Search results for 'Gap' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Daniel J. Singer (2015). Mind the Is-Ought Gap. Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):193-210.
    The is-ought gap is Humes claim that we cant get anoughtfrom justiss. Prior (“The Autonomy of Ethics,” 1960) showed that its (...)most straightforward formulation, a staple of introductory philosophy classes, fails. Many authors attempt to resurrect the claim by restricting its domain syntactically or by reformulating it in terms of models of deontic logic. Those attempts prove to be complex, incomplete, or incorrect. I provide a simple reformulation of the is-ought gap that closely fits Humes description of it. My formulation of the gap avoids the proposed counterexamples from Prior and offers a natural explanation of why they seem compelling. Moreover, I show that my formulation of the gap is guaranteed by standard theories of the semantics of normative terms, and that provides a more general reason to accept it. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  38
    Michal J. Carrington, Benjamin A. Neville & Gregory J. Whitwell (2010). Why Ethical Consumers Don'T Walk Their Talk: Towards a Framework for Understanding the Gap Between the Ethical Purchase Intentions and Actual Buying Behaviour of Ethically Minded Consumers. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 97 (1):139 - 158.
    Despite their ethical intentions, ethically minded consumers rarely purchase ethical products (Auger and Devinney: 2007, Journal of Business Ethics 76, 361-383). This intentions-behaviour gap is important (...) to researchers and industry, yet poorly understood (Belk et al.: 2005, Consumption, Markets and Culture 8(3), 275-289). In order to push the understanding of ethical consumption forward, we draw on what is known about the intentionbehaviour gap from the social psychology and consumer behaviour literatures and apply these insights to ethical consumerism. We bring together three separate insightsimplementation intentions (Gollwitzer: 1999, American Psychologist 54(7), 493-503), actual behavioural control (ABC) (Ajzen and Madden: 1986, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 22, 453-474; Sheeran et al.: 2003, Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 393-410) and situational context (SC) (Belk: 1975, Journal of Consumer Research 2, 157164) — to construct an integrated, holistic conceptual model of the intentionbehaviour gap of ethically minded consumers. This holistic conceptual model addresses significant limitations within the ethical consumerism literature, and moves the understanding of ethical consumer behaviour forward. Further, the operationalisation of this model offers insight and strategic direction for marketing managers attempting to bridge the intention-behaviour gap of the ethically minded consumer. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  3. Max Seeger, The Reductive Explanation of Boiling Water in Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument.
    This paper examines a paradigm case of allegedly successful reductive explanation, viz. the explanation of the fact that water boils at 100°C based on facts about (...)H2O. The case figures prominently in Joseph Levines explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. It will turn out that there are two versions of the explanatory gap argument to be found in Levines writings. The earlier version relies heavily on conceptual analysis and construes reductive explanation as a process of deduction. The later version makes do without conceptual analysis and understands reductive explanations as based on theoretic reductions that are justified by explanatory power. Along the way will be shown that the bridge principleswhich are being neglected in the explanatory gap literatureplay a crucial role in the explanatory gap argument. (shrink)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. David Papineau (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
    It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with anexplanatory gap’—that even after we know everything that science can tell (...)us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of aexplanatory gaparises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mindbrain relation in a dualist way. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press
    According to the self-representational theory of consciousnessself- representationalism for shorta mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the (...) right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection4). (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate (...)is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicatea series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some sense in which vague predicates are gappy which may be expressed neutrally by saying that on any appropriately constructed sorites series for a given vague predicate there will be a gap between the objects of which the predicate is definitely true and those of which it is definitely false. Taking as primitive the operatorit is definitely the case that’, abbreviated asD’, we may stipulate that a predicate F is definitely true (or definitely false) of an object just in caseDF (a)’, where a is a name for the object, is true (or false) simpliciter.1 This yields the following conditional formulation of agap principle’: ((x) ∧ D¬Φ(y)) → ¬R(x, y). HereΦis to be replaced with a vague predicate, whileRis to stand for a sorites relation for that predicate: a relation that can be used to construct a sorites series for the predicatesuch as the relation of being just one millimetre shorter than for the predicateis tall’. Disagreements about the sense in which it is correct to say that vague predicates are gappy can then be recast as disagreements about how to understand the definitely operator. One might give it, for example, a pragmatic construal such asit would not be misleading to assert that’; or an epistemic construal such asit is known thatorit is knowable that’; or a semantic construal such asit is true that’. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  7.  39
    Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of (...) conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an intrinsic, experiential side. However, despite Strawson's suggestion to the contrary, Feigl distinguishes his view from panpsychism. In fact, twofold-access theory, as I construe it, does not so much imply a pan-psychism as a local- or neuropsychism: there are physical phenomena that are experiences, experiences only directly accessible to one when they are events in one's own brain and body. Strawson is also correct that there must be facts about the physical phenomena that constitute an experience that determine that it is the experiences it is -- or indeed any experience at all. Ultimately, however, Strawson fails to make the case that this relation of determination implies that physical ultimates are -- themselves -- subjects of experience. In fact, given what I call the Complex Subject Thesis, physical ultimates are the least likely candidates for being subjects of experience, for experience, I contend, is an embodied phenomenon. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.
    I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Constitution and the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 161 (2):183-202.
    Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  28
    Gerd Grübler (2011). Beyond the Responsibility Gap. Discussion Note on Responsibility and Liability in the Use of Brain-Computer Interfaces. AI and Society 26 (4):377-382.
    The article shows where the argument of responsibility-gap regarding brain-computer interfaces acquires its plausibility from, and suggests why the argument is not plausible. As a way (...) of an explanation, a distinction between the descriptive third-person perspective and the interpretative first-person perspective is introduced. Several examples and metaphors are used to show that ascription of agency and responsibility does not, even in simple cases, require that people be in causal control of every individual detail involved in an event. Taking up the current debate on liability in BCI use, the article provides and discusses some rules that should be followed when potentially harmful BCI-based devices are brought from the laboratory into everyday life. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  11.  6
    Michelle Amazeen (2011). Gap (RED): Social Responsibility Campaign or Window Dressing? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 99 (2):167 - 182.
    This study interrogates the Gap (RED) campaign from a political economic perspective to determine whether it goes beyond merely touting the virtuous line of social responsibility. Critics (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12.  62
    Peter Fazekas (2011). Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.
    The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal (...) concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper. (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. M. Scheele (2002). Never Mind the Gap: The Explanatory Gap as an Artifact of Naive Philosophical Argument. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):333-342.
    It is argued that the explanatory gap argument, according to which it is fundamentally impossible to explain qualitative mental states in a physicalist theory of mind, is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  38
    Neil Mehta (2013). How to Explain the Explanatory Gap. Dialectica 67 (2):117-135.
    I construct a tempting anti-physicalist argument, which sharpens an explanatory gap argument suggested by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson. The argument relies crucially on the premise (...)that there is a deep epistemic asymmetry (which may be identified with the explanatory gap) between phenomenal truths and ordinary macroscopic truths. Many physicalists reject the argument by rejecting this premise. I argue that even if this premise is true, the anti-physicalist conclusion should be rejected, and I provide a detailed, physicalist-friendly explanation of the relevant premise. Along the way, I sketch an account of a priori conceptual knowledge that is compatible with naturalistic accounts of intentionality. I conclude by noting that the resulting view is a version of the popular phenomenal concept strategy that avoids a potentially worrying dilemma facing earlier incarnations of this strategy. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  9
    Tone Kvernbekk (2012). Argumentation in Theory and Practice: Gap or Equilibrium? Informal Logic 32 (3):288-305.
    ABSTRACT: It is not uncommon, in argumentation and in various professions, to diagnose a gap between theory and practice; and in the next step argue that they (...)
    Direct download (16 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  39
    Brian Loar (1999). Should the Explanatory Gap Perplex Us? In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center 99-104.
    In what follows, I argue that the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion, an implicit expectation that alldirect grasps of the essence (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  7
    Kristi A. Olson (2012). Our Choices, Our Wage Gap? Philosophical Topics 40 (1):45-61.
    According to recent empirical studies, much, if not all, of the gender wage gap is attributable to individual choice. Women tend to choose lower-paying jobs and (...)to prioritize family over career while men tend to do the opposite. This has led some policymakers to conclude that the gender wage gap does not require rectification. Although feminists have typically responded by refuting the empirical claim, I argue in this essay that they should also refute the normative claim. In particular, individual choice does not exonerate the gender wage gap if the options from which women and men choose are biased in favor of men. Yet, despite extensive research on individual choice, virtually no attention has been paid to the effect of the states choice of regulatory regime on the gender wage gap. Inthis essay, I suggest some of the mechanismse.g., licensing laws and scope of practice restrictionsthat could potentially bias wages in favor of men. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  9
    Tobias Matzner (2016). The Model Gap: Cognitive Systems in Security Applications and Their Ethical Implications. [REVIEW] AI and Society 31 (1):95-102.
    The use of cognitive systems like pattern recognition or video tracking technology in security applications is becoming ever more common. The paper considers cases in which the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  5
    Inmaculada Melo-Martín (2013). Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to Patent More? Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):491-504.
    The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  1
    Robert van Gulick (1999). Taking a Step Back From the Gap. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr 123-133.
    In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical (...)link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exists, I want to take a somewhat skeptical look at the underlying assumption that the gap is all that special. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  3
    Inmaculada de Melo-Martín (2013). Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to Patent More? [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):491-504.
    The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Charles Morgan (1995). A Gap Cohomology Group. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 41 (4):564-570.
    Dan Talayco has recently defined the gap cohomology group of a tower in p/fin of height ω1. This group is isomorphic to the collection of gaps (...)in the tower modulo the equivalence relation given by two gaps being equivalent if their levelwise symmetric difference is not a gap in the tower, the group operation being levelwise symmetric difference. Talayco showed that the size of this group is always at least 2N0 and that it attains its greatest possible size, 2N1, ifholds and also in some generic extensions in which CH fails, for example on adding many Cohen or random reals. In this paper it is shown that there is always some tower whose gap cohomology group has size 2N1. It is still open as to whether there are models in which there are towers whose gap cohomology group has size less than 2ω1. (shrink)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. John Danaher (forthcoming). Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap. Ethics and Information Technology.
    We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  53
    Nell Adkins & Robin R. Radtke (2004). Students' and Faculty Members' Perceptions of the Importance of Business Ethics and Accounting Ethics Education: Is There an Expectations Gap? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 51 (3):279-300.
    Despite a wealth of prior research, little consensus has arisen about the goals and effectiveness of business ethics education. Additionally, accounting academics have recently been questioned as (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  25.  18
    Bruno Mölder (2012). Explaining the Gap Intuition. In Oliver Petersen, Dagmar Borchers, Thomas Spitzley & Manfred Stöckler (eds.), Proceedings von GAP.7 Nachdenken Und Vordenken – Herausforderungen an Die Philosophie. Universität Duisburg-Essen 395-409.
    An explanatory gap ensues when the truths constituting the explanans do not entail the explanandum. Attempts to give a physicalist account of consciousness seem to generate an (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Tom McClelland (2011). Consciousness, Ignorance and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Writings:45-57.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. David Birch, L. Thomas Clifford & Julie Butterfield (1961). Response Latency as a Function of Size of Gap in the Elevated Runway. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (2):179.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Carmi Merimovich (2011). The Short Extenders Gap Three Forcing Using a Morass. Archive for Mathematical Logic 50 (1):115-135.
    We show how to construct Gitiks short extenders gap-3 forcing using a morass, and that the forcing notion is of Prikry type.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing (...) could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. .) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness. (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   134 citations  
  30. David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press
    Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  31. Molly Paxton, Carrie Figdor & Valerie Tiberius (2012). Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy. Hypatia 27 (4):949-957.
    The lack of gender parity in philosophy has garnered serious attention recently. Previous empirical work that aims to quantify what has come to be calledthe gender (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  32. Carmi Merimovich (2009). The Short Extenders Gap Two Forcing is of Prikry Type. Archive for Mathematical Logic 48 (8):737-747.
    We show that Gitiks short extender gap-2 forcing is of Prikry type.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Iris Vermeir & Wim Verbeke (2006). Sustainable Food Consumption: Exploring the ConsumerAttitudeBehavioral IntentionGap. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (2):169-194.
    Although public interest in sustainability increases and consumer attitudes are mainly positive, behavioral patterns are not univocally consistent with attitudes. This study investigates the presumed gap between (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  34. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Bundle Theory's Black Box: Gap Challenges for the Bundle Theory of Substance. Philosophia 42 (1):115-126.
    My aim in this article is to contribute to the larger project of assessing the relative merits of different theories of substance. An important preliminary step in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Mark Jago (2012). The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329.
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their (...)truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the formit is determinate that Aorit is indeterminate whether Ais true. Since it is highly likely that there is higher-order vagueness, truthmaker-gap epistemicism is in an uncomfortable position. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Jiafeng Zhu (2014). Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap. Journal of Moral Philosophy (4):1-23.
    The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty (...)to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizens liberty to reciprocate fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Kloskos account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  26
    Eileen S. Nutting (2016). To Bridge Gödels Gap. Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2133-2150.
    InMathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf raises an epistemic challenge for mathematical platonists. In this paper, I examine the assumptions that motivate Benacerrafs original challenge, and use (...)them to construct a new causal challenge for the epistemology of mathematics. This new challenge, which I callGödels Gap’, appeals to intuitive insights into mathematical knowledge. Though it is a causal challenge, it does not rely on any obviously objectionable constraints on knowledge. As a result, it is more compelling than the original challenge. It is also more general; the challenge applies equally to platonistic and non-platonistic accounts of mathematical truth. And it can be generalized beyond the case of mathematical knowledge to pose a challenge for, e.g., moral knowledge. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  39. Jan Willem Wieland (2011). Filling a Typical Gap in a Regress Argument. Logique and Analyse 54 (216):589-–597.
    In this paper I fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of (...)its first premise. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  44
    Elanor Taylor (2016). Explanation and the Explanatory Gap. Acta Analytica 31 (1):77-88.
    The Explanatory Gapis a label for the idea that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of brain activity. There are many different formulations of the explanatory (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Mahesh Ananth (2005). Psychological Altruism Vs. Biological Altruism: Narrowing the Gap with the Baldwin Effect. Acta Biotheoretica 53 (3):217-239.
    This paper defends the position that the supposed gap between biological altruism and psychological altruism is not nearly as wide as some scholars (e.g., Elliott Sober) (...)insist. Crucial to this defense is the use of James Mark Baldwin's concepts oforganic selectionandsocial heredityto assist in revealing that the gap between biological and psychological altruism is more of a small lacuna. Specifically, this paper argues that ontogenetic behavioral adjustments, which are crucial to individual survival and reproduction, are also crucial to species survival. In particular, it is argued that human psychological altruism is produced and maintained by various sorts of mimicry and self-reflection in the aid of both individual and species survival. The upshot of this analysis is that it is possible to offer an account of psychological altruism that is closelytethered to biological altruism without reducing entirely the former to thelatter. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Brie Gertler (2001). The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion: A Reply to Michael Tye. Mind 110 (439):689-694.
    The claim that there is an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties is perhaps the leading current challenge to materialist views about the mind. Tye tries (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  10
    M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto (2016). Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346-353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  21
    Nicole Dando & Tracey Swift (2003). Transparency and Assurance: Minding the Credibility Gap. Journal of Business Ethics 44 (2/3):195 - 200.
    There is a growing realisation that the current upward trend in levels of disclosure of social, ethical and environmental performance by corporations and other organisations is not (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  45.  47
    Andreas Matthias (2004). The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.
    Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic (...)algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription. (shrink)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  46.  80
    Mykolas Drunga (2011). Berkeley and the Time-Gap Argument. In Timo Airaksinen & Bertil Belfrage (eds.), Berkeley's Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later. Cambridge Scholars
    Berkeley doesn't use the Time-Gap Argument, as Leibniz does, to prove either that we immediately see only ideas or that we see physical objects mediately. It (...) may be doubted whether he was even aware of the time-gap problem that gives rise to the argument. But certain passages in the Three Dialogues and elsewhere suggest that Berkeley would have had cogent answers to anyone who claimed that this argument, construed as being in aid of the conclusion that we only perceive ideas, is unsound. Discussing points made by Bertil Belfrage, Len Carrier, John Foster, A. C. Grayling, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Tom Stoneham, and Colin Turbayne, I try to show that the Time-Gap Argument can be expanded into a strong argument for Berkeleian Idealism. I also idnicate how the latter provides a solution to J. J. Valberg's "puzzle of experience" and disarms James Cornman's argument in Perception, Common Sense, and Science that Berkeley, too, faces a time-gap problem. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. David Papineau (1998). Mind the Gap. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):373-89.
    On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness , Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states? How can technicolour (...) phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?" Many philosophers feel that questions like these pose an unanswerable challenge to physicalism. They argue that there is no way of bridging the "explanatory gap" between the material brain and the lived world of conscious experience , and that physicalism about the mind can therefore provide no answer to the "hard problem" of why brains give rise to consciousness. (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  48. Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2011). On the Psychological Origins of Dualism: Dual-Process Cognition and the Explanatory Gap. In Edward Slingerland & Mark Collard (eds.), Creating Consilience: Issues and Case Studies in teh Integration of the Sciences and Humanities. OUP
    Consciousness often presents itself as a problem for materialists because no matter which physical explanation we consider, there seems to remain something about conscious experience that hasn' (...)t been fully explained. This gives rise to an apparent explanatory gap. The explanatory gulf between the physical and the conscious is reflected in the broader population, in which dualistic intuitions abound. Drawing on recent empirical evidence, this essay presents a dual-process cognitive model of consciousness attribution. This dual-process model, we suggest, provides an important part of the explanation for why dualism is so attractive and the explanatory gap so vexing. (shrink)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49.  7
    M. Beaton (2016). Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, Not by Fiat. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):364-366.
    Open peer commentary on the articleNever Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousnessby Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot (...): I strongly agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action are one and the same, but I disagree when they say this identity cannot be fully explained and must simply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch the outlines of just such an explanation. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  44
    Hermann G. W. Burchard (2014). The Cognitive Gap, Neural Darwinism & Linguistic DualismRussell, Husserl, Heidegger & Quine. Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):244-264.
    Guided by key insights of the four great philosophers mentioned in the title, here, in review of and expanding on our earlier work (Burchard, 2005, 2011), we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000