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Profile: George Reisch (Northwestern University)
  1. George A. Reisch (forthcoming). Chaos, History, and Narrative. History and Theory.
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  2. George A. Reisch (2007). From the “Life of the Present” to the Icy Slopes of Logic”: Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science Movement, and the Cold War. In A. Richardson & T. Uebel (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cup. 58--87.
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  3. George A. Reisch (2007). I Hate Pink Floyd," and Other Fashion Mistakes of the 1960s, 70s, and Beyond. In , Pink Floyd and Philosophy: Careful with That Axiom, Eugene! Open Court.
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  4. George A. Reisch (ed.) (2007). Pink Floyd and Philosophy: Careful with That Axiom, Eugene! Open Court.
    "Essays critically examine philosophical concepts and problems in the music and lyrics of the band Pink Floyd"--Provided by publisher.
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  5. George A. Reisch (2007). Thinking Outside the Wall : Michel Foucault on Madness, Fascism and, If You Think About It, Syd Barrett. In , Pink Floyd and Philosophy: Careful with That Axiom, Eugene! Open Court.
     
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  6. George A. Reisch (2005). How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This intriguing and ground-breaking book is the first in-depth study of the development of philosophy of science in the United States during the Cold War. It documents the political vitality of logical empiricism and Otto Neurath's Unity of Science Movement when these projects emigrated to the US in the 1930s and follows their de-politicization by a convergence of intellectual, cultural and political forces in the 1950s. Students of logical empiricism and the Vienna Circle treat these as strictly intellectual non-political projects. (...)
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  7. George A. Reisch (2001). Against a Third Dogma of Logical Empiricism: Otto Neurath and "Unpredictability in Principle". International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (2):199 – 209.
    (2001). Against a third dogma of logical empiricism: Otto Neurath and 'unpredictability in principle' International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 199-209. doi: 10.1080/02698590120059068.
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  8. George A. Reisch (1998). Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience. Philosophy of Science 65 (2):333-348.
    I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupre and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail.
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  9. George A. Reisch (1997). How Postmodern Was Neurath's Idea of Unity of Science? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):439-451.
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  10. George A. Reisch (1991). Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism? Philosophy of Science 58 (2):264-277.
    In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's (...)
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