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Profile: Georges Rey (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. Georges Rey (1983). Concepts and Stereotypes. Cognition 15 (1-3):237-62.
  2.  10
    Georges Rey (1985). Concepts and Conceptions: A Reply to Smith, Medin and Rips. Cognition 19 (3):297-303.
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  3.  13
    Georges Rey (1983). A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness. In Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum 1--39.
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  4. Paul M. Pietroski & Georges Rey (1995). When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
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  5. Georges Rey (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Blackwell.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
     
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  6. Georges Rey (1986). What's Really Going on in Searle's 'Chinese Room'. Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
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  7.  61
    Georges Rey (1992). Sensational Sentences Switched. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  8.  14
    Georges Rey (2011). The Unavailability of What We Mean. Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  9. Steven Gross & Georges Rey (forthcoming). Innateness. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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  10.  44
    Georges Rey (1998). A Naturalistic A Priori. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):25 - 43.
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  11.  8
    Georges Rey (1988). Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press 264--296.
  12.  67
    Georges Rey (1998). A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):435-58.
  13.  16
    Georges Rey (2008). In Defense of Folieism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):177-202.
    According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...)
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  14. Georges Rey (1980). Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining Emotions. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. University of California Press
     
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  15.  24
    Carsten Hansen & Georges Rey (2016). Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):421-436.
    We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” (...)
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  16.  70
    Georges Rey (2007). Phenomenal Content and the Richness and Determinacy of Colour Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):112-131.
  17. Georges Rey (2007). Resisting Normativism in Psychology. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
    “Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...)
     
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  18.  15
    Georges Rey (2010). Concepts Versus Conceptions (Again). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):221-222.
    Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.
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  19.  14
    Georges Rey (2008). (Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:51-78.
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  20. Georges Rey (2001). Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press
     
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  21.  36
    Georges Rey (2006). Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569.
    Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...)
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  22.  32
    Georges Rey (2000). Role, Not Content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.
  23.  25
    Georges Rey (2005). Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):389-415.
    The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what I call Strong (...)
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  24.  18
    Georges Rey (1995). Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh 123--42.
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  25. Georges Rey, Alex Barber, John Collins, Michael Devitt & Dunja Jutronic (2008). Philosophy of Linguistics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (23).
     
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  26.  14
    Georges Rey (1993). The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore. In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi 61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  27. Georges Rey (2003). Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press 140--186.
     
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  28.  30
    Georges Rey (1992). Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:315-33.
    Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems.
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  29.  9
    Georges Rey (2003). Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTT. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing 105--139.
  30.  44
    Georges Rey (1995). A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for the Language of Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.
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  31.  1
    Georges Rey (1990). Constituent Causation and the Reality of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
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  32.  1
    Georges Rey (1993). Why Presume Analyses Are on-Line? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74.
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  33. Georges Rey (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
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  34.  27
    Georges Rey (2004). The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):227-258.
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  35. Georges Rey (2012). Externalism and Inexistence in Early Content. In R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter
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  36. Michael Devitt & Georges Rey (1991). Transcending Transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):87-100.
  37. Georges Rey (2003). Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press 201--225.
     
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  38.  3
    Georges Rey (1991). An Explanatory Budget for Connectionism and Eliminativism. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer 219--240.
  39. Georges Rey (2006). The Intentional Inexistence of Language—but Not Cars. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing 237--55.
  40.  26
    Georges Rey (2009). Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
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  41.  37
    Georges Rey (2001). Digging Deeper for the a Priori. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):649–656.
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  42.  2
    Georges Rey (1980). The Formal and the Opaque. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):90.
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  43.  43
    Georges Rey (1998). What Implicit Conceptions Are Unlikely to Do. Philosophical Issues 9:93-104.
  44.  7
    Georges Rey (1991). Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.
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  45. Georges Rey (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
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  46. Georges Rey (1993). Sensational Sentences. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell
     
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  47.  9
    Georges Rey (2013). We Are Not All ‘Self‐Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism. Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.
    Shoemaker presented a priori arguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik and Carruthers have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about the attitudes of (...)
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  48.  21
    Georges Rey (1995). Dennett's Unrealistic Psychology. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):259-89.
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  49.  40
    Georges Rey (2004). Fodor's Ingratitude and Change of Heart? Mind and Language 19 (1):70-84.
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  50.  16
    Georges Rey (1996). Resisting Primitive Compulsions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):419-424.
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