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  1. Georg J. W. Dorn (2006). Deskriptive Argumente und Argumenthierarchien. In Günther Kreuzbauer & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Argumentation in Theorie und Praxis: Philosophie und Didaktik des Argumentierens. LIT Verlag.
    Es werden vier verbreitete Verwendungsweisen des Wortes ‘Argument’ beschrieben, an Beispielen erläutert und dann schrittweise expliziert. Die wichtigsten Explikata sind: ‘eine Satzfolge x ist ein deskriptives Argument in Standardform’, ‘ein deskriptives Argument x in Standardform ist bei der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung p stark (bzw. schwach)’, ‘ein Aussagesatz x ist bei der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung p ein Argument für (bzw. gegen) einen Aussagesatz y’, ‘ein geordneter Tripel x von deskriptiven Argumenten in Standardform, von Argumentebenen und von Argumentsträngen ist eine deskriptive Argumenthierarchie in Standardform’, (...)
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  2. Georg J. W. Dorn (2005). Eine komparative Theorie der Stärke von Argumenten. Kriterion 19:34–43.
    This article presents a comparative theory of subjective argument strength simple enough for application. Using the axioms and corollaries of the theory, anyone with an elementary knowledge of logic and probability theory can produce an – at least minimally rational – ranking of any set of arguments according to their subjective strength, provided that the arguments in question are descriptive ones in standard form. The basic idea is that the strength of argument A as seen by person x is a (...)
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  3. Georg J. W. Dorn (2002). Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Ein Gedankenaustausch mit Karl Popper. In Edgar Morscher (ed.), Was wir Karl R. Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Zu seinem 100. Geburtstag. Academia Verlag.
    Zwischen 1987 und 1994 sandte ich 20 Briefe an Karl Popper. Die meisten betrafen Fragen bezüglich seiner Antiinduktionsbeweise und seiner Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, einige die organisatorische und inhaltliche Vorbereitung eines Fachgesprächs mit ihm in Kenly am 22. März 1989 (worauf hier nicht eingegangen werden soll), einige schließlich ganz oder in Teilen nicht-fachliche Angelegenheiten (die im vorliegenden Bericht ebenfalls unberücksichtigt bleiben). Von Karl Popper erhielt ich in diesem Zeitraum 10 Briefe. Der bedeutendste ist sein siebter, bestehend aus drei Teilen, geschrieben am 21., 22. (...)
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  4. Georg J. W. Dorn (1997). Deductive, Probabilistic and Inductive Dependence. An Axiomatic Study in Probability Semantics. Verlag Peter Lang.
    This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...)
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  5. Paul Weingartner, Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.) (1997). Die Rolle der Pragmatik in der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Beiträge Zum 20. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposium, 10. Bis 16. August 1997. Band 1. Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
     
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  6. Georg J. W. Dorn (1995). Inductive Countersupport. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1):187 - 189.
    The basic idea by means of which Popper and Miller proved the non-existence of inductive probabilistic support in 1983/1985/1987, is used to prove that inductive probabilistic countersupport does exist. So it seems that after falsification has won over verification on the deductive side of science, countersupport wins over support on the inductive side.
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  7. Georg J. W. Dorn & Gerhard Schurz (1994). Addendum: Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie in Österreich 1971-1990. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 25 (1):177 - 178.
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  8. Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (1994). Zum Report: After Twenty Years: Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie in Österreich 1971–1990. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25 (1):177-178.
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  9. Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (1993). Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie in Österreich 1971–1990. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 24 (2):315 - 347.
    Our report and bibliography concentrate on research in the philosophy of science carried out in Austria within the last 20 years. The term 'philosophy of science' is here to be understood in the broad sense of 'Wissenschaftstheorie', that is, syntactics, semantics and pragmatics of the natural sciences and of the humanities, including law. After a general introduction to the philosophy of science scene in Austria, we report about those institutions in Austria at which relevant research has been conducted, starting with (...)
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  10. Georg J. W. Dorn (1992/93). Popper’s Laws of the Excess of the Probability of the Conditional Over the Conditional Probability. Conceptus 26:3–61.
    Karl Popper discovered in 1938 that the unconditional probability of a conditional of the form ‘If A, then B’ normally exceeds the conditional probability of B given A, provided that ‘If A, then B’ is taken to mean the same as ‘Not (A and not B)’. So it was clear (but presumably only to him at that time) that the conditional probability of B given A cannot be reduced to the unconditional probability of the material conditional ‘If A, then B’. (...)
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  11. Georg J. W. Dorn (1991). Inductive Support. In Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of his Birthday. Rodopi. 345.
    I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...)
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  12. Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.) (1991). Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of His Birthday. Rodopi.
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  13. Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (1988). Why Popper's Basic Statements Are Not Falsifiable. Some Paradoxes in Popper's “Logic of Scientific Discovery”. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 19 (1):124-143.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Basic statements play a central role in Popper's "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", since they permit a distinction between empirical and non-empirical theories. A theory is empirical iff it consists of falsifiable statements, and statements (of any kind) are falsifiable iff they are inconsistent with at least one basic statement. Popper obviously presupposes that basic statements are themselves empirical and hence falsifiable; at any rate, he claims several times that they are falsifiable. In this paper we prove that (...)
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  14. Georg J. W. Dorn (1987). Zu Bolzanos Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre. Philosophia Naturalis 24:423–441.
    Bolzano hat seine Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre in 15 Punkten im § 14 des zweiten Teils seiner Religionswissenschaft sowie in 20 Punkten im § 161 des zweiten Bandes seiner Wissenschaftslehre niedergelegt. (Ich verweise auf die Religionswissenschaft mit 'RW II', auf die Wissenschaftslehre mit 'WL II'.) In der RW II (vgl. p. 37) ist seine Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre eingebettet in seine Ausführungen "Über die Natur der historischen Erkenntniß, besonders in Hinsicht auf Wunder", und die Lehrsätze, die er dort zusammenstellt, dienen dem ausdrücklichen Zweck, mit mathematischem Rüstzeug (...)
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  15. Georg J. W. Dorn (1984). Poppers zwei Definitionsvarianten von 'falsifizierbar'. Eine logische Notiz zu einer klassischen Stelle aus der 'Logik der Forschung'. Conceptus 18:42–49.
    In paragraph 21 of his "Logic of Scientific Discovery", Karl Popper characterizes with the help of two seemingly synonymous definitions the falsifiability of a theory as a logical relation between the theory itself and its basic statements. It is shown that his definitions do not agree with each other, and this result is applied to the problem of the falsifiability of contradictions, to the difference between falsifiable and empirical statements and to the demarcation criterion.
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  16. Johannes Czermak, Georg J. W. Dorn, Peter Kaliba, Edward Nieznanski, Christine Pühringer & Christian Zwickl-Bernhard (1982). Über die ersten sechs Sätze der Monadologie. Conceptus 16 (38):89–96.
    This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first published attempt at a rigorous logical formalization of a passage in Leibniz's Monadology. The method we followed was suggested by Johannes Czermak.
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  17. Georg J. W. Dorn (1981). Die Korrektheit von Paul Weingartners Klassifikation der Wissenschaften. In Edgar Morscher, Otto Neumaier & Gerhard Zecha (eds.), Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Comes Verlag.
    Paul Weingartner's classification of the sciences is analyzed in detail. There is a small mistake in the definition of the set of descriptive-normative sciences, which makes the classification incorrect, but which can easily be remedied.
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