1. Gary W. Lewis (1998). The So-Called (and Actual!) Realism of the Tractatus. Grazer Philosophische Studien 54:45-70.
    David Pears's contention that the Tractatus is to be understood as advancing a form of metaphysical realism is defended against McGuinness's view that Tractatus 1-2.063 is to be treated just as introducing a metaphysical myth that may be employed to bring into prominence salient features of propositions. Starting with a discussion of the involved difficulties, e.g., determining (1) whether Wittgenstein does in fact provide an argument for the existence of simple objects (2) what this object is and (3) what role (...)
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  2. Gary W. Lewis (1996). Wittgenstein's Grammatical Propositions as Linguistic Exemplars: A Refutation of Katz's Semantic Platonism. Philosophical Investigations 19 (2):140-158.
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  3. Gary W. Lewis (1992). The Wittgensteinian Consistency of Scepticism. Philosophical Investigations 15 (1):67-78.