86 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Georges Rey (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. Georges Rey, Empty Representations in Linguistic Perception.
    I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating considerations raised by many linguists, I (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Steven Gross & Georges Rey (forthcoming). Innateness. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Georges Rey (forthcoming). Les Phrases sensationnelLes. Les Études Philosophiques.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Georges Rey (2014). Innate and Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and Analogies (Yet Again). Mind and Language 29 (2):109-132.
    In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Georges Rey (2013). L4 The Possibility of a Naturalistic Cartesianism Regarding Intuitions and Introspection. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 243.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Georges Rey (2012). Externalism and Inexistence in Early Content. In R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Georges Rey (2012). The Turing Thesis Vs. The Turing Test. The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):84-89.
  8. Georges Rey (2011). The Unavailability of What We Mean. Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Georges Rey (2010). Concepts Versus Conceptions (Again). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):221-222.
    Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Georges Rey (2009). Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Michael Tetzlafir & Georges Rey (2009). Systematicity and Intentional Realism in Honeybee Navigation. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 72.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Georges Rey (2008). Demonstrating What You See? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (9):325-326.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Georges Rey (2008). (Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:51-78.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Georges Rey (2008). In Defense of Folieism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):177-202.
    According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Georges Rey, Alex Barber, John Collins, Michael Devitt & Dunja Jutronic (2008). Philosophy of Linguistics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (23).
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Georges Rey (2007). Phenomenal Content and the Richness and Determinacy of Colour Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):112-131.
  17. Georges Rey (2007). Resisting Normativism in Psychology. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    “Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Georges Rey (2006). Better to Study Human Than World Psychology - Commentary on Galen Strawson's Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):110-116.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Georges Rey (2006). Better to Study Human Than World Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):110-116.
    Commentary on Galen Strawson's 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism'.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Georges Rey (2006). Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569.
    Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Georges Rey (2006). The Intentional Inexistence of Language—but Not Cars. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 237--55.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Georges Rey (2005). Explanation, Not Experience: Commentary on John Campbell,Reference and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (1):131 - 143.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Georges Rey (2005). Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):389-415.
    The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what I call Strong (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Georges Rey (2005). Replies to Critics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):465-480.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Georges Rey (2004). A Deflated Intentionalist Alternative to Clark's Unexplanatory Metaphysics. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540.
    Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Georges Rey (2004). Fodor's Ingratitude and Change of Heart? Mind and Language 19 (1):70-84.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Georges Rey (2004). Millikan's Compromised Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 2--347.
  28. Georges Rey (2004). The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):227-258.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Georges Rey (2003). Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTT. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 105--139.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Georges Rey (2003). Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. 140--186.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Georges Rey (2003). Language of Thought. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Georges Rey (2003). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Georges Rey (2003). Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 201--225.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Georges Rey (2003). The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Georges Rey (2003). Why Wittgenstein Ought to Have Been a Computationalist (and What a Computationalist Can Gain From Wittgenstein). Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):231-264.
    Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process stands in need of outward criteria” (PI:§580), (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Georges Rey (2002). Problems with Dreyfus' Dialectic. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):403-408.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Georges Rey (2001). Digging Deeper for the a Priori. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):649–656.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Georges Rey (2001). Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Georges Rey (2001). Review: Digging Deeper for the A Priori. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):649 - 656.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Georges Rey (2000). Role, Not Content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.
  41. Georges Rey (1998). A Naturalistic A Priori. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):25 - 43.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Georges Rey (1998). A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):435-58.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Georges Rey (1998). What Implicit Conceptions Are Unlikely to Do. Philosophical Issues 9:93-104.
  44. Georges Rey (1997). Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Blackwell.
  45. Georges Rey (1997). Language, Music and Mind. Philosophical Review 106 (4):641-646.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Georges Rey (1996). Resisting Primitive Compulsions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):419-424.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Georges Rey (1996). Review: Resisting Primitive Compulsions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):419 - 424.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. David L. Kemmerer, Kenneth Aizawa, Donald H. Berman, Stacey L. Edgar, James E. Tomberlin, J. Christopher Maloney, John L. Bell, Stuart C. Shapiro, Georges Rey, Morton L. Schagrin, Robert A. Wilson & Patrick J. Hayes (1995). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (3):411-465.
  49. Paul M. Pietroski & Georges Rey (1995). When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Georges Rey (1995). A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for the Language of Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 86