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Nicholas Georgalis [12]N. Georgalis [6]Nick Georgalis [1]
  1. Nicholas Georgalis (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
     
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  2. Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
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  3. N. Georgalis (2006). Representation and the First-Person Perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
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  4.  40
    Nicholas Georgalis (2007). First-Person Methodologies: A View From Outside the Phenomenological Tradition. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):93-112.
    It is argued that results from first-person methodologies are unacceptable for incorporation into a fundamental philosophical theory of the mind unless they satisfy a necessary condition, which I introduce and defend. I also describe a narrow, nonphenomenal, first-person concept that I call minimal content that satisfies this condition. Minimal content is irreducible to third-person concepts, but it is required for an adequate account of intentionality, representation, and language. Consequently, consciousness is implicated in these as strongly—but differently—than it is in our (...)
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  5.  7
    L. Bovens, T. Brauner, B. J. Copeland, C. S. Delancey, J. Dubucs, K. Fine, A. Galton, N. Georgalis, J. Gert & K. Green (2006). Kastner, RE. Synthese 150:511.
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  6.  62
    N. Georgalis (1990). No Access for the Externalist: Discussion of Heil's 'Privileged Access'. Mind 100 (393):101-8.
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  7.  77
    Nicholas Georgalis (2003). Burge's Thought Experiment: Still in Need of Defense. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.
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  8.  26
    N. Georgalis (1994). Asymmetry of Access to Intentional States. Erkenntnis 40 (2):185-211.
  9.  42
    N. Georgalis (1999). Rethinking Burge's Thought Experiment. Synthese 118 (2):145-64.
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  10.  10
    Nicholas Georgalis (1986). Intentionality and Representation. International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):45-58.
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  11.  37
    N. Georgalis (1996). Awareness, Understanding, and Functionalism. Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.
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  12.  19
    Nicholas Georgalis (1999). Ontology Downgraded All the Way. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):238–256.
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  13.  13
    Nicholas Georgalis (2007). PostScript. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):121-126.
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  14.  1
    Nicholas Georgalis, Ashwin Ram, Eric K. Jones, J. Angelo Corlett, Carol Slater, C. U. M. Smith & Dorit Bar‐On (1995). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):189-212.
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  15.  13
    Nicholas Georgalis (2000). Reference Remains Inscrutable. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):123–129.
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  16.  7
    Nicholas Georgalis (1990). Review: A Realist's Teleological View of Belief. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):85 - 88.
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  17.  9
    Nicholas Georgalis (1989). Review. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (6):745-748.
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  18. Nick Georgalis (2006). First-Person Intentionality. In The Primacy of the Subjective. MIT Press
     
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  19. Nicholas Georgalis (2014). Mind, Language and Subjectivity: Minimal Content and the Theory of Thought. Routledge.
    In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of ‘thought-tokens’ and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both ‘externalist’ accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of (...)
     
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