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Gary Ebbs [25]Gary Martin Ebbs [1]
  1. Gary Ebbs, Putnam and the Contextually A Priori.
    Nevertheless, when we cannot specify how a statement may actually be false it has a special methodological status for us, according to Putnam—it is contextually a priori . In these circumstances, he suggests, it is epistemically reasonable for us to accept the statement without evidence and hold it immune from disconfirmation.
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  2. Gary Ebbs (forthcoming). Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science. History and Philosophy of Logic:1-8.
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  3. Gary Ebbs (forthcoming). Satisfying Predicates: Kleene's Proof of the Hilbert–Bernays Theorem. History and Philosophy of Logic:1-21.
    The Hilbert–Bernays Theorem establishes that for any satisfiable first-order quantificational schema S, one can write out linguistic expressions that are guaranteed to yield a true sentence of elementary arithmetic when they are substituted for the predicate letters in S. The theorem implies that if L is a consistent, fully interpreted language rich enough to express elementary arithmetic, then a schema S is valid if and only if every sentence of L that can be obtained by substituting predicates of L for (...)
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  4. Gary Ebbs (2014). Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.
    W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism (...)
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  5. Gary Ebbs (2013). Mendola's Internalism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):248-257.
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  6. Anthony Brueckner & Gary Ebbs (2012). Debating Self-Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Brains in a vat Anthony Brueckner; 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Anthony Brueckner; 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats Gary Ebbs; 5. Trying to get outside your own skin Anthony Brueckner; 6. Can we take our words at face value? Gary Ebbs; 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Anthony Brueckner; 8. Is scepticism about (...)
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  7. Gary Ebbs (2012). Davidson's Explication of Meaning. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. 76.
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  8. Gary Ebbs (2011). Quine Gets the Last Word. Journal of Philosophy 108 (11):617-632.
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  9. Gary Ebbs (2009). Truth and Words. Oxford University Press.
    Gary Ebbs shows that this appearance is illusory.
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  10. Gary Ebbs (2008). Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle About Doubt. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  11. Gary Ebbs (2005). Why Scepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining. Analysis 65 (287):237-244.
    In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument is self-undermining, it can still (...)
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  12. Gary Ebbs (2003). A Puzzle About Doubt. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
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  13. Gary Ebbs (2002). ¸ Iteconantzeglen:Ppr.
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  14. Gary Ebbs (2002). Learning From Others. Noûs 36 (4):525–549.
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  15. Gary Ebbs (2002). Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms. In ¸ Iteconantzeglen:Ppr. 167--185.
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  16. Gary Ebbs (2001). 9 Carnap's Logical Syntax. In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. 218.
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  17. Gary Ebbs (2001). Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.
    In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would (...)
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  18. Gary Ebbs (2001). Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions. Synthese 127 (3):303 - 323.
  19. Gary Ebbs (2000). The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):245 - 268.
  20. Gary Ebbs (1998). Bilgrami's Theory of Belief and Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613-620.
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  21. Gary Ebbs (1998). Review: Bilgrami's Theory of Belief and Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613 - 620.
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  22. Gary Ebbs (1997). Rule-Following and Realism. Harvard University Press.
    Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book ...
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  23. Gary Ebbs (1996). Can We Take Our Words at Face Value? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):499-530.
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  24. Gary Ebbs (1992). Realism and Rational Inquiry. Philosophical Topics 20 (1):1-33.
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  25. Gary Ebbs (1992). Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):239-266.
     
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