30 found
Sort by:
  1. Gary Watson (2013). Asymmetry and Rational Ability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):467-475.
    For a symposium on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gary Watson (2013). Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):269-292.
    Philosophical discussions of psychopathy have been framed primarily in terms of psychopaths' conspicuous moral shortcomings. But despite their vaunted ‘egocentricity’, another prominent trait in the standard psychopathic profile is a characteristic failure to look after themselves; in an important way, psychopaths appear to be as careless of themselves as they are of others. Assuming that the standard profile is largely correct, the question is how these moral and prudential deficits are related. Are they linked in some non-accidental way? This paper (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gary Watson (2009). Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Christine M. Korsgaard, R. Jay Wallace, Gary Watson, Stephen Darwall & David Shoemaker (2007). 10. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Pp. 176-181). In Laurie DiMauro (ed.), Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Gary Watson (2007). Morality as Equal Accountability: Comments on Stephen Darwall's the Second‐Person Standpoint. Ethics 118 (1):37-51.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gary Watson (2006). The Problematic Role of Responsibility in Contexts of Distributive Justice. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):425 - 432.
  7. Gary Watson (2004). Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Since the 1970s Gary Watson has published a series of brilliant and highly influential essays on human action, examining such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do? Moral philosophers and philosophers of action will welcome this collection, representing one of the most important bodies of work in the field.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gary Watson (2004). Asserting and Promising. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):57-77.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gary Watson (ed.) (2003). Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    The new edition of this highly successful text will once again provide the ideal introduction to free will. This volume brings together some of the most influential contributions to the topic of free will during the past 50 years, as well as some notable recent work.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gary Watson (2003). Free Will, 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Gary Watson (2003). The Work of the Will. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford Clarendon Press.
  12. Gary Watson (2002). Contractualism and the Boundaries of Morality. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):221-241.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Gary Watson (2002). Review: Agency and Responsibility: A Common Sense Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):876-882.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Gary Watson (2001). Reasons and Responsibility. Ethics 111 (2):374-394.
  15. Gary Watson (1999). Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion and Dependence. In Jon Elster (ed.), Addiction: Entries and Exits. Russell Sage Publications.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Gary Watson (1999). Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.
    In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gary Watson (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism Remarks on John Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.
  18. Gary Watson (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.
  19. Gary Watson (1996). Two Faces of Responsibility. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gary Watson (1995). Freedom and Strength of Will in Hoffman and Albritton. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):261 - 271.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Gary Watson (1995). Gregory S. Kavka 1947-1994. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5):99 - 100.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gary Watson (1987). Free Action and Free Will. Mind 96 (April):154-72.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Gerasimos Santas & Gary Watson (1985). Introduction. Topoi 4 (1):1-2.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Gary Watson (1985). Robert J. Richman, God, Free Will, and Morality Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 5 (5):213-218.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Gary Watson (1984). Virtues in Excess. Philosophical Studies 46 (1):57 - 74.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Gary Watson (1983). Kant on Happiness in the Moral Life. Philosophy Research Archives 9:79-108.
    This paper is a study of the role of happiness in Kant’s theory. I begin by noting two recurrent characterizations of happiness by Kant, and discuss their relationship. Then I take up the general issue of the relation of happiness to moral virtue. I show that, for Kant, the antagonists are not morality and happiness, but the moral point of view and “self-conceit”, the inveterate tendency to elevate the concern for contentment or satisfaction of inclination to the status of a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gary Watson (ed.) (1982). Free Will, 1st Ed. Oxford University Press.
    The Aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university students or the general reader.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Gary Watson (1978). Appropriate Emotions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (11):699.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Gary Watson (1977). Skepticism About Weakness of Will. Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.
    My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to socratism, it is possible for a person knowingly to act contrary to his or her better judgment. But this description does not exhaust the common view of weakness. Also implicit in this view is the belief that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Gary Watson (1975). Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
    In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation