Search results for 'Genetic psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ash Gobar (1968). Philosophic Foundations Of Genetic Psychology And Gestalt Psychology. Martinus Nilboff.score: 69.0
     
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  2. Richard F. Kitchener (1985). Genetic Epistemology, History of Science and Genetic Psychology. Synthese 65 (1):3 - 31.score: 60.0
    Genetic epistemology analyzes the growth of knowledge both in the individual person (genetic psychology) and in the socio-historical realm (the history of science). But what the relationship is between the history of science and genetic psychology remains unclear. The biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is inadequate as a characterization of the relation. A critical examination of Piaget's Introduction à l'Épistémologie Généntique indicates these are several examples of what I call stage laws common to both (...)
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  3. Robert M. Yerkes (1917). Behaviorism and Genetic Psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (6):154-160.score: 48.0
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  4. Catherine Driscoll (forthcoming). Constructive Criticism: An Evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle's Genetic and Neuroscientific Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology. :1-19.score: 48.0
    Constructive Criticism: An evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle’s genetic and neuroscientific arguments against Evolutionary Psychology. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.785068.
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  5. J. Piaget (1953). Genetic Psychology and Epistemology. Diogenes 1 (1):49-63.score: 45.0
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  6. Jason W. Brown (2005). Genetic Psychology and Process Philosophy. Process Studies 34 (1):33-44.score: 45.0
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  7. R. F. Rattray (1931). An Outline of Genetic Psychology: According to the Theory of Inherited Mind. Philosophy 6 (23):347 - 364.score: 45.0
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  8. Margaret Floy Washburn (1904). The Genetic Method in Psychology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (18):491-494.score: 39.0
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  9. Richard F. Kitchener (1996). Genetic Epistemology and Cognitive Psychology of Science. In William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. 66.score: 39.0
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  10. Adam Hochman (2013). The Phylogeny Fallacy and the Ontogeny Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):593-612.score: 36.0
    In 1990 Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy, an empirically untenable dichotomy between proximate and evolutionary causation, which locates proximate causes in the decoding of ‘genetic programs’, and evolutionary causes in the historical events that shaped these programs. More recently, Lickliter and Hunter Honeycutt (Psychol Bull 129:819–835, 2003a) argued that Evolutionary Psychologists commit this fallacy, and they proposed an alternative research program for evolutionary psychology. For these authors the phylogeny fallacy is the proximate/evolutionary distinction itself, (...)
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  11. O. Kinberg (1941). The Conception of Environment in Genetic Bio-Psychology. Theoria 7 (1):1-19.score: 36.0
  12. Marko Barendregt (2003). Genetic Explanation in Psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):67-90.score: 36.0
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  13. Alex B. Neitzke (2012). On the Genetic Modification of Psychology, Personality, and Behavior. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (4):307-343.score: 36.0
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  14. Matthew C. Keller & Geoffrey Miller (2006). Resolving the Paradox of Common, Harmful, Heritable Mental Disorders: Which Evolutionary Genetic Models Work Best? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):385-404.score: 33.0
    Given that natural selection is so powerful at optimizing complex adaptations, why does it seem unable to eliminate genes (susceptibility alleles) that predispose to common, harmful, heritable mental disorders, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder? We assess three leading explanations for this apparent paradox from evolutionary genetic theory: (1) ancestral neutrality (susceptibility alleles were not harmful among ancestors), (2) balancing selection (susceptibility alleles sometimes increased fitness), and (3) polygenic mutation-selection balance (mental disorders reflect the inevitable mutational load on the (...)
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  15. Ian Burkitt (1999). Bodies of Thought: Embodiment, Identity, and Modernity. Sage Publications.score: 33.0
    `The work develops and articulates a brilliant and original central thesis; namely that modern individuals are best understood as complex bodies of thought, as embodied symbolic and material beings. Future work on mind, self, body, society and culture will have to begin with Burkitt's text' - Norman K. Denzin, University of Illinois `After his excellent Social Selves, Ian Burkitt has produced a new theory of embodiment which will become required reading for those working in the areas of social theory, sociology, (...)
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  16. Jacques Montangero (1985). Genetic Epistemology: Yesterday and Today. Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York.score: 33.0
     
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  17. N. Humphrey (1992/1999). A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness. Simon and Schuster.score: 30.0
    This book is a tour-de-force on how human consciousness may have evolved. From the "phantom pain" experienced by people who have lost their limbs to the uncanny faculty of "blindsight," Humphrey argues that raw sensations are central to all conscious states and that consciousness must have evolved, just like all other mental faculties, over time from our ancestorsodily responses to pain and pleasure. '.
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  18. John Dupré (2001). Human Nature and the Limits of Science. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    John Dupre warns that our understanding of human nature is being distorted by two faulty and harmful forms of pseudo-scientific thinking. Not just in the academic world but in everyday life, we find one set of experts who seek to explain the ends at which humans aim in terms of evolutionary theory, while the other set uses economic models to give rules of how we act to achieve those ends. Dupre demonstrates that these theorists' explanations do not work and that, (...)
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  19. Liliana Albertazzi (2013). Dissecting Intentionality in the Lab: Meinong's Theory. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 23 (3):579-596.score: 30.0
    Besides presenting a phenomenological-experimental analysis of consciousness, Meinong challenged one of the major indisputable axioms of current scientific research, i.e. that perception in awareness has to be veridical on the stimulus. Meinong’s analysis of consciousness, which he conducted through a kind of dissection of its structures from a systematic and an experimental viewpoint, offers relevant insights to contemporary consciousness studies.
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  20. Nicholas Humphrey (1984). Consciousness Regained: Chapters in the Development of Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    Essays discuss the evolution of consciousness, self-knowledge, aesthetics, religious ecstasy, ghosts, and dreams.
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  21. Leonard Carmichael (1956). The Making of Modern Mind. Houston, Elsevier Press.score: 30.0
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  22. Kishor Gandhi (ed.) (1983/1986). The Evolution of Consciousness. Paragon House.score: 30.0
  23. Jeremy Griffith (1991). Beyond the Human Condition. Foundation for Humanity's Adulthood.score: 30.0
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  24. Jeremy Griffith (1988). Free: The End of the Human Condition: The Biological Reason Why Humans Have Had to Be Individual, Competitive, Egocentric, and Aggressive. Centre for Humanity's Adulthood.score: 30.0
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  25. George G. [from old catalog] Haydu (1958). The Architecture of Sanity. New York, Julian Press.score: 30.0
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  26. John J. Pauson (1966). Beyond Morality and the Law. Pittsburgh, Philosophical Press.score: 30.0
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  27. Nicholas Shea (2012). Genetic Representation Explains the Cluster of Innateness-Related Properties. Mind and Language 27 (4):466-493.score: 27.0
    The concept of innateness is used to make inferences between various better-understood properties, like developmental canalization, evolutionary adaptation, heritability, species-typicality, and so on (‘innateness-related properties’). This article uses a recently-developed account of the representational content carried by inheritance systems like the genome to explain why innateness-related properties cluster together, especially in non-human organisms. Although inferences between innateness-related properties are deductively invalid, and lead to false conclusions in many actual cases, where some aspect of a phenotypic trait develops in reliance on (...)
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  28. Marko Barendregt & René Van Hezewijk (2005). Adaptive and Genomic Explanations of Human Behaviour: Might Evolutionary Psychology Contribute to Behavioural Genomics? [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):57-78.score: 27.0
    . Evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics are both approaches to explain human behaviour from a genetic point of view. Nonetheless, thus far the development of these disciplines is anything but interdependent. This paper examines the question whether evolutionary psychology can contribute to behavioural genomics. Firstly, a possible inconsistency between the two approaches is reviewed, viz. that evolutionary psychology focuses on the universal human nature and disregards the genetic variation studied by behavioural genomics. Secondly, we will (...)
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  29. Clifford Sosis (2014). Hedonic Possibilities and Heritability Statistics. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):681-702.score: 27.0
  30. Birger Siebert (2005). Prospects for a Cultural-Historical Psychology of Intelligence. Studies in East European Thought 57 (3-4):305 - 317.score: 27.0
    The ideas of cultural-historical psychology have led to a new understanding of the human psyche as developing in the process of the subject acting in social and historical contexts. Such a “non-classical” reinterpretation of psychological concepts should be based on a theoretical and philosophical framework in order to explain genetic sources of these concepts. For this purpose, Il’enkov’s philosophy is of great significance. This is illustrated by discussing a possible cultural-historical understanding of the concept of intelligence.
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  31. J. Glover (1988). I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity. Penguin.score: 27.0
    This book relates work in neuroscience, psychology and psychiatry to questions about what a person is and the nature of a persons unity across a lifetime. The neuropsychiatry is now dated. The philosophy has three themes still perhaps of interest. The first is a response to Derek Parfits powerful and influential work on personal identity, which, like many other people, I discussed with him as he worked it out. I accept his view that there is no ego that owns (...)
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  32. Nicholas Shea (2012). New Thinking, Innateness and Inherited Representation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367:2234-2244.score: 27.0
    The New Thinking contained in this volume rejects an Evolutionary Psychology that is committed to innate domain-specific psychological mechanisms: gene-based adaptations that are unlearnt, developmentally fixed and culturally universal. But the New Thinking does not simply deny the importance of innate psychological traits. The problem runs deeper: the concept of innateness is not suited to distinguishing between the two positions. That points to a more serious problem with the concept of innateness as it is applied to human psychological phenotypes. (...)
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  33. Huib L. de Jong (2002). Levels of Explanation in Biological Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):441-462.score: 24.0
    Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent (...)
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  34. Richard F. Kitchener (1987). Is Genetic Epistemology Possible? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):283-299.score: 24.0
    Several philosophers have questioned the possibility of a genetic epistemology, an epistemology concerned with the developmental transitions between successive states of knowledge in the individual person. Since most arguments against the possibility of a genetic epistemology crucially depend upon a sharp distinction between the genesis of an idea and its justification, I argue that current philosophy of science raises serious questions about the universal validity of this distinction. Then I discuss several senses of the genetic fallacy, indicating (...)
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  35. Thomas D. Senor (1992). Two Factor Theories, Meaning Wholism and Intentionalistic Psychology: A Reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):133-151.score: 21.0
    In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor (...)
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  36. Stan Klein (2014). What Can Recent Replication Failures Tell Us About the Theoretical Commitments of Psychology? Theory and Psychology 24:326-338.score: 21.0
    I suggest that the recent, highly visible, and often heated debate over failures to replicate the results in the social sciences reveals more than the need for greater attention to the pragmatics and value of empirical falsification. It also is a symptom of a serious issue -- the underdeveloped state of theory in many areas of psychology. While I focus on the phenomenon of “social priming” -- since it figures centrally in current debate -- it is not the only (...)
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  37. David Morrow (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.score: 21.0
    Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our (...)
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  38. Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos.score: 21.0
    This Article considers the moral and legal status of practices that aim to modify traits in human offspring. As advancements in reproductive biotechnology give parents greater power to shape the genetic constitution of their children, an emerging school of legal scholars has ushered in a privatized paradigm of genetic control. Commentators defend a constitutionally protected right to prenatal engineering by appeal to the significance of procreative liberty and the promise of producing future generations who are more likely to (...)
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  39. Bradley Franks (2005). The Role of "the Environment" in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):59-82.score: 21.0
    Evolutionary psychology is widely understood as involving an integration of evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology, in which the former promises to revolutionise the latter. In this paper, I suggest some reasons to doubt that the assumptions of evolutionary theory and of cognitive psychology are as directly compatible as is widely assumed. These reasons relate to three different problems of specifying adaptive functions as the basis for characterising cognitive mechanisms: the disjunction problem, the grain problem and the environment (...)
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  40. Slobodan Perovic & Ljiljana Radenovic, Is Nativism in Psychology Reconcilable with the Parity Thesis in Biology?score: 21.0
    The Modern Synthesis of Darwinism and genetics regards non-genetic factors as merely constraints on the genetic variations that result in the characteristics of organisms. Even though the environment (including social interactions and culture) is as necessary as genes in terms of selection and inheritance, it does not contain the information that controls the development of the traits. S. Oyama’s account of the Parity Thesis, however, states that one cannot conceivably distinguish in a meaningful way between nature-based (i.e., gene-based) (...)
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  41. John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.score: 21.0
    In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist (...)
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  42. Robert Lockie (2003). Depth Psychology and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.score: 21.0
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist (...)
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  43. G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.score: 21.0
    This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically (...)
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  44. Kenneth J. Sufka & Derek D. Turner (2005). An Evolutionary Account of Chronic Pain: Integrating the Natural Method in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):243-257.score: 21.0
    This paper offers an evolutionary account of chronic pain. Chronic pain is a maladaptive by-product of pain mechanisms and neural plasticity, both of which are highly adaptive. This account shows how evolutionary psychology can be integrated with Flanagan's natural method, and in a way that avoids the usual charges of panglossian adaptationism and an uncritical commitment to a modular picture of the mind. Evolutionary psychology is most promising when it adopts a bottom-up research strategy that focuses on basic (...)
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  45. Bill Wringe (2002). Is Folk Psychology a Lakatosian Research Program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.score: 21.0
    It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research (...)
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  46. M. Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437-52.score: 21.0
    Abstract Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best (...)
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  47. Matthew Rellihan (2012). Adaptationism and Adaptive Thinking in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):245-277.score: 21.0
    Evolutionary psychologists attempt to infer our evolved psychology from the selection pressures present in our ancestral environments. Their use of this inference strategy?often called ?adaptive thinking??is thought to be justified by way of appeal to a rather modest form of adaptationism, according to which the mind's adaptive complexity reveals it to be a product of selection. I argue, on the contrary, that the mind's being an adaptation is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the validity of (...)
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  48. Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.score: 21.0
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient conditions, typically being unable to provide necessary (...)
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  49. Pierre Vermersch (2004). Attention Between Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (1):45-81.score: 21.0
    It is possible to consider attention as the modulating dimension of consciousness. Understood in this sense, attention can be a privileged theme for relating the first person point of view (conceived as a psycho-phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl) to the experimental sciences (e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, etc.), which have done a great deal of work on attention. This article will take up in succession some different points of view regarding the status of attention and its structure (e.g. static (...)
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  50. Peter Godfrey-Smith, Innateness and Genetic Information.score: 21.0
    The idea that innateness can be understood in terms of genetic coding or genetic programming is discussed. I argue that biology does not provide any support for the view that the whole-organism features of interest to nativists in psychology and linguistics are genetically coded for. This provides some support for recent critical and deflationary treatments of the concept of innateness.
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