do it. Otherwise their view is indistinguishable from emergentism. (shrink)
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  33. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2011). On the Psychological Origins of Dualism: Dual-Process Cognition and the Explanatory Gap. In Edward Slingerland & Mark Collard (eds.), Creating Consilience: Issues and Case Studies in teh Integration of the Sciences and Humanities. OUP.score: 18.0
    Consciousness often presents itself as a problem for materialists because no matter which physical explanation we consider, there seems to remain something about conscious experience that hasn' (...)t been fully explained. This gives rise to an apparent explanatory gap. The explanatory gulf between the physical and the conscious is reflected in the broader population, in which dualistic intuitions abound. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, this essay presents a dual-process cognitive model of consciousness attribution. This dual-process model, we suggest, provides an important part of the explanation for why dualism is so attractive and the explanatory gap so vexing. (shrink)
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  34. David Papineau (1998). Mind the Gap. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):373-89.score: 18.0
    On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness (1991), Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states? How can (...)
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  35. Brie Gertler (2001). The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion: A Reply to Michael Tye. Mind 110 (439):689-694.score: 18.0
    The claim that there is an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties is perhaps the leading current challenge to materialist views about the mind. Tye tries (...)
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  36. Mark Jago (2013). The Problem with TruthmakerGap Epistemicism. Thought 1 (4):320-329.score: 18.0
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their (...)truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the formit is determinate that Aorit is indeterminate whether Ais true. Since it is highly likely that there is higher-order vagueness (and indeed, Sorensen is adamant that there is higher-order vagueness), truthmaker-gap epistemicism is in an uncomfortable position. (shrink)
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  37. Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.score: 18.0
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of (...)
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  38. Jan Willem Wieland (2011). Filling a Typical Gap in a Regress Argument. Logique and Analyse 54 (216):589-–597.score: 18.0
    In this paper I fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of (...)its first premise. (shrink)
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  39. Jiafeng Zhu (2014). Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap. Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-23.score: 18.0
    The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty (...)to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizens liberty to reciprocate fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Kloskos account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument. (shrink)
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  40. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Bundle Theory's Black Box: Gap Challenges for the Bundle Theory of Substance. Philosophia 42 (1):115-126.score: 18.0
    My aim in this article is to contribute to the larger project of assessing the relative merits of different theories of substance. An important preliminary step in (...)
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  41. Molly Paxton, Carrie Figdor & Valerie Tiberius (2012). Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy. Hypatia 27 (4):949-957.score: 18.0
    The lack of gender parity in philosophy has garnered serious attention recently. Previous empirical work that aims to quantify what has come to be calledthe gender (...)
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  42. Julie Yoo, The Other Explanatory Gap.score: 18.0
    One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue (...)
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  43. Iris Vermeir & Wim Verbeke (2006). Sustainable Food Consumption: Exploring the ConsumerAttitudeBehavioral IntentionGap. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (2):169-194.score: 18.0
    Although public interest in sustainability increases and consumer attitudes are mainly positive, behavioral patterns are not univocally consistent with attitudes. This study investigates the presumed gap between (...)
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  44. Donald F. Gustafson (1998). Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.score: 18.0
    This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when thegapis thought to exist due to the special (...)span>” orthe pain qualein the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: (1) looking at the history of the conception of pain; (2) raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of pain; (3) considering evidence from the neurophysiological systems of pain; (4) investigating the possible biological role or roles of pain; and (5) considering methodological questions of the comparable status of the results of the sciences of pain in contrast to certain intuitions underpinningthe explanatory gapin the case of pain. Skepticism concerning the crucial underlying intuitions seems justified by these considerations. (shrink)
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  45. J. M. Musacchio (2002). Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 3 (3):331-365.score: 18.0
    The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous (...)
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  46. Stefanie Grüne (2011). Is There a Gap in Kant's B Deduction? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):465 - 490.score: 18.0
    In &quot;Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content&quot;, Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and (...)claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to &quot;Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction&quot;, Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper I argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction. (shrink)
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  47. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2000). Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein's ''Spontaneous Utterances'' and the Dissolution of the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):355 – 372.score: 18.0
    Wittgenstein demystified the notion of 'observational self-knowledge'. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and (...) more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. Not descriptions, but expressions that seem more akin to behaviour than to language. I suggest that Wittgenstein uncovered a new species of speech acts. Far from the prearranged consecration of words into performatives, utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new aura: the aura of the reflex action. I argue, against Peter Hacker, that spontaneous utterances have the categorial status of deeds. This has no reductive consequences in that I do not suggest that one category is reduced to another, but that the boundary between them is porous. This explodes the myth of an explanatory gap between the traditionally distinct categories of saying (or thinking) and doing, or of mind and body. (shrink)
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  48. Axel Cleeremans (1998). The Other Hard Problem: How to Bridge the Gap Between Subsymbolic and Symbolic Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23.score: 18.0
    The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and (...)
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  49. Stephen R. Brown (2004). Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):197-209.score: 18.0
    The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo-Aristotelian naturalized (...)virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically justified in a way logically identical to the way in which are justified certain nonethical claims about human and nonhuman organisms. This demonstration (1) lends credibility to naturalized virtue ethics, (2) calls into question the very notion of an epistemological gap, and (3) confronts antinaturalists with a dilemma. (shrink)
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  50. Matthew S. Bedke (2012). The Ought-Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.score: 18.0
    When it comes to the meanings of normative expressions, descriptivist theories and expressivist theories have distinct explanatory virtues. Noting this, and with the hope of not compromising (...)
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