Metacognitive attitudes can affect behavior but do they do so, as Koriat claims, because they enhance voluntary control? This Commentary makes a case for saying that metacognitive consciousness may enhance not control but subjective predictability and may be best studied by examining not just healthy, well-integrated cognizers, but victims of multilevel mental disorders.
Perceptual entitlement and basic beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9603-3 Authors Peter J. Graham, University of California, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
In this second edition, GeorgeGraham maintains the strengths, structure, and overall features of the first, but expands its scope, deepens the detail, and ...
Are we entitled or justified in taking the word of others at face value? An affirmative answer to this question is associated with the views of Thomas Reid. Recently, C. A. J. Coady has defended a Reidian view in his impressive and influential book, Testimony: A Philosophical Study. His central and most original argument for his positions involves reflection upon the practice of giving and accepting reports, of making assertions and relying on the word of others. His argument purports to (...) show that testimony is, by its very nature, a "reliable form of evidence about the way the world is." The argument moves from what we do to why we are justified in doing it. Although I am sympathetic with both the Reidian view and Coady's attempt to connect why we rely on others with why we are entitled to rely on others, I find Coady's argument ineffective. (shrink)
This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...) its regnant ontology (materialism/physicalism), offered its initial logical techniques (e.g. appeals to the concepts of identity and event) as well as empirical reliances (on neuroscience), and, finally, offered its most seminal sectarian doctrine (central state materialism). No history of philosophy of mind can afford to neglect them. (See for discussion Macdonald 1989.) It is to be near both the letter of Smart's paper and the spirit of his and Place's concern for how best to develop a philosophical understanding of consciousness that we entitle our own paper 'Sensations and grain processes'. (That is not a typo, as will be seen momentarily.)            In the years since Smart's and Place's contributions, the landscape of philosophy of mind has changed in many ways. The empirical reliances of very recent philosophy of mind have expanded to include the cognitive sciences (not just neuroscience); central state materialism alternately has been displaced by causal role and functional specification theories of mind; fresh logical techniques have been introduced (e.g. the concept of supervenience); and it is less clear than it was in the 1950's whether materialism is to be preferred to some more ecumenical ontology (such as naturalism).            This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness, for purposes of the paper; of which more momentarily); not so much the case for materialism (which we take to be, for the most part, complicated by considerations which we shall adduce below) as what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the conscious mind is and where it can, and most importantly can't, rely on cognitive science. There is quite a lot of ground to cover in a short space. So let's begin by demarcating the subject matter and outlining the paper to follow.. (shrink)
This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...) its regnant ontology (materialism/physicalism), offered its initial logical techniques (e.g. appeals to the concepts of identity and event) as well as empirical reliances (on neuroscience), and, finally, offered its most seminal sectarian doctrine (central state materialism). No history of philosophy of mind can afford to neglect them. (See for discussion Macdonald 1989.) It is to be near both the letter of Smart's paper and the spirit of his and Place's concern for how best to develop a philosophical understanding of consciousness that we entitle our own paper 'Sensations and grain processes'. (That is not a typo, as will be seen momentarily.)            In the years since Smart's and Place's contributions, the landscape of philosophy of mind has changed in many ways. The empirical reliances of very recent philosophy of mind have expanded to include the cognitive sciences (not just neuroscience); central state materialism alternately has been displaced by causal role and functional specification theories of mind; fresh logical techniques have been introduced (e.g. the concept of supervenience); and it is less clear than it was in the 1950's whether materialism is to be preferred to some more ecumenical ontology (such as naturalism).            This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness, for purposes of the paper; of which more momentarily); not so much the case for materialism (which we take to be, for the most part, complicated by considerations which we shall adduce below) as what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the conscious mind is and where it can, and most importantly can't, rely on cognitive science. There is quite a lot of ground to cover in a short space. So let's begin by demarcating the subject matter and outlining the paper to follow.. (shrink)
The Re-enchantment of the World is a philosophical exploration of the role of art and religion as sources of meaning in an increasingly material world dominated by science. Gordon Graham takes as his starting point Max Weber's idea that contemporary Western culture is marked by a 'disenchantment of the world' -- the loss of spiritual value in the wake of religion's decline and the triumph of the physical and biological sciences. Relating themes in Hegel, Nietzsche, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, and Gadamer (...) to topics in contemporary philosophy of the arts, Graham explores the idea that art, now freed from its previous service to religion, has the potential to re-enchant the world. In so doing, he develops an argument that draws on the strengths of both 'analytical' and 'continental' traditions of philosophical reflection. -/- The opening chapter examines ways in which human lives can be made meaningful as a background to the debates surrounding secularization and secularism. Subsequent chapters are devoted to painting, literature, music, architecture, and festival with special attention given to Surrealism, 19th-century fiction, James Joyce, the music of J. S. Bach and the operas of Wagner. Graham concludes that that only religion properly so called can 'enchant the world', and that modern art's ambition to do so fails. (shrink)
Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...) carry the day' (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is 'out of step with a very common view on the .. (shrink)
Current professional and lay lore overlook the role of honesty in developing and sustaining intimate relationships. We wish to assert its importance. We begin by analyzing the notion of intimacy. An intimate encounter or exchange, we argue, is one in which one verbally or non-verbally privately reveals something about oneself, and does so in a sensitive, trusting way. An intimate relationship is one marked by regular intimate encounters or exchanges. Then, we consider two sorts of cases where it is widely (...) thought permissible, if not laudatory, to lie to one's intimates. In discrediting these presumably central cases of justified dishonesty, we put forward general considerations requiring honesty. We end by suggesting how 'meta honesty'--honesty about one's own efforts at communication, including one's efforts to be honest--is Particularly important in intimate relationships. (shrink)
Conceiving mental disorder -- Disorder of mental disorder -- On being skeptical about mental disorder -- Seeking norms for mental disorder -- An original position -- Addiction and responsibility for self -- Reality lost and found -- Minding the missing me.
Too little attention has been paid by philosophers to the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of emotional disturbances such as depression, grief, and anxiety and to the possibility of justification or warrant for such conditions. The chief aim of the present paper is to help to remedy that deficiency with respect to depression. Taxonomy of depression reveals two distinct forms: depression (1) with intentionality and (2) without intentionality. Depression with intentionality can be justified or unjustified, warranted or unwarranted. I argue that (...) the effort of Aaron Beck to show that depressive reasoning is necessarily illogical and distorted is flawed. I identify an essential characteristic of that depression which is a mental illness. Finally, I describe the potential of depression to provide credal contact with important truths. (shrink)
This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple (...) personalities. (shrink)
Are delusions best understood as a species of belief? Can I be deluded that p without believing that p? Because delusion is a clinical symptom, there are conflicting data at every turn. Perhaps it is best to think of delusions as beliefs not because they necessarily are beliefs, but because doing so helps patients. If one thinks that “denying that delusions are beliefs” means denying deluded patients “a voice in their own treatment” and that this would cut them off from (...) alternative and healthier ways of thinking of themselves or the world, then one may wish to classify delusions as beliefs (see Kinderman and Bentall 2007, 288). I do not wish to classify delusions as beliefs (and I doubt .. (shrink)
Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might always choose to lie or otherwise (...) deliberately mislead. It is argued that the force of this derives (in part) from Libertarianism about agency, and that Libertarianism, if it undermines the Anti-Reductionist explanation of why we are entitled to rely upon testimony, undermines the Reductionist explanation as.. (shrink)
Much has been written on Michel Foucault's reluctance to clearly delineate a research method, particularly with respect to genealogy (Harwood, 2000; Meadmore, Hatcher & McWilliam, 2000; Tamboukou, 1999). Foucault (1994, p. 288) himself disliked prescription stating, ‘I take care not to dictate how things should be’ and wrote provocatively to disrupt equilibrium and certainty, so that ‘all those who speak for others or to others’ no longer know what to do. It is doubtful, however, that Foucault ever intended for researchers (...) to be stricken by that malaise to the point of being unwilling to make an intellectual commitment to methodological possibilities. Taking criticism of ‘Foucauldian’ discourse analysis as a convenient point of departure to discuss the objectives of poststructural analyses of language, this paper develops what might be called a discursive analytic; a methodological plan to approach the analysis of discourses through the location of statements that function with constitutive effects. (shrink)
What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival and reproduction.
The standard taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification generates four positions from the Foundationalism v. Coherentism and Internalism v. Externalism disputes. I develop a new taxonomy driven by two other distinctions: Fundamentalism v. Non-Fundamentalism and Actual-Result v. Proper-Aim conceptions of epistemic justification. Actual-Result theorists hold that a belief is justified only if, as an actual matter of fact, it is held or formed in a way that makes it more likely than not to be true. Proper-Aim theorists hold that a (...) belief is justified only if it is held or formed in a way that it proper or correct insofar as truth is the aim or norm. Fundamentalists hold that which particular ways of holding or forming beliefs that confer justification is knowable a priori; epistemic principles are a priori necessary truths. Non- Fundamentalists disagree; epistemic principles are empirical contingent truths. The new taxonomy generates four positions: Cartesianism, Reliabilism, Intuitionism, and Pragmatism. The first two are Actual-Result; the second two are Proper-Aim. The first and third are Fundamentalist, the second and fourth are Non-Fundamentalist. The new taxonomy illuminates much of the current debate in the theory of epistemic justification. (shrink)
Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and memory, preserve knowledge. An example from Jennifer Lackey B the Schoolteacher case B purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey's case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey's example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case (...) refutes it. The theoretical explanation of knowledge from testimony as information transmission explains how testimony transfers knowledge and why it can generate knowledge. It also reveals the real difference between so-called generative"" and so-called ""preservative"" sources. The former extract information. (shrink)
Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show (...) that all of the rival theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes (or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism. (shrink)
I hold that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Evolution by natural selection is the central source of etiological functions. This leads many to think that on my view warrant requires a history of natural selection. What then about learning? What then about Swampman? Though functions require history, natural selection is not the only source. Self-repair and trial-and-error learning are both sources. Warrant requires (...) history, but not necessarily that much. (shrink)
Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one’s current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.1..
Millianism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a name is its bearer. In a recent paper Bryan Frances seeks to undercut the traditional argument against Millianism as well as offer a new argument in favor of Millianism. I argue that both endeavors fail.
Folk psychology is the psychology deployed by ordinary folk and by scientists in ordinary life. At its most basic level, it consists of deploying the concept of mind to explain and predict behavior. This article (i) considers how folk psychology may have begun, by considering an imaginary race of primitive folk deploying the rudimentary nucleus of the psychology, or a rudimentary concept of mind, and (ii) examines one argument for the evolutionary emergence and adaptivity of folk psychology. The crucial issue (...) emerging from this is how primitive folk could have competently deployed the concept or the psychology in such a way as to survive and proliferate in consequence of successfully predicting behavior. Dennett and others are on the right track when they regard folk psychology as adaptive. But care and caution are needed in resolving the issue of competent deployment. (shrink)
It is generally accepted that the notion of inclusion derived or evolved from the practices of mainstreaming or integrating students with disabilities into regular schools. Halting the practice of segregating children with disabilities was a progressive social movement. The value of this achievement is not in dispute. However, our charter as scholars and cultural vigilantes (Slee & Allan, 2001) is to always look for how we can improve things; to avoid stasis and complacency we must continue to ask, how can (...) we do it better? Thus, we must ask ourselves uncomfortable questions and develop a critical perspective that Foucault characterised as an 'ethic of discomfort' (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xxvi) by following the Nietzschean principle where one acts 'counter to our time and thereby on our time ... for the benefit of a time to come' (Nietzsche, 1874, p. 60 in Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xxvi). This paper begins with a fundamental question for those participating in inclusive education research and scholarship—when we talk of including, into what do we seek to include? (shrink)
Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among (...) philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and elimin-ativism. (shrink)
Anti-Reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehending (both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. Comprehension as such, like perceptual representation, confers non-inferential justification on belief. Reductionists, on the other hand, reject this. Comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief. Beliefs based on comprehension are justified only if inferentially supported by other things the subject believes. I discuss an argument from Elizabeth Fricker from her ‘Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?’ She (...) argues that even if the Anti-Reductionist is right in principle, the presence of background inferential support undercuts the significance of the Anti-Reductionist view; for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role; it is superseded by inferential warrant. I show her argument is importantly question begging. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to overdetermine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs. (shrink)
Schizophrenia arguably is the most troubling, puzzling, and complex mental illness. No single discipline is equipped to understand it. Though schizophrenia has been investigated predominately from psychological, psychiatric and neurobiological perspectives, few attempts have been made to apply the tool kit of philosophy to schizophrenia, the mix of global analysis, conceptual insight, and argumentative clarity that is indicative of a philosophical perspective. This book is a major effort at redressing that imbalance. Recent developments in the area of philosophy known as (...) the philosophy of psychiatry have made it clear that it is time for philosophy to contribute to our understanding of schizophrenia. The range of contributions is many and varied. Some contributors are professional philosophers; some not. Some contributions focus on matters of method and history. Others argue for dramatic reforms in our understanding of schizophrenia or its symptoms. The authors in this book are committed to the idea that philosophy can indeed help to understand schizophrenia in a way which is different from but complements traditional medical-clinical approaches. -/- The book should appeal to every reader who wants to better understand a major mental illness, including its distinctive character, conscious content, and sources of puzzlement. Readers will find the essays gathered here afford stimulating insights into the human mind and its conditions of vulnerability. (shrink)
Current profess ional and la y lore ove rlook the ro le of hone sty in develop ing and s ustaining intimate relationships. We w ish to ass ert its importa nce. W e begin b y analyz ing the no tion of intimac y. An intim ate encounter or exchange, we argue, is one in which one verbally or non-verbally privately reveals something about oneself, and does so in a sensitive, trusting way. An intimate relationship is one marked by (...) regular intimate encounters or excha nges. Then, we co nsider two sorts of cases wh ere it is widely thought permissible, if not lauda tory, to lie to one 's intimates . In discrediting these presumably central cases of justified dishonesty, we put forward general considerations requiring hones ty. We e nd by s ugges ting how 'meta honesty'--hone sty about one's own efforts at communication, including one's efforts to be honest--is particularly important in intimate relationships. (shrink)
Gabor Forrai has written a very clear and articulate defense of internal realism, the view that the categories and structures of the world are a function of our conceptual schemes. Internal realism is opposed to metaphysical realism, the view that the world’s structure is wholly independent, both causally and ontologically, of the human mind. For the metaphysical realist, the world is one thing and the mind is another. For the internal realist, on the other hand, though the world is causally (...) independent of the human mind, the structure of the world – the individuals, kinds and categories of the world -- is a function of the human mind. (shrink)
In his 2007 PESA keynote address, Paul Smeyers discussed the increasing regulation of child-rearing through government intervention and the generation of 'experts', citing particular examples from Europe where cases of childhood obesity and parental neglect have stirred public opinion and political debate. In his paper ('Child-Rearing: On government intervention and the discourse of experts', this issue), Smeyers touches on a number of tensions before concluding that child-rearing qualifies as a practice in which liberal governments should be reluctant to intervene. In (...) response, I draw on recent experiences in Australia and argue that certain tragic events of late are the result of an ethical, moral and social vacuum in which these tensions coalesce. While I agree with Smeyers that governments should be reluctant to 'intervene' in the private domain of the family, I argue that there is a difference between intervention and support. In concluding, I maintain that if certain Western liberal democracies did a more comprehensive job of supporting children and their families through active social investment in primary school education, then schools would be better equipped to deal with the challenges they now face. (shrink)
