58 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: George Bealer (Yale University)
  1. George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the A Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1-30.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. George Bealer (1989). Fine-Grained Type-Free Intensionality. In Gennero Chierchia, Barbara H. Partee & Raymond Turner (eds.), Properties, Types, and Meaning, Volume 1. Kluwer Academic Publishers 177-230.
    Commonplace syntactic constructions in natural language seem to generate ontological commitments to a dazzling array of metaphysical categories - aggregations, sets, ordered n-tuples, possible worlds, intensional entities, ideal objects, species, intensive and extensive quantities, stuffs, situations, states, courses of events, nonexistent objects, intentional and discourse objects, general objects, plural objects, variable objects, arbitrary objects, vague kinds and concepts, fuzzy sets, and so forth. But just because a syntactic construction in some natural language appears to invoke a new category of entity, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 71-125.
    The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism’s impact on modal arguments in the philosophy of mind -- for example, Yablo’s disembodiment argument and Chalmers’s zombie argument. A less (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  4. George Bealer (1982). Quality and Concept. Oxford University Press.
    This study provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). Two conceptions of PRPs have emerged in the history of philosophy. The author explores both of these traditional conceptions and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   81 citations  
  5. George Bealer (1994). Toward a New Theory of Content. In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   43 citations  
  7. George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  8.  47
    George Bealer & Uwe Monnich (2003). Property Theories. In Dov Gabbay & Frans Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume 10. Kluwer 143-248.
    Revised and reprinted; originally in Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251. -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  9. George Bealer (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  10. George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield 201-240.
    The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  11.  58
    George Bealer (1998). Intensional Entities. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge 803-7.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  13.  99
    George Bealer (1985). Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking has No Functional Definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328.
    Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   37 citations  
  14. Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.) (2010). The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press.
    Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge. The contributors include leaders in the fields of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, who respond ably to the most recent versions and defences of materialism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  16. George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  17.  42
    George Bealer (2010). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. George Bealer (1998). A Theory of Concepts and Concepts Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:261-301.
    The paper begins with an argument against eliminativism with respect to the propositional attitudes. There follows an argument that concepts are sui generis ante rem entities. A nonreductionist view of concepts and propositions is then sketched. This provides the background for a theory of concept possession, which forms the bulk of the paper. The central idea is that concept possession is to be analyzed in terms of a certain kind of pattern of reliability in one’s intuitions regarding the behavior of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  19. George Bealer (1993). Universals. Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32.
    Presented here is an argument for the existence of universals. Like Church's translation- test argument, the argument turns on considerations from intensional logic. But whereas Church's argument turns on the fine-grained informational content of intensional sentences, this argument turns on the distinctive logical features of 'that'-clauses embedded within modal contexts. And unlike Church's argument, this argument applies against truth-conditions nominalism and also against conceptualism and in re realism. So if the argument is successful, it serves as a defense of full (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  20. George Bealer (1996). On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.
    The paper elaborates upon various points and arguments in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1993), in which the author defends the autonomy of philosophy from the empirical sciences. It provides, for example, an extended defense of the modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence, including a new argument against evolutionary explanations of the reliability of intuitions. It also contains a fuller discussion of how to neutralize the threat of scientific essentialism to the autonomy of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  21. George Bealer & Uwe Mönnich (1989). Property Theories. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251.
    Revised and reprinted in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 10, Dov Gabbay and Frans Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, (2003). -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  22. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  23. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174.
    This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  24.  33
    Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (2010). Introduction. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    In this introduction, before summarizing the contents of the volume, the authors characterize materialism as it is understood within the philosophy of mind, and they identify three respects in which materialism is on the wane.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  18
    George Bealer (1995). Concept. In Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics. Basil Blackwell 89-90.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. George Bealer (2004). An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory. Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
    Direct reference theory faces serious prima facie counterexamples which must be explained away (e.g., that it is possible to know a priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus). This is done by means of various forms of pragmatic explanation. But when those explanations that provisionally succeed are generalized to deal with analogous prima facie counterexamples concerning the identity of propositions, a fatal dilemma results. Either identity must be treated as a four-place relation (contradicting what just about everyone, including direct reference theorists, takes (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  27. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  28. George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. George Bealer (2006). A Definition of Necessity. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):17–39.
    In the history of philosophy, especially its recent history, a number of definitions of necessity have been ventured. Most people, however, find these definitions either circular or subject to counterexamples. I will show that, given a broadly Fregean conception of properties, necessity does indeed have a noncircular counterexample-free definition.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. George Bealer (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):23–54.
    Suppose that, for every event, whether mental or physical, there is some physical event causally sufficient for it. Suppose, moreover, that physical reductionism in its various forms fails—that mental properties cannot be reduced to physical properties and mental events cannot be reduced to physical events. In this case, how could there be mental causation? More specifically, how could mental events cause other mental events, physical events, and intentional actions? The primary goal of this paper is to answer this question.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31. George Bealer (1989). On the Identification of Properties and Propositional Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.
    Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional functions, crucial fine-grained intensional distinctions would (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32. George Bealer (1998). Analyticity. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge 234-9.
  33. George Bealer (1998). Universals and Properties. In S. Laurence C. MacDonald (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Blackwell 131.
    This paper summarizes and extends the transmodal argument for the existence of universals (developed in full detail in "Universals"). This argument establishes not only the existence of universals, but also that they exist necessarily, thereby confirming the ante rem view against the post rem and in re views (and also anti-existentialism against existentialism). Once summarized, the argument is extended to refute the trope theory of properties and is also shown to succeed even if possibilism is assumed. A nonreductionist theory of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  13
    George Bealer (1999). A Theory of the a Priori. Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. George Bealer (2000). A Priori Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:1-12.
    This paper is a condensed version of the author’s “A Theory of the A Priori” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000) for the evidential status of intuitions, the incoherence of radical empiricism. the thesis of modal reliabilism, and the Autonomy of Philosophy Thesis (according to which the a priori disciplines are autonomous from empirical science).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. George Bealer (1979). Theories of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 76 (11):634-648.
    This is the only complete logic for properties, relations, and propositions (PRPS) that has been formulated to date. First, an intensional abstraction operation is adjoined to first-order quantifier logic, Then, a new algebraic semantic method is developed. The heuristic used is not that of possible worlds but rather that of PRPS taken at face value. Unlike the possible worlds approach to intensional logic, this approach yields a logic for intentional (psychological) matters, as well as modal matters. At the close of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  37.  74
    George Bealer (2008). Intuition and Modal Error. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    Modal intuitions are not only the primary source of modal knowledge but also the primary source of modal error. An explanation of how modal error arises — and, in particular, how erroneous modal intuitions arise — is an essential part of a comprehensive theory of knowledge and evidence. This chapter begins with a summary of certain preliminaries: the phenomenology of intuitions, their fallibility, the nature of concept-understanding and its relationship to the reliability of intuitions, and so forth. It then identifies (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. George Bealer (1978). An Inconsistency in Functionalism. Synthese 38 (July):333-372.
    This paper demonstrates that there is an inconsistency in functionalism in psychology and philosophy of mind. Analogous inconsistencies can be expected in functionalisms in biology and social theory. (edited).
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39.  8
    George Bealer (1995). Property. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press 657-658.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  34
    George Bealer (1975). Review: David Greenwood, Truth and Meaning. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):579-580.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. George Bealer (1994). Property Theory: The Type-Free Approach V. The Church Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.
    In a lengthy review article, C. Anthony Anderson criticizes the approach to property theory developed in Quality and Concept (1982). That approach is first-order, type-free, and broadly Russellian. Anderson favors Alonzo Church’s higher-order, type-theoretic, broadly Fregean approach. His worries concern the way in which the theory of intensional entities is developed. It is shown that the worries can be handled within the approach developed in the book but they remain serious obstacles for the Church approach. The discussion focuses on: (1) (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. George Bealer (1998). Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:331-338.
    This paper answers critical responses to the author’s “A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession.” The paper begins with a discussion of candidate counterexamples to the proposed analysis of concept possession -- including, e.g., a discussion of its relationship to Frank Jackson’s Mary example. Second, questions concerning the author’s general methodological approach are considered. For instance, it is shown that -- contrary to the critics’ suggestions -- an analysis of concept possession cannot invoke belief alone, but must also invoke intuition. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. George Bealer (2001). The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    In “Self-Consciousness” (Philosophical Review, 1997), the author establishes: (I) all the leading formulations of functionalism are mistaken because their proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mental properties themselves) into the contents of self-consciousness, and (II) a certain nonreductive functionalism is the only viable alternative (which no longer underwrites functionalism’s materialist solution to the Mind-Body Problem). Michael Tooley’s critique provides no criticism of (I), except for a failed attack on certain familiar self-intimation principles. Moreover, by advocating a form of nonreductive functionalism (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  95
    George Bealer (1987). The Boundary Between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Journal of Philosophy 84 (10):553-55.
    Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, December 28, 1987, commenting on papers by Alvin I. Goldman and Patricia Smith Churchland.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45.  5
    George Bealer (1996). Intuition. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement. Macmillan 262-264.
  46.  57
    George Bealer (1983). Completeness in the Theory of Properties, Relations, and Propositions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):415-426.
    Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. It turns out that the first-order theory of PRPs that results when first-order logic is supplemented with a generalized intensional abstraction operation is complete. The construction involves the development of an intensional algebraic semantic method that does not appeal to possible worlds, but rather takes PRPs as primitive entities. This allows for a satisfactory treatment of both the modalities and the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47.  69
    George Bealer (1981). Foundations Without Sets. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (4):347 - 353.
    The dominant school of logic, semantics, and the foundation of mathematics construct its theories within the framework of set theory. There are three strategies by means of which a member of this school might attempt to justify his ontology of sets. One strategy is to show that sets are already included in the naturalistic part of our everyday ontology. If they are, then one may assume that whatever justifies the everyday ontology justifies the ontology of sets. Another strategy is to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  70
    George Bealer (2000). Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh. Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author’s paper “Self-consciousness.” (This argument is designed to refute the extant versions of functionalism -- American functionalism, Australian functionalism, and language-of-thought functionalism.) After this summary is given, two thesis are defended. The first is that the Self-consciousness Argument is not guilty of a Fregean equivocation regarding embedded occurrences of mental predicates, as has been suggested by many commentators, including Mark McCullagh. The second thesis is that the (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. George Bealer (1999). The a Priori. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell 2004.
    In the history of epistemology, discussions of the a priori have been bound up with discussions of necessity and analyticity, often in confusing ways. Disentangling these confusions is an essential step in the study of the a priori. This will be the aim of my introductory remarks. The goal of the remainder of the paper will then be to try to develop a unified account of the a priori, dealing with the notions of intuition and a priori evidence, the question (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50.  47
    George Bealer (1986). The Logical Status of Mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):231-74.
    It is argued that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is at bottom logical. The paper begins by sketching and defending a theory of intensional logic in which the notion of logically and metaphysically basic relations (called connections) can be defined. This notion is then employed in an analysis of intentionality: a connection is intentional iff it can contingently connect some individual to some proposition or concept independently of whether it connects the individual to some necessarily equivalent proposition (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 58