13 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Gary Bartlett (Central Washington University)
  1. Gary Bartlett (forthcoming). On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes in Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gary Bartlett (2014). Against the Necessity of Functional Roles for Conscious Experience: Reviving and Revising a Neglected Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):33-53.
    While the claim that certain functional states are sufficient for conscious experience has received substantial critical attention, the claim that functional states are necessary is rarely addressed. Yet the latter claim is perhaps now more common than the former. I aim to revive and revise a neglected argument against the necessity claim, by Michael Antony. The argument involves manipulating a conscious subject's brain so as to cancel a disposition which is supposedly crucial to the realization of an experience that the (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gary Bartlett (2014). Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
  4. Gary Bartlett (2014). On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    In “New Troubles for the Qualia Freak,” Michael Tye argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic micro­physical property of experiences because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Gary Bartlett (2012). Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gary Bartlett (2012). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):451 - 455.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 25, Issue 3, Page 451-455, June 2012.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gary Bartlett (2010). An Argument Against Spanking. Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (1):65-78.
    It is likely that you, like I, were sometimes spanked by your parents. A 1995 Gallup Poll found spanking to be used by 74 percent of U.S. parents of children aged seventeen or younger. But there is ongoing public debate over spanking. A lot of the debate concerns whether it should be legal. I shall not address this question, but rather whether spanking is morally permissible. I shall argue that it is not. I shall not argue that it should therefore (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gary Bartlett (2010). Recent Texts in Philosophy of Mind. Teaching Philosophy 33 (3):291-307.
    The field of textbooks in philosophy of mind is a crowded one. I shall consider six recent texts for their pedagogical usefulness. All have been published within the last five years, though two are new editions of previously published books. The first three are authored monographs: by K. T. Maslin, Barbara Montero, and André Kukla and Joel Walmsley. I then review three anthologies, each with two editors: William Lycan and Jesse Prinz, Brie Gertler and Lawrence Shapiro, and Brian McLaughlin and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gary Bartlett (2008). On the Correct Treatment of Inverted Earth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.
    Abstract: The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gary Bartlett (2008). Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Brian P. McLaughlin & Gary Bartlett (2004). Have Noe and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Programme? Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.
  12. Brian P. McLaughlin & Gary Bartlett (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Have Noe and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Programme? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.
  13. B. McLauglin & Gary Bartlett (2004). Have Noe and Thompson Cast Doubt on the NCC Programme? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-86.